Jessica asked me to do check whether the relationship with inequality is different for the different components of the POLS209 democracy score (democratic rights, civil liberties, and institutionalized rule). Here’s the result:
As we can see, there is a slightly stronger relationship between lower inequality and higher levels of institutionalized rule than the relationship between democratic institutions or civil liberties with inequality. (It’s still weak and dispersed, but it’s a bit stronger).
Here’s an interactive version of the same plot so you can check which dots are which country-years. (Values are jittered a bit to avoid overplotting).
Here’s a table with the various justifications offered for the classifications:
| country | First year | Last year | Civil Liberties | Democratic Political Institutions | Institutionalized Rule | justification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 2002 | 2016 | 5 | 7 | 2 | Overall, the classification of Angola s authoritarian regime has been fairly straightforward with the exception of a few uncertainties surrounding civil liberties that exist in theory, but are not executed in practice. For example, when evaluating whether there a re ‘elections held for major executive branch positions or for legislative positions’, the extended term of Angola s President José Eduardo dos Santos can be used as a working example. Despite having never been formally elected, Dos Santos has been in power in Angola for 33 years, making him Africa’s second longest-serving head of state just behind Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. There is clear evidence to suggest the country has significant barriers to creating political parties and contesting elections. At present, Dos Santos has ruled his country longer than Robert Mugabe. However, despite his clear ironclad grip over the regime, President dos Santos is the African autocrat that perhaps the world knows least about. There are minor disparities to this interpretation of Dos Santos s rule, such as Elias Isaac, country director for the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, who stated, “Mussolini and Pinochet and Stalin and Bokassa and Idi Amin were dictators. I wouldn’t classify Dos Santos as a dictator; he respects some differences and allows the existence of other political parties. However, Isaac went on explain how despite allowing alternative poltical parties, Dos Santos is clearly autocratic. He has concentrated so much power around himself. It’s so Machiavellian, the way he has played it. Up to 1992 the MPLA was so strong. He gradually weakened the party and became strong himself. He’s now stronger than the party. Similarly, while t here are no significant barriers in Angola except age Dos Santos is widely expected to remain president and is well positioned to continue to at least 2022 despite announcing he will step down in 2018, having ruled since 1979. This is not the first time Dos Santos has announced his departure from the political stage, only to backpedal at a later date. In 2001, the president promised not to stand in the next presidential elections, only for elections to be delayed until 2008, by which time Dos Santos had conveniently forgotten his earlier pronouncement. This sort of fluctuating behavior Dos Santos exhibits is underpinned by the falsehoods within regime. In other words, occasionally, certain liberties appear to be properly institutionalized but are later revealed to be nullified by deliberate clauses. As such, this example of Angola s d e facto one-party system sets the precedent for the way in which we can answer most questions about Angola s regime; by aligning Dos Santos claims with more likely probabilities. In terms of whether the stateâ s primary leader are accountable to the people or if there is an independent press with freedom of speech, there is clear evidence that that demonstrates a lack of these liberties. In fact, Dos Santos appears to have an iron grip on all aspects of government, heads the armed forces and appoints senior judges. He is never criticized by the country’s state media and has swiftly crushed dissent in the few privately owned newspapers. Although Angola’s 2010 constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and freedom of the media, the government has appeared to increasingly limit the exercise of these rights. The 2011 U.S. State Department report noted that the Angolan government is believed to engage in illegal surveillance of journalists, government opponents, and others, that journalists in the country are arrested, harassed, and charged with defamation, and that some journalists have been victims of shooting, stabbing, vandalism, and burglary. Most exercise self censorship. ;> 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’, US department of State, www.state.gov) Similarly, in terms of Civil liberties and key human rights, there are many concerns surrounding Angola s persistent violations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; mass evictions; arbitrary arrests; unlawful killings, sexual violence and torture by the security forces; and impunity for such abuses. In 2013 the UN Human Rights Committee urged Angola to end impunity and investigate killings, torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearances by the security forces, among other recommendations. The country has taken the positive step of signing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Torture and its Optional Protocol, and several other human rights conventions in September 2013 . However, whether Angola has made noticeable progress in implementing these treaties remains to be unseen. In terms of whether Angola has a cult of personality, a French sociologist and expert on Angola, Christine Messiant, has recently published an analysis of Fesa, otherwise known as the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation . She describes the foundation as the culmination of the privatization process of the Angolan state ; a mechanism to exalt the personality cult of dos Santos and reinforce his presidential powers; to boost his clientele approach to government; and to coopt civil society and marginalize non-governmental organizations who refuse to be sucked in by the Fesa whirlwind. Whether or not it is intentional, it is clear that this organization boosts Dos Santos image. The foundation set up by the Angolan president hands out food, clothes and toys to poor people; restores a colonial church, a sports stadium, markets and health clinics; gives vehicles to police, wheelchairs to amputees and generators to hospitals. It sponsors landmine, environmental and AIDS awareness programs. It has even nominated president dos Santos for the Nobel Peace prize. rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> http://www.ipsnews.net) Finally, Angola s seems to have relatively high levels of inequality. The country itself, has one of the world s fastest growing economies. Interestingly, the southern African state is rich in diamonds, which actually fuelled a 27-year civil war in the country. More recently, Angola’s economy grew by 5.1% in 2013. As major public infrastructure investments in energy and transport kick in, its growth is projected to reach 7.9% in 2014 and 8.8% in 2015. Yet, the United Nations Development Program reports that around 36% of Angolans live below the poverty line and one in every four persons is unemployed. rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> www.un.org) . |
| Australia | 2010 | 2013 | 13 | 10 | 11 | When it came to deciding the years for my period of study I decided to look at the year 2010 as this was the year the prime minster who was in power in 2011 was elected, with my final year being the year that she was removed from power by her party in 2013. For democratic political institutions, Australia scores very high with almost every single answer scoring two points. In order to answer these questions, I simply conducted a Google search and I was able to come up with a result very quickly in regards to the political institutions that Australia has, the elections including voting rights, the powers held by official positions and any controversies that have occurred. I also looked up election results and information regarding how to run for elections. These sources included BBC, Wikipedia and Australian Government information websites. However, the position of Governor-General is an unelected position and although they wield a large amount of executive power they may only wield this power in extreme circumstances and generally, they do what they are told to do by the Prime Minster. Furthermore, judges can abolish or make changes to laws when they find a problem with them or can create precedents limiting how they function. At the same time, certain groups of people in Australia are prevented from voting, namely because they are not citizens however this is not a sufficient number. I would like to add that I was a little confused over what Question 8 was asking. Maybe re-word it so it is “do unelected institutions or individuals hold more influence than elected officials? When it comes to Civil Liberties Australia again scores very high across the board. In order to find answers to these questions I again simply conducted a Google search and I quickly found the answers to my questions from reliable resources including the Australian Government, UN and current legislation. Australia does fall in a couple of areas as Australia’s treatment of the Aboriginal population in the rural communities is borderline atrocious with them receiving little to no access to health care, housing or financial assistance and members of the aboriginal population are occasionally discriminated against and there are numerous reports on this. Asylum Seekers are the subjected to indefinite detention in Australia while their claims are being processed, with numerous human rights groups including Amnesty International and the UN for their treatment of such people as there have been numerous controversies and protests over their treatment This type of treatment, however is strictly limited to Asylum Seekers and immigrants who are awaiting deportation due to them committing criminal acts. When it comes to freedom of speech people are not allowed to preach certain ideas of beliefs publicly without the threat of prosecution As before, Australia again scores very high in terms of Institutionalized Rule with people having clear official positions and rules in place which hold people to account when they have broken the law, including elitists and politicians. When it came to finding out information about these institutions I again simply conducted a Google search and I quickly found official government websites listing the positions and the powers which those positions hold. When it came to income equality it was again a simple Google search, and straight away I was met with numerous articles and reporting a widening gap in Australia’s income equality, however, it is nowhere near as bad as other states in the world. Resources https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/13/united-nations-reiterates-demand-for-australia-to-close-dire-detention-centres - Treatment of asylum seekers http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP0708/08rp05 - voting system https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Human-rights-scrutiny/PublicSectorGuidanceSheets/Pages/Fairtrialandfairhearingrights.aspx - Right to fair trial http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/chapter1/Part_V_-_Powers_of_the_Parliament - Powers of parliament http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/chapter2 - Role of the head of state http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2010/ - 2010 election result http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/rda1975202/s18c.html - freedom of speech limitations http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/6523.0Main+Features22011-12 - Income equality in 2011 https:/freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/australia - Press freedom and legal freedom https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/26/julia-gillard-australia-prime-minister-kevin-rudd - Julia Gillard ousted from power http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/federal_elections/2013/ - 2013 Australian Election result |
| Austria 2009 | 2007 | 2010 | 16 | 12 | 11 | Austria has developed one of the wealthiest economies in Europe and exercise a democratic electoral system. Although the election is fair and free, two parties, the center-left Social Democratic Party of Austria and the center-right People s Party of Austria have dominated the election since 1986. The antagonism between two parties was an issue in term of governance efficiency and daily function of the government for over two decades. Tension raised between the two parties when the SPO tried to eliminate the bill that subsidies school tuition fees in 2007. There were major students protests in Austria in 2007 to 2010. More than 40000 universities and schools students protesting about the declining condition of schools and universities, and the further cuts to the educational system just because the government fails to recover from the recession. However, the Austria government has seen the protests as a great danger to their governance. Thus they sent out police intervention including using tear gas or allowing police uses physical violence against students. The Austria government’s action did not end the protest but resulting in a significant working force strike against the horrible act of government to students and the rise of unemployment. In the 2009 election, the far-right Freedom Party gain a significant amount of vote in the election which has profoundly weaken the influence of SPO within the government. I used the following sources in the research: www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17431408 freedomhouse.org https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/11/aust-n07.html https://www.britannica.com/place/Austria For the ‘democratic institutions’ questions, these sources showed that Austria has an electoral democracy. Members of the upper house and the lower house can serve a five-year term. Austria has a voting age of 16 which lower than most of the democratic regimes. There are competitive political parties and free and fair elections, The tension between the OVP and the SPO decline due to the rise of the Freedom Party, but the minority participation in government remains problematic as there is a high number of foreigners living in Austria. For the ‘civil liberties’ questions, these sources showed that Austria had a positive rating in Freedom House from rank 35 in 2007 to rank 32 in 2010. Firstly, there are privately owned media but they are concentrated in elite’s hand, and the state monopolises the state broadcaster. There are no restrictions on Internet access. Secondly, there are some bans on speech with Nazi-related areas in Austria. Thirdly, religious freedom in Austria is constitutionally guaranteed. Fourthly, f reedom of assembly is protected by the constitution; it was ‘illegal’ for the SPO government to intervene the student protests at the time. For the ‘institutionalised rule’ questions, these sources showed that Austria has an independent judiciary department. The institution guaranteed that the r esidents are afforded equal protection under the law expect some minorities and foreigners. The institution also guarantees women s freedom from discrimination in various areas and allows women s employment in government agencies, where they were underrepresented. |
| Benin | 1999 | 2006 | 10 | 10 | 11 | Democratic Political Institutions: In regard to the surrounding countries, Benin is one of the most democratic and most free in that area of Africa. In 1991, they government led by Merekou held its first multi-party election, and by 2006, there was upwards of 100 political parties that could take place in the general elections for the seats in the legislature. The elections for the executive branch are a little less open. Parties must reach a particular threshold in order to offer a candidate for the presidential election. While this is not dissimilar to the threshold system that we have in New Zealand for MMP, the fact that they are not allowed to even run without a show of popularity, is not sufficient for a 2 mark in this question. Turnout is usually very high in the Benin elections. Everyone who is over the age of __ is allowed to vote so long as they are enrolled. I was unable to find whether there was anything that hampered the enrolment process, but based on the figures of turnout and overall population, it does not seem that it is an issue. The legislature is a mixed breed of ideology in Benin. Officials in government and outside can freely criticise each other and it is protected by the country s constitution. This is not always enforced, but it is to a sufficient level. Civil Liberties: The majority religion of Voodoo in Benin, has found some conflicts with the other two big players, Muslim and Catholicism. The government does not discriminate between the religions, and conflicts are generally regional and not government related. Freedoms are given in the constitution of Benin to ensure that there is no discrimination based on belief, but this is also not followed all the time. It is in the constitution that Benin is a secular state and it seems that this is followed well. Female genital mutilation remains legal in the country. It can be forced upon someone, and violence towards women and girls is still a prevailing issue. The courts system in Benin is not perfect but it does show promise and should be commended. There are very few unlawful detentions of prisoners, and prisoner are given the right to a fair trial with an advocate. The courts have been criticised though for allowing excessive or extreme punishments for certain crimes. The press is Benin during the period of 1999-2006 was very free and were restricted very little. There are still harsh libel laws on the books that can affect journalists who criticise the government, but these are very rarely used. The government has little hold over the media, and information is freely given to the citizens. Institutionalised Rule: The constitution of Benin is very similar to European style constitutions. The government follows the rules given to it and there are little instances of corruption in the state. New laws were even introduced, given severe penalties to government officials who breach these corruption laws. As the country was classified as a democracy during 1999-2006, and still is, these questions are all answered with the highest score. All sources pointed towards positive results in these categories and I could not find any material to criticise the government of Benin in this regard. SOURCES https://knoema.com/atlas/Benin/Civil-liberties-index https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=Mz57SSzuYecC&pg=RA1-PA88&lpg=RA1-PA88&dq=civil+liberties+benin&source=bl&ots=aHEmjFmHP-&sig=oC-Ezc448LgyJDrYxzdMEcRhVRM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwig6fnS0vXTAhXMmJQKHbAwBNgQ6AEIPzAG#v=onepage&q=civil%20liberties%20benin&f=fals e https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/benin https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186377.pd f https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238396.pdf http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13040368 http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.asp x http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.aspx |
| Bhutan | 2006 | 2013 | 12 | 10 | 11 | Bhutan 2006-2013 A Very Brief Political History The royal family ruled over Bhutan until 2008, when the first democratic election was held for the National Assembly. Bhutan s political system transformed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional democracy. In September of 2006 King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, abdicated the throne to his son Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. The former monarch had been expected to stay in power until 2008. The new King wished to bestow the gift of democracy upon his people. Preparations were made to ensure a smooth election process; a mock election was held in April 2007 to familiarise voters with the concept. The first elections were held in 2008, the pro-monarchy party won 44/47 seats and the remainder went to another pro-monarchy party. The elections were free and fair. Within the reporting period, a second election took place in July of 2013. The winning party; the People s Democratic Party won seventeen more seats than Druk Phuensum Tshogpa Party. Between 2006 and 2013, Bhutan s political system transformed into a functioning democracy, this is the reason the study period has been chosen. Democratic Institutions Elections are held for both the executive and legislature within the parliamentary democracy of Bhutan. The election for the National Assembly in 2008 resulted in a 79% voter turn-out. Voter eligibility is universal at the age of 18. It is for this reason, I have answered the questions regarding elections in a positive light, as Bhutan s new democracy appears to be functioning well through this period. Unelected officials in Bhutan have limited power upon the exercise of government, namely the King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. The King gifted the people of Bhutan with democracy, resigning from his position as head of state in July 2007, to make way for the election process and a new Prime Minister. The Kings role was increasingly symbolic. However, it must be questioned how much influence the King has, during this period Bhutan was a very new democracy and as such was fragile. It is for this reason I have answered the question about unelected officials in the way I have. To run for a position in Government, there are mandatory conditions one must fulfil before they can run. The individual must have a University degree and resign from a political service job if it is held. Once someone has resigned from the public service, they cannot resume employment. Buddhist and Hindu clergy cannot run for office, to ensure the separation of religion and political officials. Civil Liberties Bhutan s state and church are separated, the country had laws in place to ensure the separation of state and church. An example of this being the Hindu and Buddhist clergy legally not having the right to participate in elections. Mahayana Buddhism is the states spiritual heritage. Hinduism is also recognised within legislation. However, the state allows only these religions to practice openly in places of worship. The courts sentenced a man to three years prison for screening Christian films. In 2011 added to this list was debated, with meetings between the state and prominent Christian figures. Therefore, I have answered the questions regarding the separation of the state and church and legal discrimination of religious minorities, in the manner above. Bhutan s legal system is civil law based on Buddhist law. The Constitution of Bhutan guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and the right to a fair trial. Provisions also detail the prohibition of cruel punishment and discrimination on the grounds of sex, race and religion. Conversely, there are no separate prisons allocated for women and children in Bhutan and upon searching, many articles can be found regarding infinite incarceration. It is due to this inference I answered the questions regarding cruel punishment and the right to a fair trial, in the way I have. Regarding women s rights, there are no notable legislative discriminatory provisions to speak of. Bhutan signed the CEDAW treaty on the 17 th July 1980 and ratified 31 st August 1981. This guarantees the upholding of international standards on women s rights, through domestic legislation. The press is not able to support political parties, many do not report upon the subject. There are no media law protections for independent press or guarantees for the freedom of information. Institutionalised Rule The 2008 Constitution of Bhutan, conferred power to a parliamentary system of democracy. The document also structures the way in which the three branches of government relate. The state exercises a constitutionally given ability. The Constitution was sent for review by the public via referendum in 2005, in line with democratic principles. This document ensures that the state is accountable to the public, through the constitutional protection of elections. Every four years Bhutan s public can participate in a decision regarding the success of government parties. The process of passing legislation within Bhutan is an accountable one. Much like here in New Zealand, the bill must pass through three readings and is passed by majority vote. The King assents the legislation in Bhutan. Amendments must be proposed as a motion by majority vote, in a joint session of parliament. The same parliament can pass the legislation by a three-quarter majority vote and the royal assent of the King. It is for this reason I have rated the question about the legislative process in Bhutan as a 2. All the state s leaders are in official positions in Bhutan, as prescribed within the constitution. There is no cult of personality, that I could find evidence of. Bibliography Arora, V. Is Bhutan s Media Freedom Really Slipping? Retrieved from; http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/is-bhutans-media-freedom-really-slipping/ Bhutan Tourism Corporation Ltd. Kingdom of Bhutan. Retrieved from; South Asia: Bhutan. Retrieved from; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bt.html Central Intelligence Agency, Bhutan. Retrieved from; https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160057.pdf Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook: Suffrage. Retrieved from; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2123.html Church and State Journal Bhutan Bans Religious Activities ahead of Elections. Retrieved from; https://www.au.org/church-state/december-2012-church-state/au-bulletin/bhutan-bans-religious-activities-ahead-of Encyclopaedia Britannica Bhutan. Retrieved from; https://www.britannica.com/place/Bhutan/Government-and-society EU Business School Religious Beliefs and Spirituality in Bhutan. Retrieved from; http://www.studycountry.com/guide/BT-religion.htm Lawson, A. BBC Profile: Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wanchuck. Retrieved from; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15287281 Michigan State University Global Edge Bhutan: Government. Retrieved from; https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/bhutan/government National Council of Bhutan the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan. Retrieved from; http://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/files/Constitution%20%20of%20Bhutan%20English.pdf PLD CEDAW South Asia Ratification Status. Retrieved from; http://cedawsouthasia.org/regional-overview/ratification-status-in-south-asia United States Bureau of Democracy Bhutan 2015 Human Rights Report. Retrieved from; https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253173.pdf USAID Kingdom of Bhutan. Retrieved from; http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/424/ World Prison Brief World Prison Brief Data: Bhutan. Retrieved from; http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/bhutan |
| Bhutan | 2008 | 2013 | 5 | 8 | 8 | Section one, Democratic Political Institutions: Bhutan is a country in the process of democratic reforms and intentional regime change. Bhutan was a Monarchy and began democratic reforms in 1998, the first democratic elections were held in December 2007, January and March 2008 and seen the Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party win by large majority. In July 2008 Bhutan enacted its constitution. The constitution is a step towards democracy but not completely. The constitution provides for the continuance and protection of the King’s position. Under the constitution, the King still holds some power and influence over the political system. For instance, the king may object or recommend amendments to any piece of legislation. He appoints 5 of the 25 members of the upper house, while the other 20 are elected and the entire 47 seat lower house is elected. There are laws that restrict criticism of the King and the political system. The ethnic Nepalese also face discrimination and oppression, the majority of ethnic Nepalese were forcefully evicted fro the country in the 1990’s, since then many have been given refugee status and relocated to other countries including the US, but many remain as stateless refugees on the outskirts of the countries southern borders and are denied citizenship or allowed to return to Bhutan. Sources: Freedom House provides detailed reports for Bhutan during the research period of 2008-2013. accessed from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/bhutan Bhutan constitution. accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bhutan_2008.pdf KingdomofBhutan.com, website, offers historical and governmental information. accessed from: http://kingdomofbhutan.com/kingdom/kingdom_3_.html Section two, Civil Liberties: As mentioned above the Ethnic Nepalese are subject to discrimination in Bhutan with many forcefully ejected from their homes and the country in the 1990’s. The land and homes they had occupied were redistributed to others by the government. While the constitution makes provisions for religious freedoms there remains some discrimination and harassment by government institutions towards Hindu and Christian minorities while the Mahayana Bhudists receive subsidies and support from the state. There are laws that ban religious leaders from participating in the political process, however, Freedom House reports that these laws were flouted by some monks in regional elections. Homosexuality is illegal in Bhutan. There does exist some corruption of the judicial system in Bhutan and during the research, period steps were taken by the government to implement an anti-corruption committee that has had some success but it is a work in progress. Some citizens are still exposed to arbitrary detention and there are political prisoners in Bhutan. There are some restrictions on people’s right to assembly, and association. While independent press does exist they are still subject to laws that prevent criticism of the King and the political system, access to unrestricted foriegn cable TV is available but deliberately hampered by the government. Sources: Freedom House provides detailed reports for Bhutan during the research period of 2008-2013. accessed from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/bhutan Bhutan constitution. accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bhutan_2008.pdf Section 3, Institutional Rule: For the most part the states institutions are in control and the legislative and executive branch are accountable to the public, however, the King and those he appoints are not accountable to the public and the King still holds some significant powers. Early in the research period corruption was a big problem but Freedom House and Transperancy International have both noted a marked improvement in this area during the research period. As previously mentioned Bhutan in the research period was a country in transition, while they have started off with great progress towards democratisation during the research period, it seems the progress has slowed or even halted since 2013. This is likely due to the constitution’s protection of undemocratic aspects and the countries lack of experiance, knowledge and trust of democratic processes. Sources: Freedom House provides detailed reports for Bhutan during the research period of 2008-2013. accessed from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/bhutan Bhutan constitution. accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bhutan_2008.pdf |
| Brazil | 1995 | 2002 | 9 | 12 | 8 | I selected the years of 1995 to 2002 because that was the era in which Fernando Henrique Cardoso was president. His 8 years of presidency came in the midst of Brazil s attempt to consolidate the liberal democratic regime. The Collor de Mello administration from 1990-1992 was unsuccessful as he was indicted on impeachment charges. Itamar Franco s administration from 1992-1995 was considered a stepping-stone for the consolidation. Cardoso was Brazil s first directly elected president in 29 years and the first president to be re-elected for a second term. This re-election amendment was not only for president of the republic but also for heads of state and municipal governments. For the democratic political institutions questions, it can be understood that Cardoso s era generally had fair and competitive elections. In a diagram from a UNESCO journal it actually shows the opposition party, Lula da Silva, having higher popularity ratings until up to 2 months before the election took place. There were multiple other parties involved too. In October/November of 2000, opposition parties were victorious in municipal elections throughout the country. This depicts a regime that doesn t pose significant barriers to creating non-governmental political parties or contesting elections. Voting is compulsory for those aged between 18 and 70 and if it is not done without a valid excuse then not partaking in voting is punishable with a fine. There is also the checks and balance of Brazil s Congress that had the authority to refuse to act on some of Cardoso s initiatives and did so. Elected officials under the Cardoso era could publicly challenge one another and unelected officials, and institutions. The civil liberties answers mostly demonstrate that Cardoso s regime did value the rights of its citizens although it did have its fair amount of trials and tribulations. This era politically had a liberal democracy position but its military was still stuck in an authoritarian capacity. Cardoso made legislative action to ease the racial inequality and severe discrimination. This involved racial quotas for workplaces, access to universities and more job opportunities. This equated to 14 different legislative bills being passed through Congress simply regarding the racial quotas. However, the military was nonetheless authoritarian. There were still mass atrocities against human rights occurring. There were death squads that took justice into their own hands and were escalated, vigilantes. One example described by the Human Rights Watch is when military police conducted a search on a ranch in the northern state of Rondônia to remove 200 families of landless squatters, who were occupying the land. With violence on both sides, two police and several squatters were killed in the conflict. After the police had subdued the squatters, however, they killed several more, tortured dozens, and beat more than one hundred men. The military police humiliated the squatters, forcing one man to eat the brains of a dead companion so that he would overcome “his fear of the dead.” In all, the police killed nine people, including a seven-year-old girl shot in the back, and injured more than one hundred, thirty of whom were hospitalized in serious condition. Nine people remained unaccounted for. Though Cardoso did recognize the pervasiveness of impunity, there are only so many legislations that can be passed before becoming excessive . In terms of independent press, the coverage of corruption has been ensured and increased sharply since the 1980s. Though they were marginalized and could feel pressure from the government, it was not profound. Regarding the institutionalized rule questions, Brazil exemplifies a mixture of traits in this section. For the accountability towards people and their actions, there is none applicable when it comes to certain job titles. As a result of the mass atrocities against human rights, multiple military personnel did not get charged with these heinous crimes. Proving that there are some people who clearly flout the law without consequences. A theory that can be associated with these cases is that because they aren t highly televised, the problem can be forgotten easily and there is no comeuppance. Whereas in the case of Celso Pitt, this was the complete opposite. On March 24th, 2000, Mayor Celso Pitt of Sao Paulo was thrown out of office by the Sao Paulo regional court after testimony from his ex-wife. She provided evidence that he used 800,000 reais to buy votes on the city council in order to prevent his impeachment. Therefore it could be presumed that when it comes to political injustices, Congress conveyed harsher punishments because the leaders were generally accountable to the people and it is considered an official position. The resources utilized did portray Brazil to be a somewhat plausibly democratic regime during the Cardoso era. Though it is clear from my justifications that there were clear violations of human rights and hierarchal problems. It can be understood how these errors occurred as people exploited the ambiguity of certain government sectors . |
| Brazil | 2003 | 2011 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 29-30 In Brazil, the President is elected by majoritarian voting. There are many political parties that allow for a fair and competitive democracy . The Senate was also decided by a majority vote where each state elects three senators . In 2003, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the election as head of the Workers Party. In the 2003 election, there were thirteen parties that won seats in Parliament . 31-33 In Brazil, each person had the right to one vote and voting is compulsory between the ages of 18 to 70 . The only group disenfranchised are military conscripts . Since military conscription was compulsory, it involuntary be in a job that takes away the right to vote, therefore Brazil did not have universal suffrage. In Brazil, there was freedom to create political parties provided they respect the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, pluralism and the fundamental rights of human beings . The parameters surrounding the creation were appropriate considering they were loose enough to allow people with different ideologies to form political parties. People who wished to form political party are ensured autonomy for the structure of their party . There was no unelected institution that had power over the elected officials, President Lula was the head of the Executive branch and the Constitution outlines the presidential powers that commanded the legislative agenda . 34 Due to the nature of the coalitions within Parliament, there was an opportunity for many disputes and public challenge of other parties . 35-38 During Lula s Presidency, same-sex marriage was not recognised, therefore not all identity groups in Brazil have the same legal rights as others . In terms of discrimination in society, the indigenous groups in Brazil are in some cases not seen as equal . The villages that were homes to many indigenous people are not viewed as having the same legal rights as other towns. This was discrimination regarding housing and land ownership legal rights . There was also discrimination in the justice system since there was a disproportionately high number of young blacks in prison compared to the rest of population . There were not enough public defenders to represent all the offenders that could not afford an attorney . In 1989, Brazil ratified the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . In theory, all the acts outlined above should not have been present in Brazil, but this is not the case. There are many reports of Brazil s prisons have been plagued with chronic human rights violations . 39- 41 The Constitution of Brazil separated the Church and the State, making Brazil secular . The Constitution also allowed the right for individuals to have religious freedom . Critical speech of the Government was usually protected. It is common for parties to critique each other as well as for the public to form peaceful protests. The Constitution allowed for the public can organise and protest the Government or any public matters as long it was peaceful and nonviolent . 42 During Lula s Government, there were disputes over the growth of censorship of the press. There were many cases where people were imprisoned, threatened with aggression and censored over the distribution of information . 43 The institutions in Brazil were given powers by the Constitution, which determined their abilities. Though there were no violations of the Constitution, however, the President did seem to have a very large amount of power . Lula had power over vetoes and power to initiate some legislation, thus much of the power of the Government was in the hands of the President . For President Lula, this did not mean there were any examples of powers being used that are assigned to other institutions, it just meant he had the ability to exercise large amounts of power. 44 Between 2003-2011, it seems that no one was above the law. There were no cases of officials are elites being above the law. In later regimes, this point becomes clearer that elites may not be all equally subject to the law . 45 The institutional process of making laws in Brazil under the Lula Government was accountable. The process of putting through legislation in the elected Senate was an accountable process, however as previously mentioned the President does have power than can alter the legislative agenda . 46 The Worker s Party relied on a coalition to support and approve legislation. Since the public voted in competitive elections every five years, elected officials were accountable to the people . There is also the real threat of impeachment that can hold officials accountable . 47 The state leaders of Brazil were in official positions, President Lula was the state leader and he was in an elected official position. The executive was elected by majority vote and the senators were elected proportionally to the votes . 48 It was unclear whether Brazil, under President Lula was a cult personality. With free and fair competitive elections and accountability of officials it could be concluded that there was no cult of personality. However, popularity and public hysteria were the forefronts of Lula’s two terms in office. Though I don’t think it is appropriate to conclude that since Lula was known as the best President ever there was a strong influence of cult personality . However, the public s view of Lula must be considered. The Electoral System Country Studies, n.d. http://countrystudies.us/brazil/100.htm Ibid Federal Republic of Brazil: 2002 Presidential Election Políticos das Américas. 2005. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Brazil/pres02.html Brazil Suffrage Index Mundi . 2016. http://www.indexmundi.com/brazil/suffrage.html Ibid Brazil Political Parties Global Security. 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/political-parties.htm Ibid Dana de la Fontaine and Thomas Stehnken, The Political System of Brazil, 165-166. Brazil Political Parties Global Security. 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/political-parties.htm Brazil Supreme Court Awards Gay Couples New Rights BBC News, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13304442 Ethnic and Racial Relations Unesco office in Brazilia. n.d. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/brasilia/social-and-human-sciences/ethnic-and-racial-relations/ Fiona Watson, Brazil s Treatment of its Indigenous peoples violate their rights The Guardian. 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/29/brazil-indigenous-people-violates-rights Brazil Human Rights Report Countries of the World. 2004. http://www.ncbuy.com/reference/country/humanrights.html?code=br&sec=1e Ibid Chapter Six: Human Rights UN Treaty Collections. 2017. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en Layla Medina, Indefinite Detention, Deadly Conditions: How Brazil’s Notorious Criminal Justice System Violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights American University Law Review, 31 . 595-596. Evaldo Xavier Gomes, Religion and the Secular state Brazil National Report . 2003. https://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Brazil%202014.pdf Brazil Political Parties Global Security. 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/political-parties.htm Mario Osava Brazil: Growing Criticism of Lula within Left Inter Press service. 2003. http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/06/brazil-growing-criticism-of-lula-within-left/ Press Freedom in Brazil: Sound the Alarm Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 2012. http://www.coha.org/press-freedom-in-brazil-sound-the-alarm/ A rgelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil Comparative Politics, 32 . 151-170 Ibid Brazil President Rousseff makes Lula a minister to dodge charges in face of mass protests The world weekly, 2016. https://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/storyline/2016-03-16/brazils-president-rousseff-makes-lula-a-minister-to-dodge-charges-in-the-face-of-mass-protests/7135 Lee J. Alston, Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira, Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes: Research Proposal for a Case Study of Brazil http://www.iadb.org/res/laresnetwork/files/pr225proposal.pdf Brazil Political Parties Global Security. 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/political-parties.htm Simon Romeo, Dilma Rousseff is ousted as Brazil s President in Impeachment vote The New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html Brazil Political Parties Global Security. 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/political-parties.htm Lula s Legacy The Economist . 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/17147828 |
| Bulgaria | 1990 | 2017 | 11 | 10 | 9 | Part 1: Democratic Political Institutions: Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria was one of the USSR’s closest allies. As is commonly the case,the countries previously alligned with the USSR underwent some kind of regime change- Bulgaria proving no exception. In 1990, a new constitution was created after much deliberation and Bulgaria could no longer be described as a single party - communist state. In 1990, Bulgaria had its first ‘free and fair elections’ where more than one party competed for political power- and elections have occurred periodically since then. The Executive acts as head of state and is democratically elected for a 5 year term. In my sources, I was unable to find whether other executive positions were democratically elected, however because the legislature is democratically elected I would assume the position of executive roles are as-wel. There exist within Bulgaria, almost no barriers to political competition. Bulgaria recognizes freedom to form your own political party, however this is subject to a few restraints: Parties based on racial, ethnic or religious affliction are illegal. Furthermore, to register as a party you need to have 5000 members to register officially - which seems to put smaller interest groups at a disadvantage. There is a separation of powers highlighted by the Judiciary being an independent body which can hold other branches accountable- however some government officials are able to get away with corruption due to some weaknesses in the law Part 2: Civil Liberties As mentioned above, political parties based on certain afflictions are banned from forming, but otherwise things like freedom of religion are rights protected within the constitution, so although there are some restrictions here, they are not so prevalent so as to exclude one’s ability to practice their own believes- it is only when the belief will have a detrimental affect on the government that the government would seem to step in, thus allowing for the enjoyment of one’s beliefs. The criminal process in Bulgaria are subject to fair legal conventions such as the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and open courts: allowing public members to see trials, and a defense lawyer is mandatory. However, some people in Bulgaria have been subject to cruel treatment: more particularly, an ethnic minority group ‘Romani’ have been physically abused in order to gain information. ! In general the press in Bulgaria is independent, however there is evidence that the government can still influence the press through intimidation tactics, and some journalists complain of harrassment, however, there remains a wide variety of media outlets. Part 3: Institutionalized Rule Although the constitution rules supreme, there are slight violations made against it in terms of the corruption issues mentioned earlier. For example, there were convictions made for election-related violations- some of which were vote buying. because of these corruption issues, it can be said that some people seem to be above the law- they can get away with some controversial actions without an immediate sanction. But in saying this, the legal safeguards are still in place to stop these kinds of things from occurring, it seems to be a matter of enforceability rather than legality. Overall, Bulgaria can be regarded as democratic. It is only minor problems with enforceability and some restrictions on voter rights/discrimination that would prevent even the most sceptical from thinking so. Sources: 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bulgaria 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bulgaria 3: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 4: http://www.parliament.bg/en/const 5: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 6: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 7: http://www.parliament.bg/en/const 8: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 9: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 10: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf 11: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/bulgaria 12: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160182.pdf |
| Burkina Faso | 1999 | 2015 | 12 | 8 | 8 | Democratic Political Institutions: The president is elected every five years, but typically for most of the specified period of study, this has been in unfair circumstances, mainly because the ruling party has had greater access to state resources and media, so that although the elections are free and multiply competitive, they are not fair. There is universal suffrage for those older than 18. Retreived from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html . Accessed on 25 May 2017. In 2014, president Blaise Campaore who had ruled by fiat since 1987 and had won a streak of unfair elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014 attempted to alter the constitution and allow himself a third term. He subsequently lost that year s election, and the interim legislature proposed a ban on any MPs who had supported Campaore s amendment from contesting any future elections. The ban was enacted into law but later struck down by the Court of Justice a decision which was followed by the new president Kafando. But the president then instructed the legislature to declare treason charges against Campaore and any of his officials who supported his third term amendment. The scenario demonstrates how the government has both affirmed and obviated democratic principles, doubling back on some of its measures, and doubling down on others, which makes establishing a behavioural trend difficult. Retrieved from: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/229091/politique/burkina-le-cdp-et-ses-alli-s-suspendent-leur-participation-la-transition/. Accessed on 23 May 2017. Civil Liberties: The constitution, which the government typically adheres to, guarantees freedom of speech. However, the murder of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo in 1999 by the Campaore government has ensured srict self-censorship can still apply. However, there are no reports of government intimidation subsequent to Zongo’s assassination. In 2015, the government passed legislation to allow greater autonomy to state owned media. Internet access is not controlled, although access and use is low due to poor infrastructure. Retrived from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/burkina-faso. Accessed on 26 May 2017. Under Campaore, some student led protests were suppressed. Freedom House notes that the constitution provides for the right to assemble, though demonstrations have been suppressed or banned depending on their content and target. The presidential guard under Campaore had a history of repressing mass gatherings. In October 2015, Amnesty International reported that RSP members fired on civilian protesters and bystanders during the unrest that accompanied the failed coup, killing 14 people and injuring hundreds more. Regarding questions 10 and 11, it does not appear that group are targeted based on their identity, but there do not appear to be explicit legal protections for such identities. Rather it is anyone who opposed the government who was formerly suppressed or targeted. However, there is evidence that homosexuals with HIV have been discriminated against by the police. Institutionalised Rule: The interim government following the confused downfall of Campaore in 2014 was met with the aspirations of Lieutenant General Isaac Zida, who claimed to be acting as the new president . Opposition parties and other organised groups arranged for the transitional government to oversee that duty, and to console Zida with the deputy prime ministership. Outside that vaultingly ambitious and generous offer of committed public service from the Lieutenant General I could find no instance of miliary influence over the government, so accorded that question a high rating The Kafando government was temporarily overthrown in 2015, but government control was restored within a a month, so this instance was not given a significant weighting. However, some of the constitutional changes which followed the coup were included as part of the analysis. Retreived from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29863004. Accessed on 27 May 2017. Freedom House’s summary report on the 2014 transition government included this extract: “The creation of the transitional government allowed for policymaking and legislative action, which had come to a standstill following the dissolution of the National Assembly and suspension of the constitution in 2014. The government made several constitutional changes, including removing presidential term limits from the category of rules that may be modified, and setting them at two five-year terms, served either consecutively or separately. The transitional government also removed language regarding a second chamber of the legislature from the constitution; the chamber had never functioned during Compaoré s rule.” The report then went on to note: “The selection of the members, ministers, president, and prime minister of the interim government was led by elites, leaving the government with little accountability to ordinary citizens. The successful elections and installation of a civilian government at the end of 2015 signified a marked improvement in government representation, accountability, and transparency. Corruption continued to be a problem in 2015, though prosecutors have pursued some high-level cases against former members of the Compaoré administration. Burkina Faso was ranked 76 out of 168 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.” Retreived from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/burkina-faso. Accessed on 27 May 2017. There were two chief problems with assessing Burkina Faso: The first is a problem with available sources and materials. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which proved useful for the Morocco study, had a dearth of relevant information. Only Freedom House, which publishes regular annual reports on a cross-section of national measures had much of anything that could be used to answer the questions, so their accuracy is potentially constrained. However, where Freedom House notes particular detail, such as the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zongo, it was possible to cross reference this with multiple sources which have made specific case studies, and subsequently ascertain their veracity. The second problem is that Burkina Faso has recently undergone a swath of governmental and constitutional reforms which have aligned many of its democratic measures with an improving trend. But before the reforms, much of the government’s structure and behaviour would have scored lower marks. Because the specified period of study includes this period of transition, an ‘average’ score which accounts for both has been given, where if either of the ‘pole’ years was taken, the answers would be almost polar. |
| Burkina Faso Time period:2000 | 2000 | 2010 | 9 | 11 | 9 | Time Period: In the year 2000, the constitution was amended to reduce a President’s term from seven years to 5. Despite this, in 2010 President Compaoré was voted in again by a vast majority for his third straight term. Things appear to have remained mostly the same in this period, however in 2011 the death of a schoolboy led to uproar throughout the country. This was made worse by a military mutiny shortly after. To me, the year before this happens seems like a good time to end the period I am covering. This country and time period does not seem like happy place. In 2003, just over 50% of the population was in poverty, earning less than $1.90 a day. Things have fortunately continued to slowly improve. Sources used: http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/BFA Election results: http://africanelections.tripod.com/bf.html 2011, the year it went bad: http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20110415-campaore-defiant-after-presidential-guard-mutiny Democratic Political Institutions: The President appears to have a large amount of personal power in this regime period, but overall it seems mostly fair. Other parties are able to run, despite the President remaining in power since a 1987 coup. Positions of power are elected in the time period I have scrutinised however. The President remains in power for five years, where then another election is held. Democratic principles are upheld through the constitution. See Institutional Rule links for information I used here. Civil Liberties: With respect to religious groups, there is very little discrimination that I can find. The 2000 annual report on religious freedom states that Burkina Faso has no single dominant religion, and the constitution protects the freedom of religion. The Attorney General has the power to grant publishing and broadcasting rights to religious groups. Within this period, not a single religious group was ever denied such rights. There is clearly a separation of church and state in this country, and the previous facts came to influence my rating on its freedom of the press . One concern to do with free press is self-censorship, but at other times the press has been fairly blunt on political matters. There is no prevailing religious ideology, and people were able to practice and celebrate their religion freely in this time period. Unlike Zambia, there is less of a focus on customary law, instead prescribing universal rights through the constitution and formal jurisdictions. Where the two regimes are familiar however, is gender inequality. While a very tolerant nation towards religion, women have been accused of witchcraft and been forced to flee their villages. Such examples seem to come from more remote areas. More widespread examples of gender inequality include the fact that very few adult women have a secondary or higher level of education. In 2015, the Amnesty International regional director is West and Central Africa provided the following: For too long, the Burkinabé authorities have neglected the rights of women and girls. Redressing this wrong and lifting the barriers faced by women and girls must be a central aim of any election candidate s campaign. This was in response to widespread accounts of genital mutilation, forced marriage and domestic violence. It seems that this is something rather common in some African countries. Sources used: US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000. Can be found here: https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=OTx1qbA8OW8C&pg=PR3&lpg=PR3&dq=freedom+index+burkina+faso+2000&source=bl&ots=yTVSRfkHMp&sig=OdTbWiKVWfYX-rdEyl_uay3jrJ0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjFzsOz14nUAhVGG5QKHRARCtMQ6AEIRTAH#v=onepage&q&f=false Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/07/burkina-faso-elections-cannot-ignore-womens-crisis/ Concerns about press freedom: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/burkina-faso Institutional Rule: There is an institutional process by which laws are made, as it has a legislature. Their will is interpreted by courts which operate in a civil-law format which is slightly different from New Zealand, but its nuances are not neccessary for the sake of this project. The President has exclusive powers which are politically assigned through the constitution. There is potential for corruption, as the President selects the Prime Minister and many of the members within the legislature. Like Zambia, this format does not hold separation of powers to high regard. For this reason, I gave question 44 a 1. 46 also receives a 1 for the same reason. This is coupled with the presidential guard mutiny a year after this period, showing that groups needed to find external methods to hold their leader/s to account in some situations. I saw no evidence of a cult of personality. From the information I have gathered, this country is very poor and very unequal. The country has a very high gini coefficient and poverty rate, which I think will be reflected in the results we will see later. Burkino Faso Legal Information: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Burkina_Faso.html |
| Burundi | 1996 | 2001 | 6 | 2 | 5 | I choose the 1996 - 2000 period because in 1996 Tutsi leader Pierre Buyoya took power in his second coup, suspending the constitution and establishing a controversial regime that progressed peace talks but also engaged in widescale relocation and extrajudicial actions. In 2000, a transitional government was established that incorporated both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities, and peace agreements have been relatively successful, although unrest continues to trouble the country. I primarily used Freedom House reports, the CIA World Factbook, The Economist Intelligence Unit and the BBC News country profile to establish a consistent picture of Burundi’s troubled past, democratic institutions, protection of civil liberties and political rights. Democratic Political Institutions Having seized power again with the support of the Army, Pierre Buyoya was formally sworn in as President in 1998 with the agreement of the parliament . Although he formed an ethnically-inclusive government, oversaw a peace process and handed over power in 2003 as agreed, Buyoya led a regime that had overthrown the legitimate President. Although the Hutu majority remains in government, real authority lay with President Buyoya and his supporters, according to the CIA World Factbook ;> https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html ), Freedom House ;> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/burundi ) and the BBC News country profile ;> http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604 ) . There were no transitions of power until the appointment of the transitional government in 2000. With over 60,000 troops, Buyoya’s regime depended on military control . Civil Liberties Freedom House provided most of the evidence here, but some quick searching showed no controversy about its statements. Although the Burundian constitution included guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention, these were widely disregarded with approximately 8,000 people being detained without trial. “Regroupment” policies forcibly located hundreds of thousands of civilians into camps controlled by soldiers with the goal of preventing insurgent support by the population. Thousands of unarmed civilians were massacred and there was widespread property damage by the military and insurgents in the process ;> https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/africa/burundi.html ) . Amnesty International’s archives contain extensive records of concerns about executions, extra-judicial killings, prison conditions, torture, disappearances, etc. Unsurprisingly, the justice system does not appear to have been effective during this period ;> https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr16/013/1998/en/ ) . Ethnic conflict was clearly ongoing during this period and despite intentions at the top levels of government to bridge the divide, discrimination against the Hutu majority and violence against the Tutsi minority was widespread and systemic ;> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/burundi ) . Although press restrictions were lifted in 1996, journalists practiced extensive self-censorship and few independent media outlets existed. Political activities were subjected to detainment by the government or attack by insurgents, making permitted freedom of association difficult. There were no religious restrictions. Institutionalised Rule A coup d’etat replaced the elected government and installed Pierre Buyoya, who was only appointed as President in 1998 and definitely not accountable to the people. The parliament was suspended for a period and then exercised very little actual power before the appointment of the transitional government. The constitution was suspended for a period and then routinely violated by both authorities and insurgents. Buyoya handed over power as agreed in 2003 and there is no evidence of a personality cult or unofficial position. Inequality Devastated by conflict and widespread displacement, Burundi continues to this day to be one of the world’s poorest countries in which over 90% of the population are employed in agriculture and approximately 80% live in poverty. The UNDP’s Human Development Reports assisted in determining this. |
| Cambodia | 2001 | 2004 | 10 | 5 | 5 | I have decided to focus on the period between 2001 and 2004 in Cambodia because in 2002, it held its very first “democratic” elections so I thought that including the year leading up to the election and the years afterwards would accurately describe the political landscape and the consequences of the election. In terms of Cambodia’s democratic institutions, it appears that they were not very strong and were not necessarily democratic. There were reports that other politicians and parties were threatened leading up to the elections, where some were even physically beaten in order to intimidate them . There was a large number of reports of political killings and a lack of government ability and action to stop this political violence and intimidation. In regards to civil liberties, while there was no obvious discrimination of particular groups of people, there was a clear break down of legal institutions, where the system of checks and balances and the rule of law purely existed on paper and was never actually enforced. The government’s three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, began to merge, and the legislature branch weakened and became extremely politicized and struggled to pass laws that protected people’s civil liberities . There were also reports of those in custody being tortured by police in order to extract information from them, as well as additional failures by police to protect women from domestic abuse or sex trafficking . In terms of the press, it was not free during this time period where journalists were attacked and murdered for speaking out against the government. Also, most broadcast media outlets were owned by government officials or their associates, and the 1995 press law gave the government the authority to suspend newspapers for 30 days if they spoke against the government as well outlawing newspapers that threatened political stability, according to Belle and Whitten - Woodring’s book Historical Guide to World Media: A Country-by-Country Analysis. Institutionalised rule was frequently violated and through my research it was unclear whether some people were more above the law compared to others. While all leaders had official positions, there was a lack of accountability of citizens to their leaders, where the lack of governmental independence and accountability often led to violence and a general distrust in government branches . |
| Cambodia 1998 | 1991 | 2002 | 1 | 7 | 3 | Period of study 1991-2002 I chose this time period because it encompasses the focal year of 1998 and includes many significant and interlinked political events beginning with the peace accord of 1991 and ending with the first Cambodian multi-party election in 2002. In 1991, the United Nations intervened in Cambodia to halt the fighting between the Phnom Penh government and the resistance coalition lead by Prince Ranariddh. In 1991, the two factions signed the Paris Peace Accord which established a UN supervised interim government and free elections. The United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia was established and in 1993 the UN supervised elections took place leading to a coalition government with co-prime ministers Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. However, in 1997 Hun Sen staged a coup ousting Prince Ranariddh from power and in 1998 Ranariddh was sentenced, after fleeing in exile, and found guilty of arms smuggling. He was later pardoned by his father King Sihanouk. The 1998 elections were won by Hun Sen and the Cambodian People s Party but a coalition government was set up with the FUNCINPEC as the recently returned Ranariddh was made president of the National Assembly. 2002 saw the first multi-party elections held in Cambodia which were won by the Cambodian People s Party. Democratic Political Institutions The 1998 elections were not free or fair, the continued political killings and the international condemnation of the CPP and Hun Sen after the 1997 coup saw an unbalanced election period. Hun Sen wielded an unfair advantage during the election campaign with control over the civil service, local administration, military police, and Khmer language media. Outside of Cambodia the election looked competitive with the inclusion of opposition parties such as FUNCINPEC, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, and the Khmer Nation Party. Yet these parties faced sabotage and obstacles such as the destruction of their radio stations and damage to broadcasting equipment. During the election period the United Nations also investigated 140 reports of harassment, political violence, and intimidation. The inclusion of opposition parties seems to have come from the potential intervention of the international community rather than an attempt by Hun Sen and the CPP at a fair election. Opposition parties faced obstacles by authorities such as being denied access to broadcast media, a ban on political demonstrations in Phonm Penh during the election period, and disruptions to their rallies by authorities. Minority groups were allowed to vote in the election and the previous requirement of 4000 signatures or thumb-prints necessary to register a political party were not required, an interesting point as many were afraid of being identified by the government as not supporting the CPP party. I found no evidence of restricted voting eligibility, with the exception of alleged monitoring of opposition party members and groups that were most likely to vote for an opposition party like students, academics, trade union members, political refugees, and NGO members. However, voter intimidation and violence was common and registering to vote was difficult with the registration dates constantly changing and the refusal for Garment workers, who represented tens of thousands of votes, to get time of work so they could vote. Based on the power King Sihanouk had in 1997 to pardon his son of arms convictions and readings that suggest despite not holding any significant political power, Sihanouks popularity with the public gave him a lot of influence over the government and their decisions. Civil Liberties Civil Liberties in Cambodia during 1998 and the 1991-2002 period in general were not good. Those in positions of political authority kept government institutions weak and the judiciary was far from independent of the government. In the aftermath of the 1997 coup many members of the FUNCINPEC who were unable to leave the country were detained and tortured before being put in prison where reports of mistreatment, unsanitary conditions, and dangerous overcrowding were common. Political killings and cases of intimidation and harassment were reported to the UN in the lead up to the 1998 election. Harassment and intimidation of non-governmental groups and activists was common by security forces. All private newspapers were closed after the 1997 coup and while some were able to reopen after 1998, journalists are regularly threatened and attacked. There have been at least four journalists who were murdered since 1993 with no convictions for those responsible. The government has the power to suspend a media publication without a court order, which was seen when the Ministry suspended six pro-opposition publications for posting articles that criticised the CPP government. Hun Sen controls all of the media in Cambodia and as off 1996 his government banned any new broadcast media and newspapers from being established. Vietnamese citizens in Cambodia aren t recognized under the Constitution and they were regularly victimised by the Khmer Rouge which Hun Sen was previously apart of, the group was also responsible for the genocide of between 1.5 and 3 million Cambodians in the 1970s. A tribunal was established to convict those guilty of the genocide but the tribunal has been criticised for being slow and inefficient at bringing those responsible to justice. Women are also seen as inferior to men, which with corruption in the government, is hard to overcome. In 1998, Human Rights Watch became aware of hundreds of politically motivated murders of opposition party supporters, activists, and members. The CPP government refused to investigate the deaths instead claiming robberies, land arguments and personal vendettas were the cause of most. The state religion of Cambodia is Theravada Buddhism which accounts for 95% of the populations religion. I found no evidence to suggest that there is a restriction on freedom of religion nor that religion was an essential aspect of the government, except perhaps in the influence of the monarchy. Institutional Rule Because of Cambodia s constitutional monarchy King Sihanouk despite not officially having a lot of political power over the government was very popular among the population and had a certain influence over the government because of this. I saw this popularity as a borderline reason to answer yes to the cult of personality question. The weak judiciary systems and the CPP governments incapability to strengthen them undermine the legitimacy of a lot of Cambodia s governmental institutions. Corruption in the government was widespread and those guilty of politically motivated crimes such as threats, attacks, and murder of opposition group members and supporters were rarely held to account. rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/30-years-hun-sen/violence-repression-and-corruption-cambodia) rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/cambodia) |
| Cameroon | 1992 | 2016 | 6 | 6 | 4 | I chose the years 1992-2016 as the period for this regime. Cameroon s still have the same President and ongoing regime which is why 2016 is the end date. As for 1992, the current President came into power in 1982, however, the regime was still establishing itself and was a one-party state. In 1992, the first Presidential election was held with multiple parties which is how the regime has stayed since then. For the democratic political institution section, I looked at Freedom House reports and Elections Cameroon ‘The Election and Referendum Management Institution’. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cameroon http://www.elecam.cm/en/civic-education/about-registration.html In Cameroon, there are both presidential and legislative elections, however, they are highly unfair. Cameroon is a multi-party state but the the ruling party, the Cameroon People s Democratic Movement is very dominant and the country essentially operates as a one party state. Freedom House reported that in 2002, the CPDM increased the number of its seats in the National Assembly from 116 to 149 out of 180 member seats. The Election and Referendum Management Institution outlines that there are no barriers to entry besides having to be older than 20. There are over numerous parties in Cameroon, however, they are barred by legal harassment and the ruling party has allowed the creation of so many parties to divide the competition . The current President, Paul Biya has been in power from 1982 and has run by a high majority since then even with the establishment of multiple parties. In 1997, he won the election with 93 percent, however, it was highly unfair and corrupt . There are no-non elected positions that have executive power over the President and other officials do not challenge his power. There are some non-elected officials that have power over others but these are appointed by the President, such as the provincial and local administrators, and he has ultimate control over the judiciary. The President allows for traditional chiefs to have limited sovereignty and run their own courts and prisons ae used against regime opponents . For the Civil Liberties section, I referred to Cameroons constitution, Freedom House reports and a report about torture in Cameroon from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008.pdf?lang=en https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cameroon http://www.torturecare.org.uk/Cameroon1.rtf In Cameroon, there are over 200 ethnic groups and they do experience discrimination, however their constitution declares that the human person, without distinction as to race, religion, sex or belief, possesses inalienable and sacred rights . Even though officially there is no discrimination, unofficially does affect official institutions and human rights. The indigenous Pygmy people are especially discriminated against and are often subject to slave labour . The LGBT community faces legal discrimination and relations with the same sex is illegal . In terms of legal rights, the constitution states that no person may be prosecuted, arrested or detained except in the cases and according to the manner determined by law, but there are still reports stating otherwise and opposition activists are routinely held without charges or disappear while in custody . Torture and harsh conditions in prison are common and many inmates are held with indefinite detentions . There is generally a freedom of religion and the state is separate from the church. Speech critical of the government is criminalised and although there are some private newspapers, they have faced convictions for speaking against the regime. Freedom House reported that in April 1998, an editor was sentences to one year in prison for suggesting that the President had heart problems. The Cameroon government is yet to put restrictions on internet access. There is independent press but it constantly faces restrictions from the government. For the Institutional Rule section, I used information from Freedom House reports and the report about torture in Cameroon from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/cameroon https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cameroon http://www.torturecare.org.uk/Cameroon1.rtf In terms of institutional rule, the political institutions are constantly violating the constitution as seen with the constant use of torture and discrimination against certain minorities . The President is clearly above the law and even if there was a law against him, he holds the power to change it and is rarely opposed, for example, he changed the constitution so he could run for unlimited elections and extended the period of the presidential term to 7 years . The National Assembly is officially the institution that makes policies, however they only meet for two months a year and the President has free reign for the rest of the year . It is unclear whether there is a cult of personality in Cameroon as there is obvious popularity for the President Paul Biya but this could come from the oppression against opponents and fear amongst the population of opposing the leader and ruling government. |
| Cape Verde | 1990 | 2017 | 16 | 12 | 11 | I choose the 1990 - present period because in 1990 the one-party regime of Cape Verde yielded to popular pressure for pluralistic democracy, organising for multi-party elections in 1991. Subsequently, Cape Verde has become a successful democracy, ranked 23rd in the 2016 Democracy Index. An initial search showed there to be little information available on the specifics of the 1975 - 1990 regime, beyond its split with Guinea-Bissau after the 1980 coup in that state. Conversely, both the Democracy Index and Freedom House have consistently reported on the present regime, giving a far better summary. I primarily used Freedom House reports, the CIA World Factbook, The Economist Intelligence Unit and the BBC News country profile to establish a consistent picture of Cabo Verde’s constitutional structure, democratic institutions, protection of civil liberties and political rights. Democratic Political Institutions Cabo Verde is ranked 23 on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index ;> http://pages.eiu.com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Democracy_Index_2016.pdf ), ahead of France. The CIA World Factbook ;> https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cv.html ), Freedom House ;> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/cape-verde ) and the BBC News country profile ;> http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13148486 ) all concurred that Cabo Verde was a free democracy with strong institutions. Media also showed that there were clear and peaceful transitions of power between parties in a genuinely contested legislature ;> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3502122/Opposition-returns-power-Cape-Verde-15-years.html ) . Overall there was little controversy about the efficacy of democratic institutions. Civil Liberties Freedom House provided most of the evidence here, but some quick searching showed no controversy about its statements. The CIA World Factbook was particularly helpful for determining certain constitutional questions, and BBC News had a good summary of press freedom which supported statements in the Freedom House report that there is an active and protected independent media, with little to no government censorship. Amnesty International had no articles on Cabo Verde, but this appeared to be a case of an absence of reports due to an absence of things to report on. Institutionalised Rule No sources suggested any issues relating to violation of the constitution or rule of law. Cabo Verde is fairly uninteresting and untypical of Africa for the apparent routineness of its democracy. Inequality Cabo Verde suffers from economic issues, not democratic ones, with an economy highly dependent on tourism and foreign aid. With an arid climate and serious threats from natural disasters, it is unsurprising that there is a substantial level of inequality in the country. |
| Cape Verde | 1992 | 2016 | 16 | 12 | 10 | The lack of nefarious information when it comes to all aspects discussed in relation to Cape Verde seems to indicate that it is a shining example of what a democracy should be. According to Freedom House, its press has been free since 2002 which is as far back as the report goes and does well in all three environments; legal, political and economic. Also, according to Freedom House, it is overall a free country with a freedom rating of 1, and a civil liberty score and political rights score of 1. The only issue would be around election time in 2016 but otherwise, the elections proceeded peacefully and it is now governed by Jorge Carlos Fonseca of the Movement for Democracy . According to its new constitution, dating back to 1992, Cape Verde allows for a multi-party system, ensures that all above the age of 18 has the right to vote, and all are afforded the basic human rights as is cited in Article 26 . In terms of its inequality, on the other hand, it not extremely high, and is just above the net inequality of the USA between 1992 and 2005 there are no information post-2005 . Bibliography Freedom House. . Cape Verde: Freedom in the World 2016 . Retrieved May 23, 2017, from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cape-verde Freedom House. . Cape Verde: Freedom of the Press 2006 . Retrieved May 23, 2017, from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/cape-verde Solt, F. . SWIID. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from Frederick Solt: Income Inequality & Its Consequences, Comparative Behaviour, and Dynamic Comparative Public Opinion: http://fsolt.org/swiid/ The National Assembly. . The Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde . Retrieved May 22, 2017, from Constitutionnet: http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Cape%20Verde%20Constitution.pdf |
| Central African Republic | 1981 | 2000 | 5 | 9 | 6 | During 1981-2000, it was the period where the first competitive elections happened in the country. However, the elections were made possible from a coup led by the army commander, Andre Kolingba, to depose David Dacko . This led to the release of political party leaders which allowed multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections to be organised in October 1992 . In the 1993 presidential elections, Ange-Felix Patasse won and ended the 12 years of military rule which he then released several thousand political prisoners . However, there were reports of irregularities such as ballot shortages with a strong opposition following . Additionally, violence erupted after the polling. Two ruling party supporters were killed and dozens injured in an attacked by Kolingba supporters during the Patasse rally . There was disorder in the government where coalitions fell through which was only restored through a vigorous French military intervention and UN missions in April 1997 helped maintain security following the army uprisings. Hence, this period showed the beginning of the struggles that CAR had to experience to become a democracy. Firstly, the democratic political institution during the period would show the first few steps to the transition to democracy. It could be said its neither here nor there. In the 1986 constitution, presidential and legislative elections were constitutionally present . Also, every citizen is entitled to their right to vote which universal suffrage are applied and no barriers a present for the creation of political parties . Hence as constitutionally stated, the first presidential and legislative elections that were held in 1993 where the people vote for their leaders in an open and democratic manner . As President Patassé s was re-elected for a second term, his triumph was not matched by his party in the December 1998 national assembly elections, which produced a nearly even split between his supporters and his opponents . Additionally, the legislative is more influential to unelected institutions or individuals as they have constitutional power. An example would be they have power to declare war if the branch deems necessary . However, it would be unclear that elected officials can publicly challenge one another and unelected officials and institutions based on the country s constitution. Nonetheless, there were reports on violence led by Kolingba s political group to the public during of the rallies so demonstrate their displeasure on the result of the presidential elections . Thus, the institution in that period can be seen to be still unstable due to it still in the process of transitioning. Secondly, based on the constitution, all citizens are seen to be equal and are entitled to equal and same rights where no discrimination is tolerated but there aren t any specific articles which identifies those rights. However, based on the FreedomHouse report, there had been societal discrimination in many areas relegates women to second-class citizenship, especially in rural areas, and constitutional guarantees for women s rights are generally not enforced. Additionally, the US State Department reports major human rights abuses from extrajudicial executions, torture and alleged harsh and life-threatening conditions in prisons and detention centers. Additionally, it was also reported that these female genital mutilation, child labour and violence against children and women in relation to accusations of witchcraft . As it could be seen above that women had been poorly treated in the country, FreedomHouse had reported a slight improvement as women had gain some political positions in the government. As for female genital mutilation, it is still practiced, but has been reported to be diminishing. As for freedom of expression and press, CAR allows the creation of them constitutionally and it does have many independent press. The most popular medium of media in the country is radio as most of the population have access to radio frequency . An example of a radio channel is the UN-sponsored Radio Minurca provides unbiassed civic and voter educational programming, as well as rebroadcasts of international news. It was also reported that other broadcast media are dominated by the state and offer little coverage of opposition activities and only licensed private radio stations are music- or religion-oriented . Contradicting to the article on freedom of press as mentioned above, the CAR government had increasingly restricted those freedoms due to the critics and accusations that the press had made on the government s public policies and alleged corruption prior to 2001. . In addition to those restrictions, there were many international news reports on the journalists being arrested, imprisoned even missing for covering news that described the government to be unethical. Although both government-run and private newspapers criticized public policies and alleged corruption prior to an increase in civil unrest during 2001, the government has increasingly restricted freedom of the press and of expression since 2001. Journalists have been fined, arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and threatened with death for covering news about political violence or for publishing reports viewed as unfavourable to the government . Lastly on institutionalised rule, it could be seen that there were repeated cases of corruption and breach of human rights in CAR. As for corruption, initially it started out with political tensions in 1999. Allegations surfaced that a politician had been bribed to switch sides to the ruling party, giving it the majority in parliament . As of the Corruption Perception Index, CAR didn t show up in the list of top 90 countries, which showed the level of corruption the country had, globally . Due to the corruption, interferences to the press and weak political grooming, the efficiency and impartiality of judicial institutions. As reported by FreedomHouse, there were limitations on searches and detention are often ignored which led to conditions for prisoners to be extremely difficult and sometimes life-threatening. Police brutality was another serious problem. Freedomhouse reported that UN helped to restructure the military, which would involve the demobilization of about 800 soldiers and the presidential guard, and train 180 new police recruits. Additionally, more than 20 suspected criminals were executed without trial in 1999, and some died in prison from torture and other abuses by various military factions have become a serious problem in the capital. Thus, even if CAR is declared to democratic constitutionally, the corruption and breach to human rights are going against the fundamental of values of democracy that CAR was supposedly to be transitioning too. References BBBC. . Central African Republic profle - Media. Retrieved from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150043 BBC. . Central African Republic profile - Timeline. Retrieved from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150044 BBureau of Democracy, H. R. . Central African Republic Human Rights Report 2009. Retrieved from US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135944.htm FreedomHouse. . Central African Republic. FreedomHouse. International, T. . Corruption Perception Index 2001. Retrieved from Transperancy International : https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2001 Lakeberg-Dridi, B. A. . Central African Republic - Basic Data. Retrieved from Press References: http://www.pressreference.com/Be-Co/Central-African-Republic.html#ixzz4iQ99YOYX Project, C. . Constitution of Central African Republic. Retrieved from Constitute: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2013?lang=en#67 RWB. . News - Special Session on Central African Republic. Retrieved from Reporters Without Borders: https://rsf.org/en/news/special-session-central-african-republic Smith, K., & CNN. . Report: Accusations of child witchcraft on the rise in Africa. Retrieved from CNN : http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/07/19/africa.witchcraft.accusations/ World Press Freedom Index . . Retrieved from Reporters Without Borders: https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2009 |
| Chile | 1974 | 1980 | 4 | 1 | 1 | The time period I chose was 1974-1980, as I was assigned 1979. The end of 1974 is when Pinochet became President, and thus when the country began to transition more towards personal than institutional rule. In 1980, Pinochet approved a constitutional referendum that altered the nature of his regime. The answers for the democratic institutions questions were mostly simple. Pinochet suspended the Constitution when he took power in 1925 and thus there were no elections. Chile’s electoral service has no data for any elections between the pre-coup legislative elections of 1973 and elections that began in 1988 under Pinochet. Furthermore, numerous sources indicated that the junta served as executive and legislature from 1973-74, and that it remained the legislature thereafter . Not all political parties were banned in Pinochet’s Chile - the Christian Democratic Party supported the coup and would later serve as an opposition in the post 1980-era. Furthermore, the Socialist Party of Allende wasn’t officially banned, but it faced significant harassment and assassinations of its members and leaders. To be fair, the question on parties probably should have been somewhere between 0 and 1, but since that wasn’t an option I ticked 1. For the Civil Liberties questions, a bit more research was required. Ultimately, I discovered that the Pinochet regime exhibited significant sexism towards and exploitation of women . Furthermore, the indigenous Mapuche people found their land confiscated and their resistance smothered under Pinochet . Pinochet’s regime was famous for engaging in extrajudicial killings of the most gruesome nature, as well as torture and indefinite detentions. . The Church was not a part of Pinochet’s regime - it eventually evolved to become a fierce critic of it. Media and press freedom was also smothered under Pinochet . As for institutionalized rule, I engaged with the period during which Pinochet personalized his rule. In 1978, he kicked rival General Leigh out of the junta, and did the same with a lesser-known minister and general in 1974. For the most part, Pinochet worked with the junta but had the final word in all situations, particularly by my assigned year of 1979. Thus, for most of these questions I indicated a high level of personalized rule. |
| Chile | 2005 | 2015 | 14 | 12 | 10 | For the democratic institution questions i looked at these sources freedomhouse.org and state.gov. These showed that from 2005, the Senate authorized the reforms that repealed some of the last vestiges of military rule, ending authoritarian curbs on the legislative branch and restoring the president s right to remove top military commanders. From that The president of Chile is elected for a four-year term. The Senate s 38 members serve eight-year per terms, and the half up for election every four years, and the 120-member Chamber of Deputies is elected for four years. From that Chile has free and competitive elections, with more than one party, there no significant barriers except age to the eligibility of voters and there are both elections held for legislative, executive positions. And the percentages of corruption was low as the result of raising wages for government workers, that the the reason why Chile was ranked 20 out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index. For the civil rights questions i looked at these sources freedomhouse. These showed that from the period of time between 2005 until now, Chile is the country that respect the civil rights and do it in practice. To be more specific, There were no administration confinements on academic freedom or social occasions. The legislature routinely allowed grants marches and demonstrations, for specific routes, they refuse to give permission for certain routes refering to a worry for public safety. Police utilized nerve gas and water guns and coercively expelled or kept a few protesters when members vandalized private property, for example in august 2014 there is a few clashes between protester and police, some people are arrested because of extreme behaviors. The constitution accommodates opportunity of affiliation, and the administration for the most part regarded this privilege. The constitution and different laws and approaches secure religious freedom and the government respected for the most part regarded rebligious freedom in practice. The pattern in the administration’s regard for religious freedom did not change fundamentally amid the year. The constitution and different laws and arrangements secure religious freedom. Church and state are seperated. The law forbids religious segregation. The ONAR is a piece of the executive branch and is in charge of advancing religious freedom and resistance. The workplace’s order is to work with every religious association to execute established arrangements on religious freedom. In Chile The rights to form nongovernmental organizations and to assemble peacefully are allowed by government and largely respected. In Chile The rights to form nongovernmental organizations and to assemble peacefully are allowed by government and largely respected. The constitution ensures the privilege of association, which the administration has generally respected in practice. Laborers may shape unions without earlier approval and also join existing unions. Roughly 12 percentage of Chile’s 5.7 million specialists have a place with unions. |
| China | 1982 | 2012 | 7 | 8 | 9 | For the ‘democratic institutions’ section I used the following sources: http://english.cri.cn/1702/2004-11-1/116@159461.htm http://china.usc.edu/constitution-peoples-republic-china-1982 http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/26325.htm These sources showed that China is a one party political system ruled by the Communist Party of China. There are some other parties allowed but they have significant legal and social challenges. Public voting is done for regional officials and all above the age of 18 can vote. However there are some cases where political rights can be stripped from citizens for certain criminal offences. For the ‘Civil Liberties’ section I used the following sources: https://theculturetrip.com/asia/china/articles/a-history-of-homosexuality-in-china/ https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/asia/china.html https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/034/1991/en/ https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/065/1990/en/ https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/elizabeth-zehe-on-secularism-in-china https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/china Homosexuality in China was illegal throughout the time period specified, it was also deemed a mental disorder for quite some time. The legal, political and human rights of Tibetans were also not held during this period. As shown in both Amnesty International articles citizens of China who were openly against the regime were exposed to long periods of indefinite detention and the use of torture, these are clearly not the use of normal legal conventions. However, there is no evidence to suggest that an everyday citizen would not have had access to fair and normal legal conventions. China is heavily secular to the point of being an atheist country, this is due to its communist ideology. Speech that is critical of the government or strays from the communist ideology is generally not protected, but is allowed to a certain point. The government owns the majority of media outlets so there is very little independent press, and the online environment is heavily censored. For the ‘Institutionalized Rule’ section I used the following sources: http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/95811/20160719/communist-party-of-china-accountability.htm https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/china-s-power-china-s-people-towards-accountability http://www.moj.gov.vn/en/Pages/Talking-Laws.aspx?ItemID=25 These sources show that while the Chinese leadership may not be very accountable to the public there is at least some accountability within the party. The president has to espouse the same ideology and policies as the party, accountability about corruption however may be non-existent, I could not find enough information on this matter for the time period. |
| China | 2003 | 2017 | 2 | 1 | 4 | Question 2. Answers for China shall be from the period beginning March 2003. This time was selected as this marked the transition of power within the Chinese Communist Party from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. The significance of this change in presidency is that this was the first smooth and orderly leadership transition in Chinese Communist history. This set the precedent for future transitions of power within the party. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/china-xi-succeeds-jiang-communist http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat2/sub7/item75.html Question 3. The period of study shall continue until the present day. This is because there has been no change in the procedures or system within which the Chinese government operates since 2003. Question 4 and 5. There are elections within the Chinese Communist Party in order to select leaders. These ‘elections,’ however, are conducted as follows. The 3,000 members of the National People s Congress are formally elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, but in practice candidates are vetted by the CCP. They meet to elect a Central Committee of about 200 full members, which in turn meets at least once annually. The Central Committee elects a Political Bureau of about 20 25 full members; that body is the ruling leadership of the CCP. The Political Bureau s Standing Committee of about six to nine of its most-authoritative members is the highest echelon of leadership in the CCP and in the country as a whole. In practice, power flows from the top down in the CCP. Although this is technically an ‘election’ because it involves votes, it removes all public participation entirely. The process only involves one party, the CCP, and the people within this party - both which the public cannot choose. Ultimately there is absolutely nothing the general public can do to ensure their desired candidate comes to power in both the executive or legislature. There are elections at the local level which have some characteristics of democracy. There are votes for candidates, however these local elections are stacked in favour of the Communist Party s handpicked candidates to all but guarantee they win. Freedom House reports that independent candidates are prevented from getting their names on the ballot through intimidation, harassment, and in some cases detention. These elections are frequently undermined by fraud, corruption, and attacks on independent candidates and their supporters. Voters are also routinely denied the chance to freely choose a political representative. Clearly these local elections are extremely flawed, and the state-level elections are non-existent because the public doesn t vote at all. Therefore I shall award 0 points for questions 4 and 5. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/asia/china-clamps-down-on-even-a-by-the-book-campaign.html http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/asia/political-outsiders-turn-to-microblog-campaigns-in-china.html https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china Questions 6 and 7. Both 0 points because there are no elections, and only one party exists with strict procedures in place to ensure opposition is suppressed. Question 8. I shall also award 0 points for question 8 because, although those with executive power are there through the CCP electoral process, they have not been elected by the public - meaning an unelected group has ultimate power. Question 9. Because this question concerns the power of elected officials - and there are no elected officials in China - it should technically be 0. However, I shall make a judgement call and not follow this strictly, because otherwise I will be awarding 0 for almost everything in China. Therefore, I shall answer this question as if those with power were elected fairly. Even when considering it like this, China could potentially receive 0 points because the only cases of officials being held accountable appears to be when they are not pursuing the CCP’s interests One example of accountability occurred when Xi Jinping recently initiated a crackdown on corruption in the government. Ex-security chief Zhou Yongkang, the most senior Chinese official to be investigated for corruption, was arrested and expelled from the Communist Party in 2014. This is an example of an official being held accountable, however, Zhou Yongkang may simply have been used as a scapegoat to create the perception that something is being done about corruption. A second example is the government’s fight against pollution and environmental degradation after decades of growth have left the country with huge problems such as smog and contaminated soil. A total of 3,287 officials in eight provincial areas were held accountable in the first round of inspections earlier this year for offences including allowing construction in nature reserves and worsening pollution. These examples would suggest that some form of accountability does exist among government officials, however there is yet to be a case during my period of study where anyone has held the absolute senior leaders to account. Therefore I shall award 1 point for this question. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1214/c90000-9154406.html?winzoom=1 Questions 10 and 11. China has plenty of examples of ill-treatment and discrimination of certain identity groups both within and outside the law. One example is that of Falun Gong, a harmless Chinese spiritual discipline which has been banned in China since 1999 in a bizarre restriction of rights upon a societal group. Practitioners were sentenced to reform through labour camps where they were starved, beaten, and tortured with electric batons. By 2008, there are over 3,000 documented cases of practitioners killed by state persecution. While Falun Gong practitioners are no longer sent in large numbers to re-education through labour camps, which were abolished in 2013, many are still criminally prosecuted, in some cases receiving long prison terms, or arbitrarily detained in legal education centres, where they can face torture to force them to abandon their beliefs. Once released, they typically experience constant monitoring and harassment. It is argued that this occurred due to the popularity of Falun Gong, as the number of people participating in its practises concerned the government. A further example of utter discrimination within China is the treatment of Tibetan people. Tibetans do not have freedom of speech, religion or movement. Self-immolations where Tibetans light themselves on fire as an individual form of protests against oppression have become common. The Free Tibet website discusses how torture is an everyday reality in Tibet. Torture of Tibetan prisoners continues while those responsible for it go unpunished." There is constant suppression of Tibetans rights in China. Because of the Chinese attitude and their treatment of such minority groups, notably torture and sometimes death, I believe it is right to award 0 points for both questions 10 and 11. A 0 is awarded for both questions because such examples of discrimination occur both due to law, and also as discrimination regardless of legal rights. http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-faith-column/2008/08/falun-gong-party-chinese https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2016/02/04/chinas-oppression-of-tibetans-has-dramatically-increased/ http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/world/asia/un-rights-official-faults-china-on-tibetan-suppression.html Question 12. According to freedom house, “the CCP still dominates the judicial system, with courts at all levels supervised by party political-legal committees that have influence in the appointment of judges, court operations, and verdicts and sentences. While citizens can expect a degree of fair adjudication in non-political cases, those that touch on politically sensitive issues or the interests of powerful groups are subject to decisive guidance from political-legal committees.” Lawyers themselves who defend political activists have ended up with significant prison terms, meaning it is extremely difficult to get a lawyer, never mind have a fair trial as soon as your case involves politics. Freedom house cite the examples of Zhou Shifeng - head of the Fengrui Law Firm, which employed a large number of lawyers working on politically sensitive cases - who received a seven year prison sentence. Xia Lin, who had represented high-profile clients such as the dissident artist Ai Weiwei and the human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, was sentenced to 12 years in prison, having already spent nearly two years in pretrial detention. These are just a few examples of a flawed justice system whereby it is near impossible to win a case which is remotely to do with the government. However, as mentioned, citizens can expect a degree of fair adjudication in non-political cases, so China will have to be awarded 1 point for this question. Question 13. Torture is very common in China, and this question certainly receives 0 points. At the United Nations Committee Against Torture in 2015, the following was said: The practice of torture and ill-treatment is still deeply entrenched in the criminal justice system. Freedom house also said the following on torture in China: “Conditions in places of detention, which are estimated to hold three to five million people in total, are harsh, with reports of inadequate food, regular beatings, and deprivation of medical care. While the government has gradually reduced the number of crimes carrying the death penalty, currently at 46, it is estimated that thousands of inmates are executed each year; the government treats the true figure as a state secret.” There are countless more sources, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International who discuss the very prominent use of torture in China, especially towards Tibetans. Therefore, China receives 0 points for question 13. https://freetibet.org/torture-tibet https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2016/02/04/chinas-oppression-of-tibetans-has-dramatically-increased/ https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/china-torture-forced-confession/ Question 14. There is not necessarily an alignment of the government with a certain religion, however the government makes considerable efforts to restrict certain religious beliefs. In Freedom house’s 2017 report, it was said that a CCP work conference on religion laid out the leadership s plans to tighten control over religious organizations and activities. The space for autonomous religious practice narrowed further as the government restricted and harassed a wide range of religious communities and laid out plans for tighter management of religion during the first National Conference on Religious Work in 15 years. Authorities asserted that religion must serve as an instrument for national unity and social stability, and called on religious groups to Sinicize by endorsing the political system, conforming to Chinese society, and embodying Chinese culture. There has also been the demolition of over 1,200 crosses and numerous churches in recent years, and congregations across the region remain under pressure. In August 2016, Hu Shigen, who led a number of underground churches, was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in Tianjin for supposedly spreading subversive ideas. So, while there is not necessarily a state church, the government does impose some restrictions on religion, so I shall award 1 point for question 14. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china Questions 15, 16 and 17. Speech critical of the government - and ultimately the prevailing ideology of the Chinese Communist Party - is not protected in China. In fact, as reported by freedom house, speech deemed politically sensitive by the authorities is punished with imprisonment. Human Rights Watch also identify that activists increasingly face arbitrary detention, imprisonment, commitment to psychiatric facilities, or house arrest. As well as physical abuse, harassment, and intimidation being routine in China. Recently a new rule called the Regulation on Collecting and Using Electronic Data as Evidence, has been introduced. This allows authorities to collect and use private digital messaging information, text messages, e-mail, personal photos, videos, text documents, and online blog and forum posts to prosecute an individual for criminal wrongdoing, including speech-related offenses. China has one of the most technically sophisticated internet filtering and censorship systems in the world which removes anything sensitive to the government. Access to the internet in China is provided by eight Internet Service Providers, which are licensed and controlled by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. This, in tandem with the ‘Great Firewall’, provides the Chinese public with what is commonly described as one of the most restricted internets in the world. Internet service providers are required to block websites and delete content as instructed by censors. Thousands of websites have been blocked, including major news and social media hubs like the New York Times, Le Monde, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook. Independent press is a definite no in China as the Cyberspace Administration of China reinforced rules to prevent Chinese internet portals from producing any original news content, restricting them to repackaging content provided by a small number of authorized sources. In August the CAC imposed tough new censorship requirements on internet providers, including continuous monitoring of news content and a provision holding editors in chief personally responsible for content. This harsh internet environment prompted the 2015 Freedom on the Net survey to rank China as the world s worst abuser of internet freedom. This is a clear outline as to the extreme restrictions on speech critical of the government and their ideology, as well as any independent press. Therefore, China scores 0 points for questions 15, 16 and 17. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/china https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017877 https://www.opendemocracy.net/china-correspondent/great-firewall-of-china http://time.com/4642916/china-vpn-internet-great-firewall-censorship/ Question 18. There are frequent violations of China’s constitution. Freedom house provides examples of such situations by describing how China s constitution protects the right of citizens to demonstrate, but in practice protesters rarely obtain approval and risk punishment for assembling without permission. An example of such protests occurred in the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. The PLO opened fire on protesters with estimates of the death toll ranging from several hundred to thousands. While this is outside my period of study, by the end of 2003, as many as 2,000 persons remained in prison for their activities during the Tiananmen demonstrations. This shows that China’s standpoint has not changed regarding this issue. China s constitution also gives individuals the right to petition the government concerning a grievance or injustice. Yet, again, in practice petitioners are routinely intercepted in their efforts to reach Beijing, forcefully returned to their hometowns, or extralegally detained in black jails, psychiatric institutions, and other sites, where they are at risk of beatings, psychological abuse, or sexual violence. A further example is that although workers in China are afforded many protections under existing laws, violations of labour and employment regulations are widespread. Perhaps the most extreme and horrific example of China ignoring their own constitution is in the case of torture. The Free Tibet website explains this, saying “Torture is also forbidden under Chinese law. China s Criminal Procedure Law sets out a clear prohibition on the use of torture and Article 18 of this law explicitly describes torture as a crime that should be investigated. Despite these obligations, in practice, Free Tibet has repeatedly found that torture of Tibetan prisoners continues while those responsible for it go unpunished. We have found no instance of any official being prosecuted for conducting or supporting torture in Tibet.” The constitution in China is routinely violated, as described in these few examples . Therefore China receives 0 points for question 18. http://www.china-profile.com/history/indepth/id_121.htm http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/asia/tiananmen-square-fast-facts/ https://freetibet.org/torture-tibet https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china Question 19. As described in question 18, there are constant examples of officials violating the law and going unpunished. Many such officials appear to have immunity from the law, especially when dealing with oppressed minority groups such as the Tibetan people. Therefore China also receives 0 points for question 19. Question 20. China.org provides a detailed description of China’s law making process. A summary is “China s legislation structure is not one of checks and balances, where the legislation, administration and court stand independently to restrain one another. China s president and premier of the State Council both come from the National People s Congress. The president, following the decision of the National People s Congress, publicizes laws. The premier, however, does not have the right to approve or reject laws made by the NPC. Administrative laws and regulations shall not go against the laws passed by the NPC; local laws and regulations shall not go against the national laws and administrative regulations; and the NPC has the power to withdraw administrative laws and local regulations that go against the laws it has worked out. This shows the internal relations of China s legislation structure one of subordination, unification and supervision. It does not represent a relationship of restraint.” It seems as though China’s law making follows a clear structure which is adhered to. I have found no evidence of this process being flouted or bypassed. Therefore I shall award 2 points. http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/76212.htm http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/democratic_governance/improving-law-making-in-china--public-participation--legislation.html Question 21. The general public cannot hold officials to account. In fact, if the public is unhappy about the way the government is doing something, there is no avenue at all for them to voice their concerns without a high chance of landing in prison or facing some alternative punitive measure. Therefore, China shall score a 0 for this question. As discussed in question 18, Freedom House indicates that while China s constitution gives individuals the right to petition the government concerning a grievance or injustice, in practice petitioners are routinely intercepted in their efforts to reach Beijing, forcefully returned to their hometowns, or extralegally detained in black jails, psychiatric institutions, and other sites, where they are at risk of beatings, psychological abuse, or sexual violence. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china Question 23. There is currently a cult of personality to a certain degree in China. This has, however, not always been the case throughout my period of study, as Hu Jintao did not particularly develop this. Xi Jinping has more recently attempted to create image of charisma and charm as he attempts to increase support of the people as well as showing his authority. Xi believes this will be politically beneficial in order to avoid public opposition. There have been songs and dances created to honour Xi Jinping as evidence of this. While this is the case for Xi Jinping, it appears his predecessor did not enjoy such aspects of a cult of personality. Many sources label Hu Jintao as being rather uninspiring and lacking any charisma. Therefore it appears as though a cult of personality is not constant throughout my period of study, so I shall award 1 point for question 23. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/ http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-35824042/cult-of-personality-why-is-china-dancing-for-uncle-xi http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/xi-jinping-cult-personality |
| Colombia | 1992 | 2016 | 12 | 8 | 9 | Colombia is highly controversial country in terms of democratic assessment as far as I am concerned. There are several reason for my choice of the focal period of research in Colombia. The beginning year of my research in Colombia is 1992 because this year followed the year marked the replacement of the old Constitution of Colombia of 1886 by the newest one in 1991. The Constitution of 1991 is the current governing document of the Republic of Colombia . The final year 2016 is chosen simply because the most updated documents and reports of Colombia came out this year. In addition, although the newest Constitution of 1991 provided many democratic articles and other signals of progress in democracy did occur from 1992 to 2016, Colombia also witnessed state s inability to guarantee basic civil rights and liberties during this period. A wide range of references were used to evaluate Colombian regime but the main sources are Freedom House reports, Amnesty International reports, Colombia s constitution and article From restricted to besieged : The changing nature of limits to democracy in Colombia . For answering the ‘democratic institutions’ questions, I took reports from Freedom House, Colombia s constitution and the article in the article into account. For civil liberties questions, I looked through publishes of Freedom House and Amnesty International reports every year in chosen periods to answer. However, as this group of questions is highly controversial, I consulted from additional sources like Colombian Reflection as well. Finally, institutionalized rule questions, which are of high controversy too, were answered after I analyzed information from two main sources: Luxembourg s constitution and Freedom House reports in addition to Colombian Reflection In the article From restricted to besieged : The changing nature of limits to democracy in Colombia, the authors show that since 1990, there were some paradoxically notable features of Colombian politics. First, e lections are held regularly, but candidate s and elected politicians are regularly assassinated . Second, t he press is free from state censorship, but journalists and academics are systematically murdered . Third, there was a g rowing number of political parties and minorities participate in representative institutions; the constitution and the law address the opposition s right and responsibilities. At the same time, the killings of opposition leaders multiply . Fourth, the military has retained a high degree of autonomy in matters of public order, as well as a series of prerogatives that place it above civilian control . And finally, the article indicates that the state has been unable to contain one of the world s highest murder rates . Freedom House and Amnesty international reports demonstrates that though Colombia is electoral democracy, there were still existence of vote buying, opaque financing, and intimidation in some areas, particularly former paramilitary strongholds . The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and opposition views are commonly expressed in the media. Nevertheless, crime and conflict make it difficult for people especially journalists to work. Dozens of journalists have been murdered since the mid-1990s, many for reporting on drug trafficking and corruption. As a result, self-censorship is common if not mandatory. The government does not restrict access to the internet or censor websites. However, constitutional rights regarding freedoms of assembly and association are restricted in practice by violence. Although the government provides extensive protection to hundreds of threatened human rights workers, trust in the program varies widely, and scores of activists have been murdered in recent years, mostly by paramilitary groups. Finally, I have problems with a bunch of questions. First, I think questions regarding freedom of speech are not sufficient to assess Colombia case. In this sense, these questions mostly evaluate relationship between freedoms of speech with government. Indeed Colombian constitution guarantees freedom of expression and there is independent press in this country. However, the important thing is that while opposition views are commonly expressed in the media, journalists face intimidation, kidnapping, and violence both in the course of reporting and as retaliation for their work from mainly criminal groups. Therefore, while Colombian government basically protect freedom of speech, it is not freed at all to report due to criminal threats. Although I know that we are working on regime classification I still feel unease at labelling Colombia democratic following criterion of freedom of speech. The same problem with question Civil Liberties 6 : Is speech critical of the government generally protected?" “0 points: No. Speech critical of the government is often censorred or even criminalized.” “1 Points: Sometimes. Some criticisms of the government are allowed, as long as they do not stray beyond certain lines.” “2 Points: With very minor exceptions, yes.” It is hard to answer this question again because it is not clearly from whom it is protected. Literally, speech critical of the government are allowed, at least according to constitution. However, those reported these contents often got threatened or even murdered . Government is unable to protect civil rights but to some extent they allow freedom of expression officially. Therefore, if it just takes into account relationship between government and those who make critical speech, I should give 2-point answer. However, what happened in practice hardly allows me to give such an answer. Perhaps, some elected officials colluded with criminals in matters of drug trafficking or bribery but overall these killings were the results of state s inability to protect citizens rights rather than regime s intention. In question 8: “Democratic Political Institutions 5: Do elected officials have more influence than unelected institutions or individuals ?”, I chose an answer in that elected officials are sometimes overshadowed by non-elected officials who have more real executive power, but elected figures are not powerless. To clarify my answer, Colombian elected officials are often subjects to military and criminal influence. However, they are sometimes manipulated by those criminals who indeed do not any real executive power at all like the answering option suggests. In question 12, my answer is that t hose suspected of crimes did not have the right to a lawyer, trial, and other fair legal conventions in the sense that they were not brought to justice by the government. There was persistence of impunity in Colombia. Thus those suspected of crimes did not have the right to fair conventions because they were treated unfairly in terms of too mercifully . They should have been brought to justice though. This implies that primary elected officials, or more precisely, at least judiciary were not held accountable to their citizens and there was violation of consitution by judiciary branch. As a result, I answered the question 18 and 21 that way. After all, Colombian regime is a highly controversial in my opinion. The key factor making Colombia case complicated is criminal influence. Usually it is hard to distinguish violence from government or criminal groups while the influence of criminals are huge within Colombian society. It might be that much violation of civil liberties and civil from rights come from g overnment s inability to guarantee the security of its citizens rather its intention . Therefore, I am not that 100% confidence in assessing this country s regime. Several questions made me extremely confused so I think I need more time and effort to consider and work on Colombia in my final essay for the regime classification project. References Bejarano, A., & Pizarro, E. . From Restricted to Besieged : The Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia. In F. Hagopian & S. Mainwaring, The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511791116.009 Colombian Reflection . Primer on Colombian Politics: Institutions and Constitution . Retrieved 26 May, 2017 from https://colombianreflections.wordpress.com/category/constitutional-jurisprudence/ Constitute.org . Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2005. Retrieved 26 May, 2017 from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf |
| Colombia | 2010 | 2016 | 15 | 11 | 6 | Colombia has been a very interesting democracy to break down and classify. Certain facts about Colombia are indisputable and easy to rank such as the fact that there are elections held for major executive branch positions as we know that on 20 June 2010, after two rounds of voting in the presidential election Juan Manuel Santos Calderón was officially elected as President of Colombia and was inaugurated on 7 August 2010 . It is also common knowledge that Santos has been praised for his democratic leadership and has won a Nobel Peace Prize for pursuing a deal to end the longest-running war in the Americas. The fact that the international community recognizes Santo’s actions serves as evidence for his constructive or benevolent leadership. ;font-style: normal;font-weight: normal;letter-spacing: normal;orphans: 2;text-indent: 0.0px;text-transform: none;white-space: normal;widows: 2;word-spacing: 0.0px;> Al Jazeera and news agencies, ‘Colombia’s Juan Santos receives Nobel Peace Prize’, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com) Similarly, though high voter abstention rates have been the norm in Colombia since universal male suffrage was adopted in the 1930s, the criteria for voting have clear and definite requirements such age: 18 years, Colombian citizenship, full possession of civil and political rights . Disqualifications stem from being members of the armed forces on active duty, police officers ect., http://www.ipu.org) Also, there is evidence that Non-government parties can form . In fact, not only has Colombia maintained a two-party system ;letter-spacing: normal;orphans: 2;text-indent: 0.0px;text-transform: none;white-space: normal;widows: 2;word-spacing: 0.0px;> the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, agreed to rotate power, intercalating for a period of four presidential terms) and a level of electoral stability uncommon to other nations in the region since the National Front period 1958 1974 but also, in recent years the Colombian party system has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of new, or nontraditional, parties in its elected bodies. The presence of a myriad new parties in the 1990s, particularly in congress, suggest a trend towards political pluralism. . However, there are certain ambiguities within the system which render an accurate classification of Colombia s regime almost impossible. For example, regarding the question of whether elected officials have more influence than unelected institutions or individuals, it is difficult to judge as a major challenge to Colombia s capacity over the past ten years has been the continuation of the longstanding Colombian Civil War, which initially began in 1964. The conflict itself comprises of four main constituents, the drug cartels, the right-wing paramilitaries, and the left wing guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as the FARC and the Colombian governments army. The conflict is the world s longest continuous war, with each actor having their own interpretation of how the country should be run, whilst asserting that they represent the interests of the disenfranchised majority. Colombian President Santos has been able to construct a peace negotiation with the FARC, however this agreement to create a new peace tribunal to try those responsible for gross human rights abuses committed during the armed conflict has some obvious shortcomings. Under the agreement, those responsible for crimes against humanity and serious war crimes who cooperate with the new judicial system and confess their crimes would spend between five and eight years under special conditions that would entail effective restraint of liberty but no prison time. Such special conditions could fail to provide punishments that reflect the gravity of the crimes as required under international law. In addition, the government announced that members of Farc would be guaranteed 10 seats in the Colombian Congress in the 2018 and 2022 elections. However, this deal required ratification by Colombians in order to come into force. As such Colombian voters rejected a landmark peace deal with Farc rebels in a shock referendum result, with 50.2% voting against it. Most of those who voted “no” said they thought the peace agreement was letting the rebels “get away with murder”. rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> http://www.bbc.com) Thus it is very difficult to judge which actors have the most influence in society as it was the Colombian administration that set up the negotiations with FARC, however the government seemed to concede to FARC s every whim, yet the deal was ultimately rejected by the Colombian population who will as a consequence, will continue to be subjected to the political instability caused by the FARC. Correspondingly, perhaps it would be accurate to deem that while the power dynamics of this structure are still unclear, the Farc is clearly leaving a huge impact on Colombian society. Some questions such as are some people above the law and Are all state leaders in official positions can be accurately answered using this information. For example, the consensus within Colombia s population is that Farc leader Timoleon Jimenez and other FARC members are unacceptably above the law and this is demonstrated by their referendum decision. Also, the fact that President Santos has conceded to negotiating with FARC leader Jimenez suggests that some state leaders are not in official positions at all but manage to wield a degree of political power. However, the ambiguities of certain norms in Colombia complicate the process of evaluating the country s civil liberties. For example, freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed under Colombian law, and the government generally has respected these rights in practice however journalists practice self-censorship to avoid reprisals by corrupt officials, criminals, and members of illegal armed groups. Also in the past decade, more than 80 journalists have been murdered for doing their jobs. Therefore, whether freedom of speech is only sometimes guaranteed or is ‘typically guaranteed but with some minor exceptions’ is largely down to interpretation. A similar ambiguity is present within the issue of whether certain identity groups experience widespread discrimination in housing, the justice system, and other sectors of society or if certain identity groups are afforded fewer legal rights. For instance, a landmark anti-discrimination law, described by one supporter as an homage to equality, was signed into law last month by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. For the first time, it levies prison sentences for acts of discrimination based on ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation or nationality. According to President Santos, the law is a form of justice and claimed It was time to get tough on this and to ensure the protection of the rights of those discriminated against rel=nofollow rel=nofollow> www.ndi.org) . However, experts have claimed that the Colombian state has customarily denied the existence of racial discrimination, a position that is frequently reiterated by high-level public officials. Successive administrations have defended this notion with the argument that neither institutional nor legal discrimination exists and that processes of miscegenation have produced equal conditions for all communities. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude the extent to which certain groups experience discrimination due to contradicting information. |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of | 2006 | 2017 | 5 | 7 | 4 | Question Twenty-seven- I have chosen 2006 as the first year of my period of study for the Congo, Democratic Republic of as this was the year that Joseph Kabila of the Independent party was first elected using a multiparty election. In 2006, the name of Congo, Democratic Republic of was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Therefore, I will refer to this state as the Democratic Republic of the Congo Question Twenty-eight- I have chosen 2016 final year of my period of study as this was the final year of Kabila s term as a democratically elected President. Following 2016, he refused to stand down as President despite his term finishing and so was no longer a democratically elected leader. Democratic Political Institutions Question Twenty-nine - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo one point as although elections are held for the President, they are highly unfair. An example of this was in the 2011 election. Prior to the election the government amended the electoral law to eliminate the requirement for presidential runoff elections, giving undue advantage to incumbent Joseph Kabila. In addition to this, the U.S.-based Carter Centre monitoring group reported that due to insufficient preparation and widespread irregularities throughout the process- including incomplete voter lists, lack of voting materials, missing results from some 3,500 polling stations, and impossibly large voter turnouts in some districts- the presidential election results were not credible . Question Thirty - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo one point for the election of legislative positions as although elections were held for the National Assembly during Kabila s term, they suffered from the same problems as the Presidential elections. Question Thirty-one - Although it is not legal disenfranchisement, the significant violence against those opposed to the governing party create a barrier of fear amongst opposition supporters to vote. This creates a barrier for potential voters of opposition parties. Question Thirty-two - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo one point as although it was possible to create opposition parties, the police made it very challenging to gain support. An example of this was in the lead-up to the 2011 election. Opposition politicians and their supporters faced violence and harassment by police& Police used tear gas, beat protestors with clubs, and fired lives rounds into the air to break up a series of demonstrations in September and October by supporters of opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress UDPS) leader Tshisekedi, who had emerged as Kabila s main presidential challenger. This oppression of opposition politicians and supporters is clear evidence of non-governmental parties being significantly handicapped. Question Thirty-three - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo two points as President Kabila and other members of the executive, such as the Police, clearly hold the most power and influence in their state. Although their election may be somewhat fraudulent, they hold far more power than non-elected institutions such as the military or the monarchy. Question Thirty-four - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo one point as although the legislature and executive can challenge one another, the legislature is structured as a Presidential majority. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the legislature will challenge President Kabila on issues. Civil Liberties Question Thirty-five - I have given the Democratic Republic of Congo one point. Despite not being criminalized or being afforded fewer legal rights, discrimination against certain identity groups continues to be a major problem. The Mbuti of Ituri and Congolese Banyamulenge Tutsi of South Kuvi face major discrimination. An example of this was in October 2011 when five Banyamulenge aid workers and two other Banyamulenge civilians were killed in an ambush in South Kivu, by allied rebels of Burundi s National Liberation Front. It is widely believed that group was targeted because of their ethnicity, as other members of the group in the vehicle who were not Tutsi were released. Despite being guaranteed by the constitution, discrimination against women also continue to be a major problem. Mass rapes continue to occur, and conviction is rare. Abortion is prohibited, access to contraception is extremely low, and childbirth mortality is a serious problem. In addition to this, women are greatly underrepresented in government, making up only 10 percent of the National Assembly. Question Thirty-six - I have given the Democratic Republic of the Congo zero points. Despite being guaranteed by the constitution, the identity group of women face widespread discrimination in the justice system and Congolese legislation. Mass rapes continue to occur, and conviction is rare. Abortion is prohibited, access to contraception is extremely low, and childbirth mortality is a serious problem. In addition to this, women are greatly underrepresented in government, make up only 10 percent of the National Assembly. Question Thirty-seven - Despite being guaranteed by the Congolese constitution, suspects of crimes are not always given fair legal conventions. The judiciary is subject to corruption and manipulation, and the court systems lacks both trained personnel and resources. In addition to this, there is little justice for victims of violence and sexual violence. Question Thirty-eight - The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not protected from arbitrary or cruel punishment. According to Amnesty International, state agents as well as members of armed groups perpetrated acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The National Intelligence Agency was responsible for abductions and forms of prolonged incommunicado detention that breach the right of detainees to be treated with humanity and the absolute prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment. Question Thirty-nine - There is a clear separation of church and state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution and generally respected in practice. Question Forty - Although it is constitutionally guaranteed, freedom of speech and expression against the government is very limited. According to Freedom House, members of the state security apparatus threaten, detain and attack journalists whose reporting is critical of government officials. Question Forty-one - Similarly, speech which is critical of the prevailing ideology in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is dealt with very harshly. This is seen in the significant violence against journalist, particularly near election times. Question Forty-two - The press is independent but faces great pressure to report positively on the actions of the government. This pressure is seen in the number of journalists threatened, detained and attacked by state security apparatus whose reporting is critical of government officials. Question Forty-three - The constitution is routinely violated. This is seen in the large number of violations of the constitution in areas such as freedom of speech and expression and the independence of the judiciary. Question Forty-four - Most government and government-allied forces enjoy apparent impunity from even the most heinous crimes. These groups of people are clearly above the law. Institutionalized Rule Question Forty-five - Although there is an accountable institutional process for creating laws and policy, this process is sometimes used in a corrupt manner. For example, before the 2011 elections, the government amended the law to eliminate the requirement for second round presidential election when no candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round. This amendment was seen by opposition parties as corrupt manipulation of the law-making process to ensure Kabila s re-election. Question Forty-six - Due to the corruption of the electoral process, President Kabila is not entirely accountable to the Congolese people. However, the form of democratisation adopted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has made the Kabila somewhat sensitive to pressure. Question Forty-seven - Despite the dubious appointment of leaders, all leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo hold official positions. Question Forty-eight - President Kabila does not have a cult following. However, the lack of free of speech against him result in Congolese people often have a greater opinion of him that what is accurate. This results in a cult-like following of Kabila by some members of society. Bibliography Amnesty International. . Annual Report- Democratic Republic of the Congo 2016/2017 . Retrieved from Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/report-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/ Baker, A. . Congo’s President Is Refusing to Step Down, Raising Fears of Bloodshed . Retrieved from TIME: http://time.com/4604626/congo-kabila-protests-glissement-katumbi/ BBC News. . Democratic Republic of Congo profile - Timeline . Retrieved from BBC : http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13286306 Freedom House. . Congo, Democratic Republlic of . Retrieved from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa Freedom House. . Congo, Demoratic Republic of . Retrieved from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa |
| Costa Rica | 1990 | 1994 | 15 | 11 | 10 | Democratic and Political Institutions: Costa Rica is a Democratic Republic as established by the 1949 constitution which was enacted after a brief civil war in 1948. After the enactment of the 1949 constitution, the army was officially disbanded, the absence of a national army is often credited with facilitating the lasting peace and strength of Costa Rica’s democratic system. Free and fair elections are held every 4 years to elect the president and all 57 members of the state legislator with no option for reelection. All other members of the executive cabinet are appointed by the president and do not require the approval of the legislative assembly. There exists an independent Judicial branch consisting of district courts, 4 courts of appeal and the supreme court. The supreme court deals with constitutional matters and supreme court judges are elected by the legislative assembly. The supreme court is responsible for electing officials to an electoral commission that oversees national elections. During the research period from 1990-1994 prisoners in Costa Rica were excluded from voting, however, this only represents a very small portion of the population, 3,905 people in 1990. There existed no other restrictions on voting other than age, voting was compulsory but not enforced. The 1990 election was dominated by the two main parties at the time, The Social Christian Unity Party and the National Liberation Party, however, 12 other parties competed for parliamentary positions with 3 gaining seats and 5 of those parties supplied presidential candidates who competed for the presidency. Sources for first section: The Costa Rican constitution, accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en Freedom House reports on Costa Rica only started in 1998 but can help verify the extent to which the constitution was enforced during the research period 1990-1994 accessed from; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/costa-rica World Prison Brief provided stats on prison population that was ineligible to vote during the 1990 election, accessed from: http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/costa-rica Data on the 1990 election was sourced from: Elections in the Americas a Data Handbook volume 1, accessed from wikipedia at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_Rican_general_election,_1990 Civil Liberties: The Costa Rican constitution provides strong protections for civil liberties including protection against discrimination based on religion, race, gender, or sexuality, and protection from arbitrary detention and cruel punishment. The constitution is enforced by an effective legal system in which accused persons can defend themselves and there exists a special ombudsman who can investigate any breaches of civil liberties. The constitution states that Roman Catholicism is the state religion but the constitution also provides for religious freedom and the state is relatively free from religious ideology and it is not enforced in any way. No Church or religious institutions hold any inappropriate power over the political processes of the state. There exists a free and independent press that provides a wide diversity of television channels, newspapers, and radio stations, however, there does exist libel laws that have been criticised for having a potential cooling effect on negative reporting of the government. While such negative reporting including allegations of corruption do take place, in some instances reporters can be and have been charged with defamation for giving negative reports of government. There have since been reforms of these laws that have strengthened freedom of the press in Costa Rica but they were still in effect during the research period 1990-1994, and were not considered to have a minimal cooling effect on negative reporting. Sources for second section: The Costa Rican constitution, accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en Freedom House reports on Costa Rica only started in 1998 but can help verify the extent to which the constitution was enforced during the research period 1990-1994 and help verify the accuracy of the below report on the Costa Rican Press during the research period. accessed from; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/costa-rica Data on the press was collected from Press Referance.com. accessed from: http://www.pressreference.com/Co-Fa/Costa-Rica.html Institutional Rule: The state’s political institutions are highly functional and exercise power and the rule of law within Costa Rica. The state’s legislative assembly and the president are held accountable in regular elections and by the law. At the time 1990-1994 neither presidents or legislative members were permitted to run for reelection so there may be considered some restriction on electoral accountability, however, the restrictions on reelection were removed in 2003 and Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier who served as president from 1990-1994 attempted to run for reelection in the 2010 election but withdrew prematurely when he was convicted on corruption charges. This case highlights the fact that while some high-level corruption does exist in Costa Rica even high-level politicians can still face prosecution for their crimes. There does also exist problems with drug trafficking within Costa Rica and there have been allegations of government corruption and police brutality relating to the drug trade but these criminals are not generally above the law and can still be held accountable. Sources for third section: The Costa Rican constitution, accessed from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en Freedom House reports on Costa Rica only started in 1998 but can help verify the extent to which the constitution was enforced during the research period 1990-1994 accessed from; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/costa-rica Data on Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier was accessed from wikipedia.com who cited Spanish media reports. accessed from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael_Ángel_Calderón_Fournier |
| Costa Rica | 2002 | 2016 | 11 | 12 | 10 | Costa Rica Justification The period of my study for Costa Rica is 2002-2016. Costa Rica is a democracy and has been, with a few years of exception, since 1899. 2002 has been chosen as the starting point of the regime as it was the first time the essentially two-party system was challenged. The 2002 election was the first year a third party became relevant and no party surpassed the 40% mark resulting in a second round. This was the establishment of a multiparty system. The multiparty democracy is ongoing which is why the ending date is 2016. For the Democratic Political Institutions, I looked at Freedom House reports, as well as Costa Rica s Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/costa-rica https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en Costa Rica has competitive multiparty elections for both executive branch positions and legislative positions . There are no significant barriers except age in terms of voting. In Costa Rica, voting is required by law but is not enforced . Non-governmental parties can form easily and there are no non-elected positions that exercise executive power . The Roman Catholic Church is the official state church and although it does not have significant power over officials, it does have some influence in political affairs . Finally, elected officials can challenge each other and hold each other to account. In 2014, nine parties won representation in the legislature. There are 57 seats in the Legislative Assembly and the ruling party, the National Liberation Party only won 18 seats . For the Civil Liberties section, I referred to the Freedom House reports, the Costa Rica s Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2011 and a report from the U.S Department of State on the Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor written in 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/costa-rica https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168207.htm Although not formally criminalised, indigenous people in Costa Rica often receive less rights in regards public services and land rights . The government has made movement to pass the Indigenous Autonomy Bill, which will protect indigenous land and reserves, but they have been slow to pass it and continue to resist pressure from Inter-American Commission on Human Rights . Women are often sexually harassed and forced to work overtime with no pay although there have been policies to combat this . The constitution states that no one may be detained without prove linking them to a crime and without a written mandate of a judge or authority in charge of the public order . It also states that no one should be submitted to cruel punishments in prison but delays in the judiciary system, as well as overcrowding of prisons, result in indefinite sentences and harsher conditions . Although there is a state church in Costa Rica and it does have some influence, the government has made it clear that there is a separation between the state and the church. The constitution establishes that the president, vice president, cabinet members and Supreme Court cannot be clergy members . Costa Rica government actively practices freedom of religion . Speech critical of the government and against the prevailing ideology is accepted to an extent. Media is free and over the years of the regime, it has been less accountable to the government. In 2004, a poll stated that a third of journalists were threatened with prosecution for damaging the reputation of an individual . In 2015, a minister was fired by the government by drafting a bill that would allow media outlets to be shut down if they continuously spread lies about the government . The media section was difficult to answer as the circumstances changed throughout the regime and although the media was always free from the government, it was not allowed to damage the reputation of an official and an individual could sue the writer and now it is much more free . For the Institutionalised section, I used information from Freedom House reports and the Costa Rica s Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/costa-rica https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/costa-rica https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en Costa Rica s political institutions do follow the constitution and no one is above the law . Nearly every President since 1990 has been accused of corruption and in 2003, it was revealed that President Abel Pacheco had illegally financed his campaign, which he claimed wasn t any worse than his competitors . Despite this t he elected government and lawmakers implement state policy without interference and corruption is not considered a huge problem . Even with the corruption, the government is accountable to the electorate . All state leaders are in official positions and there is clearly no cult of personality. |
| Cuba 1978 | 1968 | 1985 | 5 | 4 | 4 | I mainly used a source in order to make sense of communist Cuba in this era under Fidel Castro. A book called Cuba: A New History by Richard Gott. Cuba closely followed its Soviet fathers in many matters such as the structure of government, like Soviet Russia, Cuba followed a single party system, so although there was some sort of elections they were particular unfair and moe symbolic than anything. Similar to Soviet Russia, speaking out against the political regime or ideology was not well received, for example in 1970 party leader Fidel Castro declared that “Yes, we shall bring in a 10 million-ton sugar harvest!” this number was more or less picked out of the air in order to inspire the people, as well as please Soviet Russia, who a lot of this sugar was supplied to. When Oswald Borrego quietly suggested that this target may be unattainable, he was dismissed from his job, in the end the total sugar production for that year was 8.5 million, which was even with stopping holidays such as Christmas, it easy to see that the 10 million was a pipe dream and Borrego was fired for simply speaking against the party. Civil liberties in communist Cuba were thought to be relatively low, with no independent press and harsh penalties often when the accused had no representation. One example of this was when poet Herberto Padilla. Padilla initially supported the revolution but began to speak out against it when Castro aligned with the Soviet Union, in 1971 he was arrested for writing poems against the party, despite appeals from many of Cuba’s loved writers as well as writers abroad Castro stuck by his decision. This also shows how Castro could often act on a whim and had the sole power of the revolution. In terms of the institutional rule, there were processes that were transparent and the party could be held accountable for their actions, however, the most interesting part of this was the cult of personality surrounding Castro. He was adored by the people and in a lot of peoples eyes, he could do no wrong. Castro enforced this with propaganda and many of the speeches he was so well known for giving to inspire his people and the revolution. There was also an amount of inequality in the country, as some would get rich from Castro’s endorsement while other would not. |
| Cuba 1990 | 1976 | 2008 | 7 | 7 | 3 | Decided to do the period that Fidel Castro was President of Cuba from 1976 to 2008 rather than his period as Prime Minister from 1959-1976 http://www.biography.com/people/fidel-castro-9241487 When Castro first went into power he tried and executed hundreds of members from the previous government of Batista. Fidel Castro s Cuba Rita J. Markel. . A Los Angeles Time newspaper reported that Castro never had elections but also didn t see the American elections as any better. He believed that voting for neighbouring delegates every 2 ½ years was sufficient for the people to have a say and choose who was in the government, however there were reports of the elections being influenced by the Communist Party, which Fidel denied. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1459874924/877B37F0AD1F4882PQ/5?accountid=14782 There was a clear one party government, all others were made illegal and all those that opposed were suppressed. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fidel-Castro Voting was supressed in most forms and were far from free and fair elections, the US put a law in place prohibiting the lifting of trade restrictions with Cuba until free and fair election commitments were made. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-record-repression There are elections for districts and they must have at least 2 candidates maximum 8 and they are not chosen by the communist party. People’s Power: Cuba’s Experience with Representative Government, Peter Roman. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Chapter 4. In 1990 again in the Los Angeles Times article Fidel himself reported that 97% of the eligible voters voted in the neighbourhood delegates. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1459874924/877B37F0AD1F4882PQ/5?accountid=14782 Additionally it is everyone over the age of 16 that can vote rather than 18. There are exceptions such as people in prison, although this is not unusual, people that have been deprived of their political rights or mentally unable. Castro often People’s Power: Cuba’s Experience with Representative Government, Peter Roman . Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Chapter 4. Only Castro s Communist party is allowed. All other political parties are banned. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fidel-Castro Fidel and the government have significant power/absolute power neither the military or church hold significant power. He kept tabs on the military and some senior military officials were investigated for corruption and complicit in cocaine smuggling, they were eventually executed. Cuba: A Short History, Leslie Bethell. Cambridge University Press: New York. It was difficult to find if elected officials could publicly challenge other officials, seemingly they could. Fidel held members of the military to account for supposed corruption. So assumingly other members could bring officials to account but not to the same extent as a democratic country. There were top officials that when Castro found out about their corruption, he had them executed. Cuba: A Short History, Leslie Bethell. Cambridge University Press: New York. I feel that for question 34 there needs to be another option. As officials may be able to hold other officials to account but they couldn t bring Castro to account and it is unlikely anyone in his favour/that he trusted could be questioned. There does not seem to be few rights afforded to some groups the only exception being people that opposed Castro, however, I didn t take that as being included in the question. There was oppression of gay men and women in the beginning of the revolution, with them landing in jail. However, after 1980 there was an unofficial tolerance of them. So there were not really barriers but the topic remain very taboo. Cuba: Idea of a Nation Displaced, Andrea O Reilly Herrera. State University of New York Press: Albany. Amnesty international in 1990 identified a Dr who was a member of the Party for Human Rights in Cuba. He and others were arrested, the others were released, he stayed in custody with no access to a defence lawyer and with no charges. Resulting in long periods of questions and is an indefinite detention. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr25/006/1990/en/ People have also been harassed including beatings and attacks when objecting the government. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-record-repression Besides letting the pope visit in 1998 it was a one rule party. Cuba: A History, Sergio Guerra Vilaboy and Oscar Loyola Vega. Ocean Press: New York. . No, Castro repeatedly denied freedoms, where there were crackdowns on people speaking out against the government, with them being imprisoned, harassed or beaten. This included the ideology or revolution that Castro was implementing. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-record-repression Freedom House first takes measurements of press freedom in Cuba from 2002, at that time there was no freedom, having a score of 96 this is an incredibly low score. Journalist that weren t part of the regime were continually harassed and subject to beatings. The political freedom of the press was at 40/40 being the worst possible, as outsider news agencies could only hire people that were trusted by the government, not independent journalists. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/cuba Under their constitution, the “press, radio, television, films, and other mass media are state or social property, and may in no instance be the object of private ownership It is restrictive in the constitution so it is generally obeyed. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/cuba/Cuba996-03.htm Castro was above the law, if someone tried to bring him to account it is likely that he would have them on trial for breaking the law as he did with the military personnel There was a bureaucracy but it was headed by Castro. But for the most of it he had unquestioned and total control over the government. They can do what they want and don t have to listen to the popular opinion of people. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fidel-Castro Castro was the President and had no elections for himself, but all members of his government had to be elected, even if they couldn t speak out freely against the government. http://www.globalresearch.ca/cuba-under-fidel-castro/3084 Yes only because people couldn t speak critically about the government, that to stay in favour and not be punished there had to be a conformity with the ideology that was driving the revolution. Fidel committed to making the country equal however there were still people who came from history of slavery that were still in destitute housing and lifestyles. but there wasn’t the same amount of extreme super wealthy as there are in other countries . |
| Cyprus | 1993 | 2003 | 13 | 10 | 10 | I decided to focus on the period between 1993 and 2003, which was the period in which Glafcos Clerides was the president of Cyprus. The political institutions, from my research, appeared to be, for the most part, fairly democratic. Freedom House reports from the period reported that elections were competitive, had more than one party, and there were no significant barriers for parties to form and for citizens to vote. These findings were also backed by Alan Siarfoff’s book Comparative European Party Systems which reinforced the claim that during this time period there was a balanced multi-party system. In terms of civil liberties, there was no obvious, forced mistreatment of specific groups of people, despite the fact that at the time Turkish Cypriots were exiled and refused to participate in government affairs independently and chose to do so, so the fact that they did not have great representation was not one imposed by the government . There were some reports of church affiliation and meddling in state affairs, like banning political discussion inside mosques after the 9/11 attacks, but these reports were minor. According to Belle and Whitten-Woodring’s book Historical Guide to World Media: A Country-by-Country Analysis, by 1977, the media in Cyprus became completely free after all media became clear of government ownership and provided an arena for public debate without fear of censorship or punishment. This was further emphasised after the 1989 Press Law was passed that allowed radio-stations to be privately owned and protected journalists’ rights to keep their sources confidential. With institutionalized rule, Cyprus during this time period appears to have followed the rule of law strictly, and this was reinforced in the fact that there was little information on any violations, so I took this to mean that there were no issues. When answering the final question regarding income inequality, from Soteroula Hajispyrou and Nadia Nicolaidou’s report based on Family Expenditure Surveys found that wealth inequality declined between 1991 and 1997, and then in 2003 it increased to higher levels than in 1991. From this I concluded that there was a medium amount of inquality in Cyprus during this time period as even though it declined between 1991 and 1997, it increased to even higher levels and so the earlier decrease does not account for the whole time period and make the inequality any less. I couldn’t answer question 9 regarding whether elected officials could publicly challenge one another due to the fact that I couldn’t find any information or reports on this aspect of democratic political institutions. |
| Czechoslovakia | 1968 | 1989 | 3 | 4 | 6 | From “life during the communist error in Czechoslovakia” By the website “private Prague guide” and freedom houses Czech Republic country report of 2006, I deduced that the state leader is determined by the parliament and the state leader determines the parliament. There is only one party, “the communist party of Czechoslovakia” and any organizations not supporting of communism were suppressed. There were some brief periods in which some literature and pays critical of communism or the state were not censored, but that didn’t last. Almost all independent media was opposed and censored. Religious groups along with oligarchs were arrested or removed from their homes and churches, due only to the communist idea. Corruption, According to “life during the communist error” not only occurred during the communist error but also is a cause for corruption in modern democratic Czech republic. The laws were violated, but mainly by the Russians in 1968, when they invaded. in many ways, the USSR could be considered the ruling elite of Czechoslovakia and were free to violate all laws and liberties with impunity. |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2003 | 2017 | 6 | 7 | 4 | I commenced the period of study in 2003, at the close of hostilities of the Congolese Civil War. In 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo held its first multi-party elections in 41 years. These elections, which were monitored by international observers and deemed to be generally free and fair, saw the incumbent re-elected to the presidency. However, the next set of elections in 2011 saw accusations of voter intimidation and rigging. The incumbent president has taken authoritarian measures to consolidate his power, including the arrest of potential opponents. In one case, a man who announced his intention to merely run for the presidency faced arrest and was forced to flee the country. Amnesty International accuses the DRC of arresting people at private gatherings criticizing the election results. However, the country has been making progress towards democracy since the end of the Congolese Civil War. According to Counterpart, government officials at the local level have been successful in re-enfranchising large portions of the eligible population. I therefore awarded 1 point for most of the ‘Democratic Political Institutions’ questions. There is extensive evidence that although civil liberties are codified in the constitution, they are often not respected by the government. Some cases are more egregious than others; there are allegations that the DRC holds political prisoners, has a corrupt and ineffective judiciary, and tries to suppress critical media reports. People are often denied their constitutional rights to a lawyer and a fair trial, although it is unclear exactly how often this happens. The DRC is unfortunately infamous for the widespread use of rape as a weapon by its armed forces, and women’s rights in general are in an abysmal state. The government is also intolerant of protest and public criticism. Free Speech and Free Press Around the World reports that on several occasions, protesters have been killed in clashes with the military, which is routinely deployed to enforce law and order. The DRC is majority-Catholic, and the Catholic Church plays an important role in the lives of many Congolese. The Church enjoys the unique position of being able to openly criticize the government without reprisal, due to its power. Previously, the government had persecuted members of the Kimbanguist minority since the colonial period, but this Christian denomination has since been legalized, and is generally subservient to the state. Other religious minorities tend to be persecuted if they reach a certain size and begin to exercise significant influence. Question 14 alone is not enough to express this reality, since persecution of religious minorities is carried out despite separation of church and state. The ‘Institutionalized Rule’ questions were difficult to answer, because the DRC is nominally democratic, holds regular elections, and has a written constitution. However, the most recent round of elections in 2011 were accused by the opposition and by observers of being rigged in favor of the government, the elections scheduled for 2017 were delayed, and many provisions of the Congolese constitution are routinely violated. The government moved to abolish the second round of the presidential elections, a move widely seen as calculated to entrench the incumbent and his cronies in power. The Congo is clearly a state in flux - a government struggling to stay in power by authoritarian means, working against an entrenched system of democratic norms that dates back to the colonial period. |
| Denmark | 1982 | 1993 | 15 | 11 | 11 | - This year was chosen as it is the beginning of the Prime-Ministership of Poul Schluter and the government of the Conservative Peoples Party This end year was chosen as it the end date of the reign of the above mentioned Prime-Minister and political party. Fully democratic, this can be seen through the Constitution Act of the Kingdom of Denmark, sections; 29, 30, and 31. This ensures free and fair elections for all major legislative and executive positions. Having done some research I have found very little to no evidence to suggest that during the period of 1982-1993 there was anything contrary to this going on, while the Prime-Minister Schluter was not elected into his first term and merely took office follwing the resignation of this predecessor, he did after that consistently win elections to maintain his position. Of course one potential objection would be that the Monarch still exists in a executive position with it mostly being a ceremonial position. For this reason I find it hard to justify lowering Denmark’s score for this question solely because of the existence of a Royal figurehead who while being an unelected member of the executive, realistically wield little power if any. https://web.archive.org/web/20131103060508/http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/~/media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publikationer/English/My_Constitutional_Act_v_11_2013.pdf.ashx Fully democratic, see above explanation. I have decided to award Denmark full points for this question again, as as discussed above, the Constitution Act of the Kingdom of Denmark section 29, clearly outlines the rules for suffrage, with no barriers other than age and capability of conducting one’s affairs and again having done some research I have found no evidence that this was circumvented during the years of 1982-1993. https://web.archive.org/web/20131103060508/http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/~/media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publikationer/English/My_Constitutional_Act_v_11_2013.pdf.ashx I’ve awarded Denmark full points for this question as well, as while it was difficult to find evidence affirming that there were no barriers to entry at the time, but I found absolutely nothing to suggest that there were any significant barriers to contesting elections or forming political parties. One interesting example found was that in 1991 the political party by the name of; National Socialist Movement of Denmark, was founded, however there is little existing evidence of this party with their official website appearing to have been taken down, although they can be seen to have competed in a local election in the region of Sjealland in 2005 The fact that it was legal and permitted for what is effectively a Nazi party to be formed in 1991, particularly in a nation like Denmark, suggests a high level of freedom to form political parties at the time. I’ve decided to give Denmark a 1 for this question rather than a 2 partially because of the continued existence of a unelected Monarch in a executive position and their role in giving royal assent to legislation, meaning they have the ability to deny to give assent, and effectively hold some power above elected members, however while they hold this power, it is very unlikely that they will ever exercise it Although, I’ve decided to give them a 1 regardless, even though a 2 could be justified, mostly because I feel like a bit of variety in this form would be better, rather than Denmark scoring consistent 2s. I have found nothing in my research to suggest that elected officials were limited in their freedom to challenge one another or any institution or unelected official. Denmark possessed no specific lese-majeste laws at the time, while Royalty are merely protected by regular libel laws, as with all other Danish citizens. My research has suggested that during the time there were little to no forms of legal discrimination in Denmark, infact homosexuality was legal at the time, as well as same-sex Registered Partnerships were legalised in 1989, and discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation was outlawed in 1987.http://www.scandinaviastandard.com/a-brief-history-of-lgbtqi-rights-in-denmark/ With equal pay for men and women being enshrined in legislation previously in 1976. http://kvinfo.org/laws-facts-and-figures/danish-equal-pay-legislation In my research I’ve found little to suggest any widespread discrimination by the state present in Denmark at the time. Again, I’ve found nothing to suggest anything to the contrary of this. It is infact quite difficult to find much information on Denmark in this period of time, I suspect because it was so uneventful with everything being very democratic. Same as above While there is and was a state supported church with the Monarch as the head https://www.kristendom.dk/indf%C3%B8ring/dronningen-og-forholdet-til-folkekirken http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0907/S00012.htm It does have little realistic impact over how the state is run, particularly because Denmark is a Lutheran nation, with Lutheran Church having historically being less involved in the lives of adherents than other denominations, mostly due to their dogma. Section 77 of the Constitution protects the right to freedom of speech in Denmark and again through my research I’ve found nothing to suggest that these rights were infringed on during the target period. Speech contrary to the prevailing ideology is protected, as seen by existence of the National Socialist Movement of Denmark. Nothing in my research has suggested that free press had been suppressed. Again, nothing has suggested that this was not the case in Denmark during this period. As I’ve previously mentioned this seems to be because this was a fairly uneventful period of Danish history. Same as above. The rules for passing policy into law is clearly outlined in the Constitution in sections 41 and 42. And again I have found nothing that suggests that this was circumvented in the target period. https://web.archive.org/web/20131103060508/http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/~/media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publikationer/English/My_Constitutional_Act_v_11_2013.pdf.ashx Yes, as there were usually 4 year election cycles. Nothing to suggest otherwise. No, from my research I found nothing to suggest that Schluter had any cult of personality, despite which is expected for a democratic politician. |
| Djibouti | 2004 | 2010 | 8 | 6 | 3 | My answers base on the information in the country reports of freedomhouse.org. The sources demonstrates the incomplete democratic institution in Djibouti due to democratic system is partly free. Djibouti is a semi-presidential republic country, with executive power in the hands of the government, and legislative power vested in the government and Congress. In Djibouti, people do not have the rights to participate in political and government issue. In 2010, a new national constitution has been approved. The president is the head of state, and elected by the people for a five-year term. The government is headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the President and the Council of Ministers. The Congress has 65 members, elected for a five-year term. However, many resources show that this progress is just referendum of state and the citizen can not exercise their rights in election system. On the other hand, Islam is the main religion in Djibouti and have 94% citizen follow Islam. Djibouti’s constitution accept that Islam is the only state, but also guarantees the equality of citizens of all religions and the freedom to practice religion. This is one of the reason that female in this country have to face with the discrimination, they do not have the equal rights with male and they frequently abuse and face with violence. Besides, there are no freedom of press in Djibouti according to freedomhouse, the government that dominate the press only allows for information to improve profitability and trust. Information is filtered and may be false. Through this, the state wants to use this information to control the consciousness and perception of the people. Many newspapers have been repressed by the government for opposing information to the state. |
| Dominican Republic | 1994 | 2000 | 6 | 11 | 9 | I chose the years between 1994-2000 as my period of study because 1994 marks the last election in the Dominican Republic which international consensus marks as fraudulent and 2000 marks the nearest general election to my year of focus. For the following justification, I used Wikipedia as a source for background knowledge drawing heavily on Freedom House and Amnesty International to examine more specific details. Some information was also drawn from Encyclopedia Britannica, although this is more general information. The basic political framework of the Dominican Republic seems to be solid, with elections for both executive and legislative positions. Although prior to 1996 these elections were often biased and fraudulent, by 1999 international consensus is that elections were free and fair, demonstrated particularly in the 1996 election. While this is not addressed directly in the questions, I believe that the enormous power given to the president is worth noting here. Although democratically elected, the president has the power to remove other elected officials which could make corruption a large issue. Indeed, there was widespread corruption particularly in the courts. The Dominican constitution reserves 27 paragraphs for outlining the powers of the president. There are no major barriers for voting within the Dominican Republic. Even some people under the age of 18 can vote provided they are married. There do not seem to be barriers toward creating political parties or contesting elections either. The actual democratic process of the Dominican Republic seems reasonable, and its problems come more in other areas. However, without a funding limit it is possible for the wealthiest party to have a major advantage over others. This seems to be a fairly minor issue that hasn t had a serious impact on elections . It is possible for the lower house to impeach the president, but despite this technical power there have been no examples of confidence votes or impeachments that I could uncover during my period of study, or any other period of time for that matter. In terms of civil liberties, it is clear that certain minorities are heavily targeted by both the state and the social majorities. There have been multiple accounts of intolerance toward gay individuals, even if homosexuality is not technically illegal. More severe, Haitians are an ethnic minority who are treated appallingly. In 1999, many worked in state-run sugar plantations. Haitian immigrants live largely in terrible conditions, and their children are refused legal residency by authorities widely deemed a restrictive interpretation of the constitution. Reports indicated that up to 6000 Haitians were rounded up and expelled en masse, in some cases separating children from their parents. This clearly shows that even if the governmental framework is relatively secure, social liberties are less impressive. The Dominican Republic suffers heavily from a corrupt and unfair judicial system. Amnesty International reports that by the end of 1999 14,657 people were detained, of whom 71% were in pre-trial detention. This led to tension and poor conditions in prisons. Investigations during 1999 were ongoing into the ill-treatment of detainees, which points toward it being a distinct possibility. Even if they have the legal rights to fair trial, it seems that this is being undermined in practice. This evidence also suggest that torture and unlawful detention are significant factors in the Dominican Republic. Freedom House suggests that 9/10 people in prison have not been convicted of a crime. The judiciary is said to be corrupt and politicized, and the head of the police force is an army official. The state is secular, and no religious orthodoxy is enforced. Although speech against the government is not criminal, at least 200 people were killed by police during 1999 many of them involved in protests against the deterioration of public services. This certainly seems to be an instance of speech against the prevailing ideology being actively persecuted, as well as unprotected. Although this is severe, it seems to only take place in the presence of active protesting on the streets so is not totally restrictive. Most media within the Dominican republic is independent, however in 1999 Amnesty International references a journalist critical of a former president who disappeared after being arrested by members of the army. As of 1999, a judicial case was ongoing but considering the corruption of the judiciary it would be difficult to claim their investigation is unbiased. As evidenced by the judiciary corruption, it seems that constitutional violations are not infrequent. While individuals are supposedly given the right to free and fair trials, that does not seem to play out in practice. While well-organised labour unions are permitted to strike, in practice they are often subject to government crackdowns. In theory, the president is not above the law but again, in practice it seems that he does not hold himself accountable to the people. By using violence to repress protests, he proves this to be the case. Laws and policies cannot be passed at whim, as the lower house must send bills to the president for consideration which must in turn be discussed and considered by the senate. This again suggests that although civil liberties in the Dominican Republic are poor, the political liberties are mostly fairly substantial. Through elections, the officials of the Dominican Republic are held accountable to the people. There are no state leaders in unofficial positions all power seems to be vested in legal vessels. It is fairly clear that there is no cult of personality within the Dominican Republic. Although Joaquin Balaguer has significant political weight and is called kingmaker, he was forced to win an election using multiple counts of fraud so if there is a cult of personality, it is fairly ineffective. I believe that the Dominican Republic will have low income inequality, as its governments are very concerned with improving the economy which drives elections. |
| East Timor 2007 | 2006 | 2012 | 9 | 11 | 6 | Study Period 2006-2012 Despite East Timor being granted independence in 2002 and being accepted as a member of the United Nations, the corruption of the FRETLIN party conflicted with the authenticity of the 2007 elections and therefore I decided to start the study period at 2006. The violence of 2006 and the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri was a significant event that saw Jose Ramos Horta go from ex foreign minister to acting Prime Minister of East Timor. The elections that took place in 2004 were seen as free and fair despite minor inconsistencies that came from inexperience. Multiple parties ran in the 2007 elections and Jose Ramos Horta undeniably won the presidency. However, no party received a majority of the vote and so a coalition government was established. At the same time as the election the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste was set up to stabilise the violence of 2006 and rebuild the police and security forces which had suffered under the violence of 2006. The riots were found to be the fault of Alkatiri and his inability to act before it was too late. Alkatiri s interior and defence ministers were also found to be at fault, however these charges were eventually dropped, with the exception of ex-Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato who was found guilty of arming civilians. An assassination attempt was carried out by rebels against President Ramos-Horta in 2008, he survived and later in 2010 he pardoned or commuted the accused sentences. Due to security concerns and a preference for continued stability, the United Nations was asked to extent their presence in East Timor. As a show of stability and an attempt to increase state relations, East Timor officially applied to be a member of the ASEAN in 2011. I felt that 2012 was an appropriate end date for the study as this was the year that the United Nations ended their peacekeeping mission, while Australia withdrew its troops from the country. Despite this, stability continued into the 2012 election where Taur Matan Ruak won the presidency and the government continued as a coalition. Democratic Political Institutions East Timor is classified as an electoral democracy, yet before the 2007 election there was widespread corruption in the government under the FRETLIN party. East Timor in 2006 was the poorest country in Southeast Asia with 40% of its 1 million population living below the poverty line. This was due to an unequal distribution of state funds, with government money going to the capital rather than the whole nation, affecting those in rural areas the most. Elections were deemed to be free and fair despite the inexperience of the country and there were no voting barriers despite age that I could find, although female representation in government was, and still is, lacking. There was significant public opposition to the election results from those that supported the FREDLIN party mostly, especially with the appointing of Gusmao as Prime Minister. After the win of Ramos-Horta a coalition government was established as no party had received a clear majority. The new ruling coalition was named the Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority which was contested by the previous ruling party FREDLIN who tried to appeal the decision through the courts on grounds of illegality. Civil Liberties Under the Alkatiri government in 2006 600 members of the FDTL were fired for striking in protest of poor working conditions and low pay among other things. There has been continued frustration from the public with the government s inability to improve the country s poverty and unemployment rates, while after the 2007 election there was some improvement with ridding the government of internal corruption. The revised Penal code of 2006 criminalised any critical or harmful comments of government officials, this revision carried a consequence of up to three years in jail and was aimed at stopping journalists from speaking too critically of the government. This revision was not stopped by the coalition government in 2007. The majority of East Timor is religious with 98% of the population being Roman Catholics, there is no outright religious discrimination against minority groups. Except that within the law of the Roman Catholic church it prohibits anyone who lives under religious vows such as nuns and priests from running for office. The question of independent press was hard to answer as although there is a presence of independent press they are targeted and threatened by groups outside of the government itself. Women are seen to be equal to men under the constitution of East Timor and are not prohibited from voting or participating in government. Despite this female representation within government is low and domestic violence rates in the country are high. A weak justice system meant that domestic violence cases were rarely prosecuted or reported. During 2006 the threatening, attacking, and arresting of journalists was significant during the riots, with supporters of Alkatiri and the FRETLIN party targeting independent news groups and journalists that were critical of the government . This violence meant that the media could not properly report on the social and political problems that faced East Timor and saw many journalist go into hiding due to threats. rel=nofollow> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/east-timor) Institutionalised Rule The President has a fairly limited range of power in the government and the role is seen as more symbolic than anything. The weak judiciary system failed to hold those responsible for the violence in 2006 accountable for their actions. The whole justice system in East Timor is backlogged and therefore it is difficult to prosecute criminals efficiently, and in the case of domestic abuse this means that many women don t report domestic violence incidents. Although an Independent Special Commission was established to identify cases of corruption and crimes committed during the 2006 riots, most of the cases that the commission found have not been prosecuted. The Law on Truth and Clemency for Diverse offences act has slowed down the justice system and weakened the judiciary s legitimacy as it contains an amnesty provision that many worry could prevent those involved in the violence of the 2006 riots from being prosecuted and may see those that are already convicted being released. rel=nofollow> https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2008/country-chapters/east-timor) rel=nofollow> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/east-timor) |
| Egypt | 1976 | 2005 | 7 | 7 | 3 | The period of study that I have chosen begins on 1976, when former president Anwar Sadat introduced for the first time in the Egyptian Republic the multi-party system for Parliamentary election, which has remained since then, regardless reliability. The last year of this period seems to be late 2005, after Hosni Mubarak held the first legal presidential election in Egypt s history. Check sources at the end, I tried to synthesize as much as I could to support every argument. Since the beginning of the multi-party electoral system introduced by Sadat, elections were not a sign of democratization. By 1976, it was a Winner Takes All system, and parties may run as independents or join one of the three platforms that Sadat created . Each district contested two seats of for a total of 342 and Sadat s party won 82% of them, despite popular vote was only 60%, according to scholars. Besides, Sadat held nine referendums while in power using them as a device to produce a popular mandate for his policies . In addition, during Mubarak s rule, the electoral law was changed and any party which wanted to get a seat in the Parliament should at least get 8% of the polls, otherwise those votes would go to the National Democratic Party, the official regime party emerged from the ASU and created by Sadat in 1978. Freedom House has scored Egypt with a 6 on a scale up to 7 during that time, being this the worst score in terms of political rights, stating that NDP dominates the tightly political system, always achieving majorities of at least three thirds of the Parliament. The President was appointed by the Parliament and there was no competitive process for his election. The parties were handicapped independents or branches of the main NDP under its influence, running for a manipulated parliamentary election whose winner was known before. Elected officials had more influence than unelected, but this is tricky, because the NDP run for Parliament in a system designed to result in solid majorities for them, and the winning party was supposed to appoint the President, who actually held executive power and controlled the NDP, so the president chose himself again and again. We must consider that the country was ruled under the Emergency Law since 1967, with none interruption since Mubarak got in office in October 1981, Sadat and Mubarak used fighting terrorism the end cause. Human Rights Watch states that, under the state of emergency, security officials had total power to stop demonstrations, public meetings and arrest people with no evidence or charge, therefore this law is incompatible with the ideal of free and fair elections. Egyptians didn t have the chance to change the government democratically and the Law served as a justification to continuous violations of the 1971 Constitution. Freedom House argues that Emergency Law limited many other rights which aim to be basic in any democracy: the government had power to tap telephones, intercept emails, search people and places without warrants, and bring anyone to jail under the accusation of threat to national security, political challengers were often found in court. More than 70 political prisoners had been processed and executed under Mubarak s rule before 1999 under special military courts set up for terrorist offenses. The Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist nonviolent movement was officially outlawed, and it was always a target because of its popularity. Once said that, no surprise that the Freedom House also scored civil liberties in Egypt with a 6 over 7 by 2004. Despite formally not contemplated, certain groups were discriminated in some sectors of society. Being Islam the state religion, Christians were treated less equally and they didn t receive the same support from the government, for example when there was an attempt to build or repair a Church, the regime used to deny or delay permission, and when there was any conflict between Muslims and Christians, officials seemed to soften the religious origins of the issue. Religious orthodoxy was not enforced, but there were significant unofficial disadvantages to non-Islam practitioners. Women were traditionally discriminated despite the sex-equality contemplated in the Constitution, they were disadvantaged on divorce or other personal status issues. They earned half of what her husband did. Besides, domestic violence was found often and spousal rape is not illegal, among other limitations. LGTB laws did not criminalize same-sex relations, however they have been prosecuted under the 1961 law against prostitution, which also contemplated debauchery as a crime, so interpretation by moral police was taken against any homosexual activity . In terms of justice, the Emergency Law said that any security related, or even civil crime, case should be judged by special courts, which sentences cannot be appealed and are subject to ratification of the president, members of the opposition and even homosexuals have been judged in these courts, so no clear answer for question 12. Death penalty is legal, supported by the Constitution, not explicitly, under The Islamic law Sharia . Between 1991 and 2000, more than 530 people were sentenced to death. Besides torture is a systematic practice which had almost become an institution . For instance, in Alexandria, there was the case of a father who reported the disappearance of his daughter and who was arrested and accused of her murder following the discovery of a child’s body. The father finally confessed under torture to the murder of his child. Evidence says that in cases involving Islamist groups or related to terrorism, the police arrest not only suspected persons but also their family. Women, children and old people, no-one can escape . Opposition parties have limited access to the media and new parties must receive government permission to become legal. Although the legislative power is supposed to be held by the Egyptian Parliament, clearly the executive has the last word for every policy and even approve laws by decree. In addition, the president can generally flout popular opinion and both Sadat and Mubarak were above the law and the emergency state and the excuse of fighting against terrorism made them, and any appointed officials, immune to the rule of law and the power to violate the Constitution and interpret it their own way. The Press Law, the Publications Law, the penal code, strict libel laws, and the long-standing state of emergency restricted press freedom. Popular opinion was shaped by media and censorship. The government owned all broadcast TV and radio stations, besides the three leading newspapers. Also foreign publications were officially subject to censorship. There were some independent media since 2001 but their programming is subject to state influence. Any explicit criticism of the president, family, Islam or military could result in prison penalties and closure of publications. According to Freedom House, in November 2002, two journalists were imprisoned for publishing allegedly indecent photographs. In addition, several writers, activists and journalists were tried on defamation charges and sentenced to fines and prison terms throughout 2001. As stated by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere ., there has been a cult of personality, more intense during Mubarak s rule. He portrayed himself as a healer of the nation, who did not promise anything at all to the population, and it seemed to work for a long time. Bibliography: Gasiorowski, M. J. . An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset. Comparative Political Studies,29, 469-483. doi:10.1177/0010414096029004004 Posusney, M. P. . Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies. Studies in Comparative International Development,36, 34-62. doi:10.1007/bf02686332 Blaydes, L. . Authoritarian elections and elite management: Theory and evidence from Egypt. In Princeton University Conference on Dictatorships . Elections in Egypt. . Retrieved May 28, 2017, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/elections-egypt/state-permanent-emergency-incompatible-free-and-fair-vote Freedom House. Egypt. Retrieved May 27, 2017, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt The Death Penalty in Egypt . . International Federation for Human Rights. Pelletiere, S. C. . Sharia law, cult violence and system change in Egypt: the dilemma facing President Mubarak . Carlisle: U.S. Army War College. |
| El Salvador | 1992 | 1999 | 14 | 12 | 7 | El Salvador has undergone substantial democratic reform in the past 30 year. Civic elections were established in 1984, however they became constitutionally more effectively democratic once the peace accord was signed in 1992, which marked the end of the civil war between Conservative Arena Party and leftist gureilla party FMLN. Therefore, I find 1992 a good starting year for my study. I have chosen the ending year 1999 as it marks the end of Armardo Calderon Sol’s presidency, and his successor Francisco Flores Perez administration involved considerably more corruption and so should be treated as a different political era for El Salvador. According to Freedom House, El Salvador rated a 2.5 in freedom, and a 2 in political rights in 1998 . I believe this an accurate rating of the ‘Democratic Political Institutions’ questions as El Salvador has a robust electoral system which is effective in reflecting the vote of the people, for example the ruling party lost 11 seats in the 1997 election compared to the 1994. Furthermore, after the peace accords were signed, the military in El Salvador was greatly reduced in size and is neutral in elections. This was quite an achievement for a nation emerging from such a violent military driven civil war. It must be noted here that due to this time period occurring directly post civil war, some more rigorous democratic functions were simply unachievable due to the primary focus being on securing peace. These undemocratic effects are visible within the civil liberties section and are mainly to do with the effects of crime, police corruption and an ineffective judicial system. For questions 37 and 38 I chose the 1 point rating due to corruption in the police force. The police force in El Salvador was reconstructed in 1992 following the peace accords and was largely made up of ex-guerillas/soldiers who had fought in the civil war. This actually went against the rules of the peace accord, however as mentioned, El Salvador was desperate to secure peace first and deal with the democratic implications afterward . Due to a lack of accountability measures imposed on the police force, they actually hold quite a substantial amount of power. However, this power is not easy to address within these chosen questions because it is not that the police have superior executive power to the elected-officials. It is in fact, due to a lack of police accountability there is a lot of corruption within the police force and this undermines citizen faith in the state’s ability to do its job. I believe it is the police force corruption, combined with an ineffective judicial system that has allowed El Salvador’s crime scene to become so large. The size of this crime rate undermines the democratic power of the state to protect it’s citizens, and devalues the citizens faith in their own democratic influence. This was clearly a democratic problem throughout the time period I have chosen because even by the year of 1998, the FBI were called on to help investigate three murders where members of the national police were suspects . The on-going problem of police and judicial corruption explains why El Salvador scored just 36/100 on Transparency International in 2016 . Because of the crime rate and police accountability problem I have assigned a 0 to question 44 asking whether some people are above the law. Besides that, El Salvadorian citizens have a lot of civil liberties, although socio economic factors such as education, life expectancy and income are low . El Salvador has a vast range of privately owned media establishments, which is a stark contrast to the 1980’s civil war era where El Salvarodian’s mostly recieved their information through military or rebel propaganda and biased media . Other civil liberties are also sucsessfully democrtic such as the f reedom of religion, right to gather in unions and organize political parties. Particularly compared to a pre-civil war El Salvador, the democratic improvements have been immense. References: Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/01/19/remembering-el-salvadors-peace-accord-why-was-that-peace-elusive/ Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/el-salvador Aljazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2013/08/201381310843483272.html http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/2012228123122975116.html Transparency International https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 Open Democracy https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/salvador_democracy_3592.jsp |
| El Salvador | 2004 | 2009 | 12 | 8 | 8 | El Salvador is a difficult country to study due to there being a lack of reliable information. When studying El Salvador I had to do more research than I did with Australia and I didn’t always find information from reliable resources. The time period I was assigned was 2004, and I have studied up until 2009. I have done this as in 2004 they held Presidential elections, of which Antonio Saca won the election in the first round of voting. I finished in 2009 as this is when he was democratically voted out of power by the people. For Democratic political institutions, I relied on Wikipedia, BBC and the Political Databases of the Americas. Overall El Salvador scored fairly well across the board, however it was tricky to determine if its electoral system is reliable in practice. When it comes to voting it is nearly impossible as a citizen living in rural El Salvador to vote, despite voting being enforced by law. I took into account the fact that the United States directly influenced the 2004 election, saying that Antonio Saca was their favourite candidate and that if he did not win there would be a deterioration of US-El Salvador relations. Otherwise, the election consisted of more than 2 parties and other than the United States voicing their preference for president, there was no direct interference in the election from any third parties. Parties can be formed by people so long as they are not Labour Unions. Small political parties suffer immensely from other parties interference due to their lack of funding and corruption. However, these problems do not spill over into the vote counting process. When it comes to Civil Liberties I did the same as before to gather information. However I relied more upon Wikipedia and the BBC’s country profile for information and I directly Googled terms that would come up with what I need along with freedom of speech, independent media and legal rights in El Salvador. Overall, El Salvador scores fairly well however it is difficult to measure the rights of the people and if there is discrimination due to it not being widely reported, however, it is acknowledged to occur and it is difficult to stop. I found it interesting that freedom of speech exists in the country along with independent media outlets and that El Salvador allows for the criticism of the government. Corruption is an issue in El Salvador as is the right to a fair trial, with there being cases when people have not received justice for serious crimes However President Antonio Saca was accused of corruption numerous times throughout his rule of the country and recently he has been ordered to stand trial for corruption allegations, showing that people are punished for their crimes regardless of their position. For Institutionalized Rule El Salvador again scores highly in quite a few areas. When Googling for the information required I found many websites that gave me the required information, including Wikipedia, BBC and crime watch websites. The leaders are held accountable to the people for their actions and they are constrained by the constitution. There is no cult of personality and all government positions are official positions. But some people in El Salvador are above the law due to their wealth. An example of this was ‘a rich man could rob a bank, pay a fine and he would walk free. A poor miner could steal the same amount in the form of goods, and he would be imprisoned because he cannot afford the fine’. Despite this people are beginning to be held accountable for their actions and I struggled to figure out why this is the case. I am left assuming that it is due to an increase in awareness of crimes due to the internet and other forms of communication. In terms of income equality, there is a large level of inequality in the country with corruption being one of the main sources of it. Government programs under Antonio Saca were aimed at reducing income equality, however, they really benefited himself and his families business interests despite this there is only a medium amount of income inequality in the country which I found to be very strange References http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ElecSys/Salvador/salvador.html - Electoral system in El Salvador http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/the-infiltrators-a-chronicle-of-el-salvador-police-corruption - Police corruption http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19401932 - country profile including media and freedom of speech http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/ElSalvador1983English.pdf - El Salvador constitution including official positions and powers https://knoema.com/atlas/El-Salvador/topics/Poverty/Income-Inequality/GINI-index - Income equality https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/el-salvador - Press Freedom and legal freedom https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_inequality_in_El_Salvador - Gender equality in El Salvador https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadoran_presidential_election,_2004 - 2004 El Salvador election result https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/slv/en_slv_legal_system.pdf - El Salvador judiciary system https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Saca#Early_life - El Salvadors President information |
| Estonia | 1999 | 2004 | 15 | 11 | 11 | Estonia during this period was a state in a transition period, sundering former ties and establishing new relations namely with the European Union, NATO and, towards Finland & Sweden. This reorientation was also illustrated in the quantity of trade with the EU, 70% of Estonia s exports and over 70% of its imports and significant efforts prior to Estonia s entry into the EU, such as Germany s assistance in the strengthening of Estonia s legal system 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia s Progress Towards Accession ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/estonia_en.pdf ) Democratic institutions in Estonia during this period functioned well, and whilst participation in elections was low, the elections themselves showed no signs of corruption. It should be noted however that regarding the breadth of enfranchisement there were issues, specifically for the stateless population and constitutional provisions but is not necessarily a formalized barrier) pertaining to the disenfranchisement of prisoners. Whilst there were systems in place to correct statelessness, there were barriers in complicating this, with language representing a significant complication. Estonian being the official state language left little in the way to accommodate Russian speakers, who constitute a significant linguistic minority. This language discrimination also has an impact on the exercising of rights specified in the Estonian Constitution . During this period, there was considerable press freedom through public and private sources . There were no violations of freedom of assembly laws and trade unions remained independent of the state. There were also no gender or religious restrictions imposed Estonia , Freedom House The political landscape was also diverse with multiple parties competing. The population also enjoyed a measure of economic power by proxy . All sources indicate a lack of corrupt practices and broad subservience to existing norms, with state institutions exercising the powers assigned to them and not deviating, full accountability for all regardless of office and a highly visible and accountable legislative process all-in-all Estonian institution rule stood as perhaps the best aspect of the state, consistently achieving the highest allocable scores. Links for all sources: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=pUawCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA198&lpg=PA198&dq=Toomas+Hendrik+Estonia+as+a+Nordic+Country&source=bl&ots=Kp4QWLuoL3&sig=weprArh2px6fm7g32YH1IVSit_U&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjIpvPq-ZHUAhWKa7wKHacUBDcQ6AEIQDAF#v=onepage&q=Toomas%20Hendrik%20Estonia%20as%20a%20Nordic%20Country&f=false https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/estonia_en.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/country/estonia https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Estonia_2011.pdf file:///C:/Users/Seth/Desktop/Vic/POLS%20209/eur510022006en.pdf |
| Ethiopia 1996 | 1995 | 2005 | 10 | 11 | 8 | Period of study: 1995 to 2005. I chose these parameters because Ethiopia adopted a new constitution from 1995 with new elections following a period of transitional government from 1991 to 1995. The period ends at 2005 because the results of the 2005 elections were disputed by opposition parties and international observers. Democratic Political Institutions: To answer questions in the category of Democratic Political Institutions I first looked to the Constitution of Ethiopia to see what the situation was in law, and then to sources such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to find instances of the Constitution not being followed. Generally, the elections held between 1995 and 2005 were open to opposition parties and were partially competitive. As noted below, lack of competitiveness was not generally due to Government interference, but there have been instances of harassment. Elections in 1995 and 2000 were generally considered to be free and fair, with constraints due to individual party funds and limitations rather than interference from the incumbent government. Voting rights are guaranteed in Article 38 of the Ethiopian Constitution and I have seen nothing to suggest that people have been informally prevented or discouraged from voting. There have been reports by Amnesty International of harassment and arrest of opposition figures and journalists. The 1995 Constitution set out a fairly standard democracy, however this system was not fully embraced by the incumbent Government, which had been in power as a transitional authority since 1991 . It is likely that the incumbents became comfortable in their power and did not want to give it up. The democratic institutions did exist but were not strong enough to constrain the power exercised by the Government. Civil Liberties: There are many civil liberties enshrined in the Constitution, and I could not find evidence of formal discrimination, however there have been reported instances of breaches of civil liberties in breach of the Constitution. There are reports of discrimination and even military action against certain ethnic groups, however this discrimination is not codified and these instances do not seem to be widespread. Amnesty International reports on the case of former Olympic athlete Mammo Wolde, who it claimed had been imprisoned for over four years. Again, this does not seem to be standard practice. Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press are guaranteed in Article 29 of the Constitution, but there are reports of journalists being arrested and denied basic procedure rights for publishing material critical of the Government. Separation of Church and State is clearly stated in Article 11 of the Constitution . I have found nothing to show whether this is in fact enforced or not, but I would assume it is given that the major religions are Islam and Christianity, and to impose a state religion would no doubt create unnecessary religious tension. Civil liberties as outlined in the Constitution seem to be largely for show as they are not respected by the Government. There may have been good faith in creating the Constitution, but this good faith has not transferred to actual governance. Institutionalised Rule: Ethiopia from 1995 to 2005 was governed by the same party with substantially the same leadership with at least some internal accountability mechanisms. Article 76 of the Constitution provides for responsible Cabinet, so that ministers are at the very least accountable to the legislature, which is elected by the general public. Laws are created through the standard parliamentary process, not by a single person. I have not found any evidence to suggest this process is flouted - laws must still pass through parliament. |
| Gabon | 1960 | 2017 | 5 | 4 | 6 | Democratic Institutions: Since independence in 1960, Gabon has only had three leaders: Leon M’Ba, Omar Bongo, and Ali Bongo. I primarily focused my research on the Bongo leaderships as this family has the longest reigning history. When Omar Bongo came into power he enacted a single-party system for the first half of his presidency; it wasn’t until 1990 that opposition parties were made legal. Even with competing parties in their elections, there are wide spread accusations of them being rigged to support the Bongo family rule. The only changes this had in government were the number of the 120 legislative seats occupied; once opposing parties were made legal they’ve never held a majority. Since the leadership covers such a long period with two varying official policies I gave the rating 0 on opposition party questions, because even though they were eventually made legal they had virtually no effect. This was reiterated when Ali Bongo became president upon his father’s death. Public opinion was at an all time low with some assembly after the election; according to the US State Department report, they were met with tear gas by the governments security. Civil Liberties: Research was a little bit varied when it came to the human rights violations committed by the Gabonese government. Sources like Human Rights Watch claim repeated horrid human rights violations, whereas the US State Department report depicts a slightly less harsh environment. While legally no particular group is denied civil rights, there are still relatively widespread discrimination against children, women and the indigenous peoples. Freedom of religion is pretty widely respected, which wasn’t surprising considering Omar Bongo himself converted from Christianity to Islam. There weren’t any reports of punishment for not following his chosen religous ideology and there are still indigenous tribal practices used. The general consensus of my sources are that the biggest human rights violations reported are through their prison conditions citing obvious mistreatments and torture. The legal system appears to have a moderate sense of efficiency where most people are granted their legal right to a public trial; however there are also reports of this right not being granted. The less clear aspects of civil liberty is the freedom of the press. Most, if not all, media outlets are state run; however there are still reports that criticize the sitting government. I think it is a case where as long as there is not evidence of a significant or threatening uprising, the government allows it. Cases of journalist imprisonments and violence support my findings on that issue. Generally citizens are granted the right to speak openly of their discontent with Gabon’s government through multiple outlets, but the assumption is that many people wouldn’t have access anyway. I think it would be safe to say that this country leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to granting secure and safe rights to its citizens. Institutional Rule: For the sake of the public eye Gabon at least tries to appear that they are adhering to the constitutions rules. While there have been some public violations its been mostly bureaucratic manipulation. There are reports of things like arbitrary arrests which are unconstitutional but they go unpunished due to the fairly unconditional power the Bongo family has had for the last 50 years. Where the aspects of institutionalized rule are most obvious are the blatent disregard for public opinion as shown through the succession of Ali Bongo. There were widespread protests and public polls which show that citizens don’t trust the electoral process. Despite this, all people who have power in Gabon are technically “elected officials”. While some seem to be above the law, there are occasions where officials have been fired or dismissed for misconduct. I think because the government of Gabon still declares itself a democracy it tries to at least put on a charade to that effect from time to time; however it’s pretty obvious that its been under a dictatorship since 1967 arguably since 1960. References Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Gabon . . Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186409.pdf Gabon . . U.S. Department of State . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51473.htm Gabon profile - timeline - BBC News . . BBC News . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13376514 Gabon’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 1997 . . Retrieved from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_1997.pdf Gabon’s media crackdown forcing journalists out | DOHA CENTRE FOR MEDIA FREEDOM . Dc4mf.org . Retrieved 26 May 2017, from http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/gabons-media-crackdown-forcing-journalists-out-8894 LGBT Rights in Gabon | Equaldex . Equaldex.com . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.equaldex.com/region/gabon Narraway, P., Hamlin, A., David Anderson, J., Ossipoff, M., Chirimumimba, F., Apollo, M., & Ossipoff, M. . Gabon Voters Know Better Than to Trust Election Results . Democracy Chronicles . Retrieved 26 May 2017, from https://democracychronicles.org/gabon-voters/ UPDATE: The Gabonese Legal System and Legal Research - GlobaLex . Nyulawglobal.org . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Gabon1.html#StructureOfGovernment |
| Gabon | 1967 | 2009 | 10 | 7 | 7 | Democratic Political Institutions Omar Bongo came to power through a single-party regime, he maintained this single-party rule until capitulating to growing pressure and demands to allow multi-party elections later on in his rule, however. Despite this development, Gabon’s elections were generally fraudulent and unaccepted by opposition parties most of the time; Bongo was also known for purposefully delaying elections so as to guarantee his victory . Much of Bongo’s rule was akin to that of Robert Mugabe’s of Zimbabwe, seeing as Bongo was known for putting opposition parties against each other and maintaining a strong grip on the internal politics of his own party . Also, in 2003, the ruling party removed a 1997 constitutional amendment on term limits so that Bongo could run for the successive elections, which he did, and won. Additionally, early on during the single-party rule, the opposition was led into exile in Paris . There does not seem to be any restrictions on voting outside of age, however, there are informal circumstances that may limit voting: such as the discrimination faced by women and the lack of infrastructure in the interior of the country, which makes voting a harder process for some . Regardless of this, however, the claims of rigged elections are second-only during the multi-party period when acknowledging the single-party period the country is endured. Frankly, the voting limitations didn’t matter considering Bongo was in power for 42 years. Civil Liberties Any criticism or libel against government officials is susceptible to criminalization . Of course, isn’t much of a threat seeing as most private press outlets have either had their licences revoked or outright banned in the country; otherwise, the few weekly newspapers that still operate struggle to produce regular content due to financial struggles . The Freedom House reports show mostly corruption and censorship from the earliest report onwards, thus has been included in the bibliography. Unfortunately, however, despite ‘legal protections’ for women in the fields of education, employment, and business, they still face widespread discrimination mostly in rural areas . There is no major ethnic or cultural discrimination otherwise, or it is not reported on . However, there were a number of political prisoners during Bongo’s reign, 67 were supposedly suffocated to death in 1995 and were held without trial and several were shot, without trial . Reports are brief and hard to find, but generally, hint towards similar scenarios in Gabon during the time – so it can be assumed Bongo utilised torture and execution to maintain his rule. Institutionalized Rule Bongo did engage with corruption in the country. Seeing as Gabon is the second-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, he took advantage of this and transferred otherwise state wealth into his own personal finances. He is reported as having to own 33 properties in both Nice and Paris, with an estimated $190m in USD . It became clear in 1999 when a US Senate investigation that Bongo, had in fact, stolen much of his personal wealth from Gabon’s public finances . Bongo’s daughter and son also occupied by the roles as Chief of Staff and Defence Minister, respectively, and majorly benefiting from both these positions and the corruption of Gabon . Despite his family holding two major positions of power and his insurmountable wealth, Bongo never pursued a cult of personality. Due to the massive suppression of media and the long list of corruption – much Gabonese remained indifferent or disliked Bongo . An interesting event to note, however, was when Bongo died – the state-owned newspaper did not publish the death immediately and suppressed any reports of it . Alongside this, two independent news outlets were banned in the country for attempting to do so. It seemed Bongo was a generic African kleptocrat, not exactly pursuing a clear ideological government, nor wishing to impose a certain narrative on his people, the only notable example of interesting or odd behaviour was his conversion to Islam, however, many speculated that this was to strengthen diplomatic ties with the oil-rich Muslim states, seeing as Gabon had joined OPEC during his rule. Much of his presidency also fell to a controversy over being propped up by the French government . Because of his French Connection, Bongo remained relatively safe from any attempts at rebellion from the populous because of stationed French troops near the capital of Libreville . I struggled to answer the inequality question seeing as most of the wealth was just held by Bongo and his family, rather than spread out amongst an elite. From the readings, it seemed as though the PDG wasn’t all that well-off and Bongo was the sole benefactor of Gabon’s massive oil deposits. Because of this reason, I think it will have a ‘medium’ inequality only because of the massive concentration in one person rather than concentration amongst an elite. Bibliography Amnesty International. . Amnesty International Report 1995 - Gabon. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0140.html Amnesty International Annual Report 1998. ;letter-spacing: normal;orphans: 2;text-indent: 0.0px;text-transform: none;white-space: normal;widows: 2;word-spacing: 0.0px;> POL 10/0001/1998) . . London, United Kingdom: Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1998/en/ Hon, H. V. & Hoffman, V. . Chapter 3: Gabon. The Annual Register. Volume 221. A Record of World Events. 221, p. 237. Day, A. J. & Hoffman, V. . Chapter 3: ii. Central African Franc Zone States. The Annual Register. Volume 238. A Record of World Events. 238, pp. 259-263. Duodu, C. . Omar Bongo and his worldly possessions. New African, pp. 66-67. Lewis, D. S. & Harvy, A. . Chapter 3: ii. Central African Franc Zone States. The Annual Register. Volume 242. A Record of World Events. 242, pp. 254-258. Freedom House. . Freedom of the Press. Gabon - Country Report, 2002. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/gabon Freedom House. . Freedom in the World. Gabon - Country Report, 1998. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/gabon Reed, M. C. . A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 25, pp. 283-320. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/stable/pdf/161015.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5892340f77bc2731439440111463b9a3 |
| Georgia | 1992 | 2016 | 11 | 11 | 8 | In relation to its democratic political institutions, Georgia has indeed multiple parties, notably the United National Movement and the Georgian Dream, who have been at odds for the past 4 years . For this particular reason, I saw fit to award 1 point for question 7 " Non-government parties exist, but they are significant, y handicapped by legal harassment or other problems" as there have been reported incidents of political violence when the 2016 presidential elections drew near . Political parties also have the right to challenge each other, as is what happened when Giorgi Margvelashvili took over from Mikhail Saakashvili in 2013 after being in office for a decade; power is also no longer concentrated with the President since his inauguration but is also shared with the Prime Minister . As to its civil liberties, there is a separation of the state and the church, however the laws and policies favor the Georgian Orthodox Church granting it privileges not accorded to any other religious group. Georgia s diverse ethnic makeup, mainly Armenian and Azerbaijani, has caused very little in the way of socio-political issues, but the language barrier has prevented most of them to fully enjoy the rights and freedom, education and jobs being key examples, and as an extension cannot realise their political rights they do not know how to vote, or even how to express own political platform and are excluded from political participation . There is also strong evidence that points to gender inequality as a result of the rise of militarism and religious fundamentalism, which creates powerful threats to the freedom and rights of women. Independent press does exist but is marginalised . Otherwise there is no evidence that would suggest that citizens are free to say what they will and even have the freedom of assembly . There is very little in the way of reports or research on institutionalised rule in Georgia, and most of the answers I based off their constitution which can be found on Legislationline.org. Bibliography BBC. . Georgia country profile. BBC News . Retrieved May 22, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17301647 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. . International Religious Freedom Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238594.pdf Cecire, M. . Georgia’s Long-Shot Democracy. Foreign Affairs . Retrieved May 22, 2017, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/georgia/2016-10-20/georgias-long-shot-democracy\ Chkheidze, K. . Gender Politics in Georgia. Gunda Werner Institute. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from http://www.gwi-boell.de/en/2011/02/07/gender-politics-georgia Freedom House. . Nations in Transit 2017: Georgia Country Profile . Retrieved April 22, 2017, from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/georgia Georgia Freedom of Assembly . . Retrieved May 22, 2017, from Legislationline: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/topic/15/country/29 Synergy-Press. . Ethnic Minorities in Georgia: Problems and Resolutions. Synergy-Press: Synergistic Platform for Inter-cultural Communication . Retrieved May 22, 2017, from https://synnergy.wordpress.com/2010/10/19/ethnic-minorities-in-georgia/ |
| Georgia | 2008 | 2014 | 13 | 9 | 6 | Georgia is widely regarded as partly free . From the research that I have found, I agree with this statement. The period from 2008 to 2014 is useful in explaining why this is the case. The was the appropriate time period as 2008 was when the Georgia/Russian war over South Ossetia was finally coming to an end; to 2014 as there have been adjustments to fundamental problems within Georgia s institution and the bringing up of a competitive authoritarian regime by the leading party. Their constitution states that they have a democracy. The two main players in Georgian Politics have been the United National Movement, and the Georgian Dream party. The UNM came into leadership in 2005 after the rose revolution upheaving the previous authoritarian party. They promised to rebuild the democracy that Georgia s constitution says it has. However, democracy often came at a cost of trying to rebuild the economy and other external factors that had influenced the current almost collapsed system that Georgia had. The report by Freedom House stated that from 2005 to 2012 that Georgia had not actually improved at all in terms of democracy and legitimacy. There was huge controversy in 2010 when hundreds of Georgian citizens were evicted by the government leaving them homeless or inadequately compensated for this major inconvenience, although this received Western criticism, not much was followed through by the Govt to amend on this issue. General rules of law are made through an official process, but sometimes these laws might be abused by UNM. In answer to question 7, when a billionaire named Ivanishvili decided that he forming an opposition party to UNM, he and his wife were stripped of their citizenships; after receiving criticism by players in the West, they were allowed to still run, however not given their citizenships back. The President appoints the cabinet and can serve up to two five-year terms. While elections are viewed as free and fair there is an abuse of government resources for campaigning, cases of fraud and other systematic abuses that have made it hard for opposition parties to get leverage throughout elections. In saying this, there is an allowance of opposition, and they are able to campaign and win, as demonstrated when the Georgian Dream Party won the 2012 election. While I think that the Government is accountable in Georgia, amendments are not always followed through. In the year of the Election in 2012, videos leaked in September of severe systematic abuse within Georgian prison systems, while it was already widely known that prisons had major overcrowding and poor conditions mostly due to the courts low number of acquittals, this was news to the public, who responded by demonstrating massive protests against the UNM. I would say that the state of Georgia s non-democracy is not a result of institutionalised authoritarianism but rather brought about by parties that know how to abuse the system. There have been many cases where protestors and journalists have reported physical/verbal abuse from police. In 2011 there were incidents where police arrested and abused journalists, wiping the memory off of their cameras, also allegations of tear gas being used against peaceful protestors, despite the protestors trying to cooperate with them. So although I would say freedom of assembly and independent media is allowed, there is a limit and if breached, will be met with retaliation from the police. Adding to this, media is regarded as diverse, however; the Government had tended to favour certain media outlets over others during this period, making it hard for other outlets to gain official information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Freedom of religion is widely respected, but minority groups have tended to receive intimidation by police officials. The Christian Orthodox Church has been a favoured one in Georgia and often received benefits that other religious groups would not necessarily receive. There is a pressure struggle between the judicial and executive branch with the executive pressuring the judicial branch forcing corrupt decisions and law enforcing. Since the takeover of the Georgian Dream party, democracy has seemed to improve steadily, yet one of its biggest problems is battling institutionalised corruption. In 2013, the majority authority was going to be shifted from the President to the Prime Minister; this was adopted by Saakashvili in 2010. It is criticised that this remained in this position of power. In the 2012 election, 23 candidates successfully and cleanly campaigned. This was a significant step in the transition of parties to lead Georgia. In summary, although throughout this time period would classify Georgia as a competitive authoritarian regime, it also proved that the type of party in rule determined how democratic the country would be, rather than the institution itself. REFERENCES BBC News. BBC. Feburary 14, 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1054642.stm . Cienciala, Anna M. HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY, 1968-1980. THE BALKANS, 1948-1980. January 01, 2002. Freedom House. Freedom House. / /, 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/georgia . Human Rights Watch. World Report. / /, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/georgia . Körösényi, András. Government and Politics in Hungary. /: Central European University Press, 1998. P.Conradt, David. Britannica. 06 12, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany . Pittaway, Mark. Politics of Legitmacy and Hungary’s Post-war Transition. Contemporary European History, 2004. Yerevan. “International Observers Say, Presidential Elections in Georgia ‘Positive and Transparent’.” ArmInfo - Business Bulletin, 2013. |
| Ghana | 1992 | 2000 | 9 | 7 | 7 | Ghana I decided to pick 1992 as my starting point for one main reason. This was the year that Jerry Rawlings, originally known for leading a successful coup, decided to allow for presidential elections in Ghana. Furthermore, this was also the year that the current constitution of Ghana was created. I ended the timespan at 2000 because that is the year that President Rawlings was defeated in the elections. Yet, there was still a peaceful transition of power. I found interesting results when it came to the Democratic Political Institutions set of questions. Rawlings had made it illegal for any political parties besides his own, the Progressive Alliance, in the years before 1992. However, in April of 1992, he legalized political parties. Even with this new opposition he won the election with freedom house stating that it was neither free nor fair . Additionally, I would have liked to put 1.5 points for question 7. The question asks if there are significant barriers to creating political parties and contesting elections. Although the election of 1992 was not until November, future president Rawlings did not make it legal for anyone to engage in party politics until may 18 th, 1992. This gave his party a large amount time to prepare for the election and possible determine who was an enemy to the party. The opposition party leaders plead for lifting the ban, but Rawlings denied that as well . Moreover, it is clear that the judiciary is not truly independent from the central government, thus the police and other armed/security forces are often not held accountable for their actions . It is also evident that the media could not challenge or criticize the president during these times. In fact heavy fines were instituted against anyone that was deemed to have written libel against the government. Thus, the government was effectively intimidating the press . Questions 10 through 17 have to do with civil liberties. In 1998 Freedom house reported Ghanaian women suffer societal discrimination that is particularly serious in rural areas, where opportunities for education and wage employment are limited, despite their equal rights under the law. . When I first read the case about religion I imagined that Ghana would suffer from religious discrimination ether against Muslims or Christians, but I found the opposite to be true. Christopher Y. Nyinevil argues that Ghana has able to adopt religious pluralism instead of secularism. He cites article 35 in the constitution, which imposes on the state a positive obligation to actively integrate the people of Ghana by bridging societal differences, including religious ones. Thus, it is in Ghana s best interest for all religions to peacefully co-exist. Again freedom of expression was allowed for the masses, but those same rights were not always guaranteed towards the media. Freedom House gave an example of this when they stated, A media critic on state-run Ghana Television was arrested in November for allegedly making libelous statements against President Rawlings. Chris FM, a rural private radio station, was temporarily closed in November following allegations that a parliamentary candidate had used the station to broadcast inflammatory statements against political rivals of the NDC . In relation to human rights, Freedom House reported that Ghana was improving by 2000 however, there was still high recordings of beatings by police and security personnel as well as people being detained for long periods of time without trials . Questions 18 through 23 deal with institutionalized rule. This is the section where I had trouble finding information. As to my knowledge there was no cult of personality that President Rawlings had created from 1992 through 2000 however, he may have created this before my timespan. Works Cited Nyinevi, Christopher Y. “The Separation of Church and State under Ghana s Fourth Republic.” Journal of Politics and Law, vol. 8, no. 4, 29 Nov. 2015. Accessed 30 May 2017. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2123_92.htm https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/ghana |
| Greece | 2009 | 2015 | 6 | 12 | 10 | During 2009-2015, there seem to be have been instability and distrust with the government. Also, the country was in a debt crisis during those years. In the October 2009 parliamentary elections, the Opposition, Panhellenic Socialist Movement party, won the election called by PM Karamanlis which George Papandreou takes over as new prime minister . From FreedomHouse reports, there were multiple countrywide riots, protests and strikes happening in the country during the period. Those disturbances posed serious threats to the general population. Not only did those disturbances happened, the government s incapability and continuous disagreement by the public on their economic policies caused lack of trust of the government . In addition to the internal disturbances in the country, the country was also then under a huge debt crisis starting 2012, which the government s economic policies and budget cuts where not favoured by the rest of the populations . Firstly, the democratic political institutions of Greece can be described to be democratic, based on its constitution. The doctrine of separation of powers are in place between the legislature, executive and judiciary. Elections are also constitutionally present. For presidential elections, it happens every five years and a president can only re-elected again as president once . Among the powers of the president is to appoint the Prime Minister . For parliamentary elections, it happens every four years where the Members of Parliament will be elected in each electoral district. Among the rights of the Members of Parliament, they enjoy unrestricted freedom of opinion and right to vote accordingly to their conscience and they can be prosecuted only for libel according to the law, after leave has been granted by the Parliament . Hence, based on the constitution, all Greek citizens, male and female, are entitled to their right to vote in elections. However, there had been reports on certain towns in the country where it had failed to register Roma who did not fulfil basic residency requirements. Hence, this led to some barriers and discrimination to the population of that town due to their residential registration . Additionally, there had been corruption incidents happening in the government and courts which made them to resign from office and the latter dismissed. The examples would be in October 2008, a land exchange deal involving the Vatopedion monastery and the Hellenic Public Real Estate Corporation almost brought down the government and led to the resignation of two cabinet ministers. In addition, two judges were dismissed during the year on corruption-related charges . Thus, from the above we could justify that Greece had a democratic political institution where proper procedures are followed and right repercussions are implemented. Secondly, based on the constitution, the civil liberties of the people were present. There aren t any discriminations or rights limited to certain groups or gender . Such liberties are as follows: No person shall be deprived of the judge assigned to him by law against his will and the people are protected from arbitrary or cruel punishment . Speech critical of government is protected as every person may express and propagate his thoughts orally, in writing and through the press in compliance with the laws of the State . There are independent press where multiple new independent newspaper, publishing and media companies after the democratization of the country. However, based on reports and news articles, the me mbers of some minority religions and minority races face social discrimination and legal barriers. Such examples of social discriminations and legal disparities are the government not officially recognizing the existence of any non-Muslim ethnic minority groups and Macedonian is not recognized as a language, and using the terms Turkos or Tourkikos in the title of an association is illegal and may lead to the dissolution of the group. Also, the Romany community continues to face considerable discrimination and a general denial of justice but the Council of Europe s commissioner for human rights reported that Greece s treatment of the Romany population where getting better. As of FreedomHouse report, acts of racist violence are an ongoing problem. According to the April 2014 report by the Racist Violence Recording Network, 143 acts of racially motivated violence were documented in Greece in 2013. In response to Golden Dawn and increasing xenophobic violence, Parliament passed an antidiscrimination bill in September 2014 that toughened penalties for attacks motivated by ethnic origin or sexual orientation. However, the legislation has been criticized for failing to protect victims of hate crimes from deportation proceedings. Additionally, the country s Romany community continues to face considerable governmental and societal discrimination. LGBT individuals encounter some discrimination, including occasional violent attacks. Also from the FreedomHouse report, immigrants were disproportionately affected by institutional problems in the judicial system. This was when the immigrant movement were high in the European region to due the civil war and conflict in the middle east. Greece s policies on immigration continues to be criticized for its indiscriminate nature and for inhumane conditions in detention centers. As mentioned above, there are press freedom in Greece however it had eroded during the economic and financial crisis of 2010-2015, passing from the 35th place in 2009 in Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index to the 99th place in 2014 The inappropriate use of violence by police forces against journalists has been attributed both to a strategy of silencing and to the lack of competence of police about how to deal with city riots. . Lastly for the institutional justification, it would be said that even though right repercussions are being implemented to elected officers, Greece still has tracked records of multiple cases of corruption from the government offices. Especially, during this period, many of those cases were examples on how the government officers were bribed to get better job/business opportunities and police inappropriate brutality. According to the U.S. State Department s 2008 human rights report, the police internal affairs unit took numerous actions against officers for various crimes, including forgery, pimping, and taking bribes, though overall investigations were weak and penalties were disproportionately lenient. In addition, based on the FreedomHouse Report, the parliamentary panel ruled in October 2010 that five former New Democracy ministers should stand trial on charges of fraud and breach of duty related to the Vatopedi land-swap scandal, which involved exchanging state-owned land for property of much poorer quality owned by the Vatopedi monastery. Greece was ranked 78 out of 178 countries surveyed in Transparency International s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, the worst ranking of any country in Western Europe.In 2015, FreedomHouse reported that tax evasion was a serious challenge, with an estimated 24 percent of economic activity going undeclared which the government had failed to prosecute tax evasion by economic elites. Thus, the level of ongoing corruption in Greece does not clearly slow its democracy to the fullest. References BBC. . Greece profile - Media. Retrieved from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17372888 BBC. . Greece Profile - Timeline. Retrieved from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17373216 FreedomHouse. . Greece . FreedomHouse. FreedomHouse. . Greece . FreedomHouse. FreedomHouse. . Greece. FreedomHouse. International, T. . Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Retrieved from Transperancy International : https://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results Network, R. V. . 2014 Annual Report. UNHCR. State, U. D. . Human Rights Report 2008. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119082.htm The Constitution of Greece. . Retrieved from Hellenic Resources Network: http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/syntagma.html Van Der Heijden, T. . Media landscape in Greece must reform quickly . Euroscope. World Press Freedom Index . . Retrieved from Reporters Without Borders: https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2009 World Press Freedom Index . . Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2014 |
| Guatemala | 1986 | 1995 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 1986 signaled the first year where military dictatorship would transfer some of its power over to government through the democratic process. In 1986 Cerezo won the Guatemalan elections transitioning regime type in Guatemala. Elections for the legislative branch were held, but only right wing coalitions would participate up until 1995. The state run terror at the time meant that there was a lack of representation between party groups as leftist activists and organisations were targeted by the military. There was low voter turnout during this time period however it did slightly increase. The military was ultimately in control of the government. Their capabilities were secretly funded by the CIA under the Reagan administration. The election of cerzo in 1996 was a puppet election to institutionalise military power and regain international legitimacy. It did not constitute the protection of human rights or adherence by the military and subsequently the government to the law. However, there was international intervention to facilitate conversations of peace between guerrilla groups, the government and the military. Civilian killings at the hands of the military were astronomical. Indigenous peasants were mainly targeted for the village killings An estimated 200,000 civilians were killed during the civil war. This was predominantly in villages where opposition to the military dictatorship were high and opposition to the regime was strongly detested. Mass killings and rape and torture of women and children occurred constantly like the Massacre of Rio Negro and Cuerto Pablo. Individuals that were a perceived threat to the state were also targeted by the G2 a military intelligence service located in the presidential palace. Speech critical of the government made you a target for military operations and speech about communist ideology but mass surveillance had relaxed since the 70 s and as the UN and the USA got more involved in humanitarian rights, civil movements were allowed to form and mobilise the ability for them to critique the government. Not all state leaders were in official positions the military leader at the time placed military officials in parliamentary roles and ultimately held power over the executive in this time. He attempted to flout total military domination but due to such external pressure by the UN peace talks had become institutionalised in Guatemala and this provided the framework for a restraint on military power but in reality massacres and G2 operations were still implemented. Accountability in this era only included formally political leaders. Serrano organised a self coup in 1993 attempting to dissolve congress, censor media and suspend the constitution but after this failure pressures from the population to be accountable for his actions and heavy critique by the media forced him to resign. This coup affirmed civil society as a legitimate political actor providing a slight restraint on executive power. Violations and human rights abuses by the military went heavily unchecked by the legislature and government, in this instance these branches failed to exercise their power to the extreme detriment of the population. The legislature consistently failed to uphold the rule of law with military and government abuses of power deeming multiple murders, torturings and disappearances as in the public interest . This time period can be defined by it arbitrary militant massacres veiled by democracy but also the ability to non- governmental civil institutions to form and play a role in the political sphere with the help of international organisations. http://www.jstor.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/stable/40470764?seq=13#page_scan_tab_contents http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/reader.action?docID=682267&ppg=17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War#Societal_structure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge_Serrano_El%C3%ADas#President http://www.timelines.ws/countries/GUATEMALA.HTML |
| Guatemala 2002 | 1996 | 2006 | 13 | 12 | 9 | Guatemala ended the civil war with the Peace Accord was signed in 1996, the government began to promote a democratic system and allowing women participate in any election process. The system worked well until Alfonso Portillo Cabrera became president in 2000. President Cabrera described as one of the most unpopular and corrupted leaders in the world at the time. During President Cabrera’s office time, there were a large number of protests against Free Trade Agreement with the US and the border dispute with Belize. Most of these protest are violently interrupted by the ‘riot’ police and the government. These events continue happening even Óscar Berger Perdomo became President in 2004 who tries to heal internal wounds in Guatemala. Although Guatemala has a better-off government which placed more resources in public services, the number of protests continue rises in 2006 as The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement was signed. I looked at these sources in my research: www.britannica.com/place/Guatemala/Resources-and-power#toc40937 www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19636725 freedomhouse.org For the ‘democratic institutions’ questions, these sources showed that elections were competitive, with more than one party, though some parties restricted from participating in the election process including the Communist party or any parties that aimed to overthrow the democratic regime. The international observers have classified Guatemala’s elections are free and fair since 2003. For the ‘civil liberties’ questions, these sources showed that Guatemala has a below average civil right comparing to other democratic countries. Although the constitution said there are social freedoms in Guatemala, the government unlikely take actions when someone abuses other’s freedom. Firstly, there is privately owned press and broadcast media, but the media ownership is extremely concentrated in the hands of moderate business elites, and m ost media have centrist or conservative views. Secondly, there is a situation where violence against local or foreign journalists is permitted by the state government since the Guatemala’s highest court suspended various criminal libel laws and it is seen as a contribution to self-censorship in the country. Thirdly, although t The constitution guarantees religious freedom, however, some people have faced discrimination for their Mayan religion. For the ‘institutionalised rule’ questions, these sources showed that corruption played a significant role since 1996, even t he judiciary department was corrupted, functioning at inefficiency stage with capacity shortages and violent intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses. |
| Guyana | 1992 | 2015 | 14 | 12 | 11 | Guyana is infinitely more democratic that Turkmenistan. This is likely due to its American influence and population, to the degree that it is the only country in South America with English being the dominant language. Guyana incorporates a multi-party system of democracy, where-in any citizen aged eighteen or older can vote for their desired candidate, much like many other OECD countries. The first election to be labeled a fair election was in 1992, and was supervised by President Carter of the United States of America. Typically, the two major parties represent different ethnicities within Guyana, and so clash frequently in terms of resource allocation and general priorities of the government. This election was won by the People’s Progressive Party who continued to rule until 2015, though without any negative influence by the government to sway possible voters. The people of Guyana generally have the same civil liberties and rights as typical citizens of the United States. They are free people, with no limitations for the freedom of speech, association and such-forth. However, it must be noted that those practicing homosexual acts are considered criminals in Guyana, so there is still restriction on the freedom of sexual preference/orientation. As a country, Guyana provides a good government to match its people, with a balance of separation of powers as well as policy in place for reforms as well as the possibility of new governments to take over if they win the electoral race, as APNU-AFC managed to do in 2015. The law of Guyana is derived from British Common Law and codes imported from the Dutch-Roman sects . This provides a sound democratic framework for the country to work off, while also giving the country a chance to have variation from the countries it spawned from. |
| Haiti | 1988 | 1990 | 10 | 3 | 4 | Sources for Democratic Political Institutions:,, Sources for Civil Liberties:, Sources for Institutional Rule:, I took the years 1988-1990 for the period of this regime because Arvil took power in 1988 in the second coup of that year, and was forced to resign in early 1990 before elections were held. The sources I consulted for the Democratic Political Institutions questions included the CIA World Factbook for 1989, which answered most questions. While there were no elections during Arvil’s regime there were nominal plans for elections in the year 1990, before Arvil was forced out due to protests. While I could not find many sources about the civil liberties during the Arvil regime, the Human Rights Watch report mentioned the imprisonment of some political opposition leaders, while the suspension of the constitution suggested some civil liberties were forfeited despite lack of concrete evidence that I could find. In regards to question 11, while I could find no legal discrimination against identity groups, there were attacks on some major churches, as well as unorganized and indiscriminate killings. While the there was a degree of freedom of the media, there was a significant level of self-censoring even on the part of many of the major US media entities such as the New York Times. |
| Honduras | 1999 | 2009 | 7 | 10 | 6 | Throughout most of the twentieth century, the military exerted considerable influence over the Honduran government. The reason behind the decision to consider 1997 as the starting date for the purpose of this assignment is that in 1999, under the Presidency of Flores, attempts were made to bring the armed forces under civilian control. Instead of generals, civilians were placed as head of the armed forces, as well as in charge of controlling the armed forces budget. Independent auditing of the military s expenditure and business venture s also took place these were the sources of high-level corruption. The end date for the purposes of this assignment is 2009. This is when a transition of power took place, resulting in the exile of President Manuel Zelaya before the end of his term, after he attempted to change Honduran s constitution in his favour. Democratic Political Institutions Honduras classified as a presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the President is the head of state and government. The government exercised executive power while Congress possessed legislative power. The judiciary, appointed by the congress, is separate to the executive and the legislature. Citizens were able to change their government through elections that took place every four years. According to a Freedom House report, the 1997 presidential election was considered generally free and fair, as were the 2001 and 2005 elections. There are multiple political parties that competed against each other during election time. The two main parties were the center-left Liberal Party and the conservative National Party . Thus, there were multiple candidates that the population of Honduras could choose from, were no party had a guarantee of being voted into power. This is evidenced by the fact that between 1997 and 2009 both the PL and PN were voted in during different periods. Additionally, the constitution of Honduras prohibited the presidential candidacy of anyone who had previously been President. In 2009, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to amend the constitution, which would allow him to extend the period of time for which he was in power. He was ultimately unsuccessful, as the military disregarded his instructions and the Supreme Court judged his actions to be illegal. This resulted in the government expelling Zelaya from his Presidency. As well as demonstrating that the Constitution of Honduras was generally upheld, this helps answer the question of whether unelected officials tend to have more power than elected individuals. This example demonstrates that the unelected military and judiciary held a level of influence that could ultimately compete with that of an elected official. Historically, the unelected military has exercised immense power within Honduras. As noted above, efforts to curb this power were made towards the end of the 20 th century, however the military s influence remained generally strong within Honduras. While religious groups held some influence within Honduras, in 2004 the elected Honduran Government extended formal recognition to three LGBT rights interest groups, despite opposition from the Catholic Church. While there were no direct restrictions that barred certain groups from participating in the elections, Honduras had generally seen low voting participation from women. More generally, a Country Report commented on the overall low participation rate in the 2009 general elections as being a consequence of the lack of public faith in Honduras s government. The Superior Electoral Tribunal, an independent organ, supervised and implemented elections. Civil Liberties Arbitrary detention and torture by the police commonly occurred. Human rights organisations have stated that prison officials often used excessive force against prisoners, which included beatings, isolation, torture and threats. Many religious minority groups and indigenous-based unions that strived for land rights were vulnerable and repressed. However, in 2000 the government took steps to place the agenda of indigenous people on a public sphere. This was to be achieved through an official agreement. Despite this, general discrimination toward indigenous communities continued to exist. The constitution of Honduras enshrined gender equality under article 60, which states that discrimination on grounds of sex, race or class is punishable. During Flores Presidency, from 1997 2001, Flores appointed five women to high-level positions, including that of minister of security. Despite this, violence and discrimination against women remained very prominent throughout Honduras. Honduras has been rated 6 th in the world in respect of the amount of femicide that occurs within the country. Gender roles were deeply ingrained in society, where women were treated as passive homemakers. As noted above, in 2004 the government formally recognised three LGBT rights interest groups. Despite this, marriage equality had not been recognised, and same sex couples received no legal rights or recognition. Additionally, it has been reported that as many as 200 Hunduran people had been killed due to their sexual orientation or gender identity between 1993 and 2003. As well as this, international human rights organisations have stated that LGBT individuals have often been the target of harrassmanet, abuse and murder by the military. As well as this, it has been reported that lengthy pre-trial detention often took place, and individuals were not guaranteed a due process of law. ;> https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160459.pdf) The Honduran Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press. In practice, however, press laws were not always respected. The press was generally owned by businessmen and politicians. A pressreference website noted that through the shift from the 20 th to the 21 st century, freedom of the press remained a difficult goal . Accorrding to a 1999 CPJ report, independent journalists often faced pressure from the government, and in 2001, Reporters Without Borders described Honduras s media situations as tense . Acts of intimidation and violence towards journalists were not uncommon. I n addition, criminal defamation laws existed that prohibited journliasts from in any way attacking the character of a public official in the exercise of his or her function, by act, word or in writing. The press website also noted that while the government post 2002 might not be as controlloing of the press as governments in the past,, threats and legal matters remained in the way of a totally free press. Institutionalised Rule: Transparency Interntional described Honduras as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. More specifically, across most of the sources that I have come across, the judiciary has been described as corrupt . In 1998, the Supreme Court was filled with lawyers close to the military and officials that had been accused of corruption. It was not uncommon for judges to face death threats and violent attacks, after asserting themselvse in human rights cases . In addition, corruption had also been identified in the legislative and executive branches. Prior to 1999, military officials were somewhat immune from being held legally respinsible for their crimes, due to their cases being easily dismissed in the military court. However, in 1999 military individuals began to be prosecuted in civilian courts, which helped curb this impunity. In addition, in 2000, a former chief of the armed forces and 9 other officers and generals were accused of embezzling $349,000 in a civilian Court. This demonsrates that attempts were made to achieve some sort of accountability standard. However, the ability for certain individuals to evade the law remained prominent. A US travel website warns its citizens that criminals within Honduras operate with a high degree of impunity . ;> https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/honduras-travel-warning.html ) Moreover, less than 3% of reported femicide cases were resolved by the courts. ;> http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/central-america-femicides-and-gender-based-violence .) This had the effect of encourging perpetrators to commit such crimes, knowing that they would not be convicted. However, as mentioned above, in 2009 President Zelaya was held accoutnable for his breaches. This also relates to the process of policy and law making. Zelaya attempted to arbitrarily change the law, which obviously was not in line with the standard processes. He was barred from doing so. |
| Hungary | 1956 | 1989 | 7 | 4 | 5 | Hungary has been harder to define since the focal point is around 1977 however major events seemed to form around this era rather than this having a major part to play. The Hungarian People s Republic was in rule from 1956 to 1989. The year of 1989 bought about the end of communism in Hungary. This time period is relevant because it covers the reign and liberalisation that Janos Kadar and his party brought to Hungary before the overriding of the want for a market economy that eventually led to the end of communism in 1989. Kadar was instated in 1956 by Government officials. Kadar managed to bring in liberal reforms and people s rights started to increase. In the end, the democratic opposition was going to be the winner with majority support from the people after failed attempts at economic change and a failing ideology that was communism. Changes to the constitution such as free elections, representative democracy and 100 more changes were not looked at until 1989 and therefore do not really relate to the way Hungary was run in previous years. Even though people were relatively free during the Communist era, there were not free multi-party elections. Although Kadar managed to introduce liberalist ideas, the old institution was there and therefore ingrained laws and traditions remained; and during this time the Judiciary had not been separate to the Legislative or Executive powers. By the 1970 s free health care was granted to every citizen. People s rights were considered but freedom of choice to choose who would lead them in this phase was not an option. As well as this, the idea of the arts and culture lifestyle that Hungary once had was replaced with socialist manifestations and political propaganda advocating for the ideology of socialist realism. Freedom of Media was strictly controlled, especially the Hungarian Press. As was with television, having not been brought into Hungary until the 1950 s at first television wasn t the mainstream of communication between the Government and the people but by the 70 s there was only two radio stations and two state-run channels. At the start of this era there was a real sense of nationalism having overcome the dictatorship that before ruled, this allowed for wider social acceptance for limits on political freedom, however as the rest of the world began to modernize and the need for economic development in Hungary pressed on, communism didn t satisfy the civilians needs and ultimately bought the downfall of this regime and ideology in 1989. REFERENCES BBC News. BBC. Feburary 14, 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1054642.stm . Cienciala, Anna M. HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY, 1968-1980. THE BALKANS, 1948-1980. January 01, 2002. Freedom House. Freedom House. / /, 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/georgia . Human Rights Watch. World Report. / /, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/georgia . Körösényi, András. Government and Politics in Hungary. /: Central European University Press, 1998. P.Conradt, David. Britannica. 06 12, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany . Pittaway, Mark. Politics of Legitimacy and Hungary’s Post-war Transition. Contemporary European History, 2004. Yerevan. “International Observers Say, Presidential Elections in Georgia ‘Positive and Transparent’.” ArmInfo - Business Bulletin, 2013. |
| India | 1980 | 1991 | 9 | 12 | 8 | India is an interesting case study, as it is a democratic country which suffered during the period of 1980-91 from endemic corruption, economic inequality, and human rights abuses. For the ‘Democratic Institutions’ questions, I awarded India 2 points. Although Indian politics have been dominated by the Indian National Congress for decades, India is not a single-party state as it holds multi-party, competitive, open elections with universal suffrage. I would add that the scope of these questions does not account for non-state actors; in the elections of 1984, ongoing fighting in some regions prevented large segments of the population from going to the polls. Nevertheless, the elections of 1980 and 1984 demonstrated that multi-party, competitive elections took place in India. The election of 1991 resulted in no majority for any party, further putting paid to the myth that the INC continued to exercise dominance over Indian politics. India has a checkered human rights record, particularly in the 1980s. Members of the Sikh and Muslim religious minorities were routinely discriminated against by the government and police. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, anti-Sikh riots were conducted across the country, and members of Congress were implicated in this - using voter lists to identify Sikhs. The police extrajudicially abducted, tortured and ‘disappeared’ thousands of people in the Punjab region during this time period, and they have not really been held to account. Muslims fared little better. In 1987, members of a provincial constabulary rounded up and executed 42 Muslim youths. In general, human rights were not always respected by the government, although a 1980 Supreme Court decision - ‘Minerva Mills v. Union of India’ - placed a check on the government’s ability to bypass individual rights. I therefore awarded India 0 or 1 points for most of the civil rights questions. The Indian constitution did not guarantee freedom of the press specifically, but it protected freedom of expression in general. The 1980s saw the growing independence of the media from the government, which had previously exerted such influence over some media outlets - notably All India Radio - that they were widely known to be government mouthpieces. Criticism of the government was not formally criminalized, and the media played an important role in exposing corruption scandals. However, the government brought huge pressure to bear on media outlets to stop reporting on certain matters. I awarded India 1 point for the question on freedom of the press, but 2 points when it came to individual freedom of expression. Again, although the INC dominated the government up to and including this period, India did not have institutionalized systems of rule such as are described by the relevant questions. There were routine cases of officials flouting rules and laws and bypassing state institutions. The state suffered from endemic corruption, but the Bofors scandal that unfolded in the late 1980s showed that corruption was not enabled by voter apathy and that the perpetrators could be brought to account - despite the government’s best efforts to cover it up. I awarded India 1 or 2 points for the questions relating to violation of the law and being held to account. I ended the period of study in 1991, when the election of that year caused India to embark on a program of liberalization, modernization and reform. |
| Ireland | 1981 | 1987 | 13 | 12 | 7 | Regarding questions 1 and 2, I chose the years between 1981 and 1987 as my period of study. This is an interesting period, as it encompasses four general elections in the space of just six years. This draws attention to the complex political competition that was rife at the time. I start my study in 1981, where Fine Gael leader Garret Fitzgerald is elected as Taoiseach . My study ends in 1987, where Charles Haughey of Fianna Fáil is elected to the same role. Although the period of time is relatively short, it is disproportionately dense with information due to the number of elections held. In terms of democratic political institutions, I examined Wikipedia articles, and the Irish constitution. Ireland holds competitive elections for both legislative and executive branch positions. Executive authority lies in the hands of the government, ministers who act as representatives of the party currently in power. In 1982 alone, there were two different elections which resulted in two different governments being elected. This demonstrates meaningful political competition, as both elections had different outcomes and were extremely close. On February 18, Fianna Fáil won the popular vote by 1.8%. In November of the same year, the opposition parties formed a coalition, and won a general election by 6.6%. Although the upper house is not elected through the people, its members designated by elected officials. Furthermore, their power is significantly limited in comparison to the fully elected lower house . There are no significant barriers to the eligibility of voters. A minimum age of 18 is in place, and Irish citizenship is also required. There are no issues concerning the creation of political parties or the competitiveness of elections . Although members of the Seanad Éireann are not elected by the general public, they are still predominantly chosen through elected officials, with six of their number being selected by university graduates. Elected officials can easily hold each other accountable through confidence votes, and one such motion was passed during my year of focus between November 3-4. For the questions on civil liberties, I examined the 1983 Amnesty International report, as well as the constitution of Ireland and Wikipedia for background information. As homosexuality was not decriminalised until 1993, I could not justify giving them a higher rank for question 10. However, despite the law Ireland s social opinion of gay minorities was fairly liberal. As such, there was no evidence of significant backlash against the homosexual community within Ireland and it seems that all minorities within Ireland were treated rather well. Amnesty International reports no incidents of any such discrimination. Although Irish citizens are free from arbitrary and cruel punishment, and have the right to fair trial there was an incident in 1982 that might cast some doubt on this. Eamon Kelly, a member of the Irish Republic Socialist Party gave a confession apparently under ill treatment. After prolonged questioning and sleep deprivation, he involuntarily confessed and this evidence was used to convict him. In light of this information, I was forced to answer sometimes to question 13. While the legal system in Ireland seems to be mostly fair, that example casts enough doubt to make me lower their rating slightly. Although the Irish constitution has roots in catholic values, it is not religious in nature and is completely secular in theory and in practice. There is no state church, and no obvious enforcement of religious orthodoxy. Freedom of speech in Ireland is very impressive, and they deserve high praise in this area. I have not found a single example of serious repression against it. Although there were some newspapers controlled by various politicaties, including An Phoblact, which was fairly influential most media was independent of the state, and there was significant diversity in opinion as evidenced by the range of newspapers expressing different views. When examining the questions on institutionalised rule, I used the same sources as I had previously, along with an explanatory website explaining Irish citizens voting rights. The Irish constitution has had no prominent violations that I could discover, and nobody seems to be above the law. Irish politicians during my period of study do not seem to have engaged in any activities that could constitute unlawfulness in any case. The upper house is able to delay laws passed by the lower house, and referenda are often held on subjects of legislation. For this reason, I believe the institutional processes in place are accountable. The head of state is firmly accountable to the people as general elections can dislodge his power, and votes of confidence can do the same. This happened twice in 1982 during my period of study. All state leaders hold official positions, and their power is legal and appropriate to the constitution. There is clearly no cult of personality in Ireland. I believe that income inequality in Ireland will be comparatively low due to the accountability of the government to its people. References http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/ https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Bhunreacht_na_hEireann_web.pdf Amnesty International Report : https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1983/en/ Wikipedia . |
| Italy | 1992 | 1998 | 13 | 12 | 10 | Justification of Italy Period: 1991-2006. Focal point: 1992 As with the Mozambique case study, this choice of time period requires a background for context. The years after World War Two and the fall of the fascist regime lead by Benito Mussolini saw Italy transform into a republican democracy along with the consolidation of a new constitution. Italy saw many years under the rule of the Christian Democrat Party until the recession during the 70 s and 80 s which saw only two non-Christian Democrat governments. Our period of interest is the early 90 s which saw massive disenfranchisement among voters along with the massive corruption scandal which was broken and covered in detail by the Clean Hands investigation . Debt due to excessive spending to combat the recession also had a massive effect on ordinary citizens which furthered the political system from everyday people. Also during this time, the Christian Democrat party who had been in power for nearly the whole time since the establishment of democracy split into factions after the clean hands scandal. The corruption scandal exposed corruption in all forms of Italian political and legal system. The end year of 1999 is the year all these reforms from the corruption scandal was solidified. This decade saw the start of the real instability and constant change of government . As one scholarly source states, the clean hands scandal, threat of government bankruptcy and a yes vote on referenda to overhaul the electoral system was the big three reasons why this period moulded what contemporary Italian politics has become. Despite all this overwhelming evidence of a clearly flawed system, the justification of the three sectors under investigation resulted in a high score for each part. This however, does not mean the Italian democratic system is perfect by any means. Justification of Democratic Political Institutions Elections have always been both free and fair. They are always representative of the votes cast in that sense, Italy s political institutions have always representative with the slightly un democratic selection of the Prime Minister by the elected President. The parliament is a bi-cameral system with an upper and lower house. Universal suffrage for those over 18 has been established at the same time it became a democracy. There is freedom to associate and create political parties . Justification of Civil Liberties The separation of the Italian state and the Catholic church does exist lawfully but however the Catholic church still has a pervasiveness in Italian society. There is however total freedom of religion . The judicial system however, is the let-down of this section. It is guaranteed independent but the problems lay in its effectiveness. It is notoriously slow with people waiting over 18 months for access to court along with a law that allows for preventative detention . Freedom of press and speech is protected at there are strict libel laws for untruthful publishing. Most of the media is independent and an egalitarian law guarantees equal airtime for all political parties if that organisation decides to cover politics. Justification of Institutionalized Rule Equality before the law no matter the position in society is a principle of Italian society . The executive is accountable to the people and to the elite . The state positions are all voted upon except the Prime Minister. Law making power lies mostly with the legislative. The executive has a lot of restrictions on it with power being decentralized. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/italy file:///C:/Users/Rayhan/Downloads/out.pdf https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171701.pdf http://www.tandfonline.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402380701500322?needAccess=true file:///C:/Users/Rayhan/Downloads/2650330.pdf file:///C:/Users/Rayhan/Downloads/ONGARO-2011-Public_Administration.pdf |
| Jordan | 1990 | 1998 | 4 | 5 | 3 | For the issue of Jordan in 1995, I mainly used the source from the FreedomHouse website, since they cover the situation in Jordan before 1998 in great details. For question 29 to 31 regarding elections, it is clearly stated on the websites that the people could not change their government democratically. The king was the person that had the power to appoint someone to power. There were elections in the country, but it was only set up after a riot in 1989, and these elections were not effective since in the end the King approval mattered. Furthermore, I could not find any actual concrete rules that speaks about certain types of people that could not vote. But it was well-known that the country had a discrimination for women and non-islamic ethnic, thus it can be assume these type of people may not have access to elections For question 32 to 34 regarding institutions. As stated above, due to the discrimination, there would most likely not be a non-islamic party or a women lead party, so we can count religion and gender as a barrier to creating a party. Furthermore since the King had absolute power over the parliament, a new party must serve the king interest rather than criticize him. It was a fact that the King was above any institutions or officials, but it was still possible for officials to compete against another officials, if the King allowed it. For question 35 to 42 regarding civil liberties. Islam was the country official religion, enforced by the government on its citizen. As stated above women and non-islamic groups often face discrimination in many areas. Furthermore, a majority of women suffered from “honor killing”, which often went on without prosecution. The government did have some effort against “honor killing”, but not significantly and women were still abused by men. In term of free speech, there were certain independent press, but they were controlled by the government with heavy penalty for any attempt to talk against the leader. However, there were some cases when small demonstrations were allowed. For question 43 to 49 regarding institutionalized rule. Institutions in Jordan were considered to be ineffective at time since they relied on their king order. Moreover, the process of law making were non-transparent because the King had the power to scrap any policy he did not like regardless of how much time and development went into them. The King was considered above the law and hold power of the parliament, so people could not him accountable through conventional means. Since this is a monarchy based system, there was definitely a cult of personality. |
| Kazakhstan | 1999 | 2006 | 7 | 6 | 6 | - This year was chosen because that is the beginning of the government formed by the Otan political party.Despite the fact that the President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in office since 1990. This year was chosen as this is the end of the Otan government and the beginning of the Nur Otan government, which is what Otan formed into. While Kazakhstan’s first multi party elections were held in 1999, the elections were fairly unfair with intimidation of opponents being used to secure the election. The elections can be further discredited as in 2000 Nazarbayev was granted special lifetime privileges effectively allowing him to influence the government even if not in office. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/kazakhstan For this reason I’ve awarded a score of 1, as while there were multi party elections, their were unfair. Same as above. There appears to be no major discrimination when it comes to suffrage, as stated in the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan Article 41. http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/K950001000_ Where it is stated that one has the right to vote provided they are over the age of 18. However, as discussed above, it is clear that in practice this is not entirely the case as there still existed some degree of coercion and intimidation at the ballots.For this reason I’ve awarded a score of 1. While non government parties are allowed to exist and new parties to form, for example, during this period many new parties were registered, including; Socialist Resistance of Kazakhstan, Ak Zhol Democratic Party, and the Communists People’s Party of Kazakhstan. And other parties or politicians were allowed to contest elections, however many of them experienced at least some degree of harassment, through dubious legal allegations and other methods, such as former prime-minster Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and others. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kazakhstan0404/3.htm This question was difficult to answer, but I’ve decided to give it a 1 score, as while Nazarbayev was in office for the full span of this time period, and continues to be, but because of the law passed in 2000 giving him lifetime privileges and powers, he could if he chose to step down from office, continued to wield significant power and influence within government, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/kazakhstan While officials were technically able to challenge one another or the establishment, this was often met with certain repercussion stemming from the establishment, as seen through the treatment of Kazhegeldin and the DVK. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/kazakhstan https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kazakhstan0404/3.htm At the time in Kazakhstan certain groups were legally disenfranchised and unable to enjoy full rights and privileges that were afforded to other citizens. While homosexual activity was legalised in 1998, homosexuals were still discriminated against in Kazakhstan, with no legal protection from discrimination either in employment or day to day life, they were also barred from military service.http://www.refworld.org/docid/55b20c664.html At the time in Kazakhstan women also faced some degree of disenfranchisement, lacking legislation to enshrine their legal equality among men, with laws comprehensively attempting to end domestic violence and grant women fair representation within government only being passed in 2009, after the focus period. http://www.refworld.org/docid/55b20c664.html See above explanation, homosexuals were discriminated against in society, along with women. For the most part citizens accused of offenses are afforded the right of a fair trial, but in some cases, particularly those of high profile political opposition figures, this right is often circumvented, such as in the case of the trial of Kazhegeldin, who was trailed and sentenced in absentia, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kazakhstan0404/3.htm and that of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, during his investigation he was held indefinitely, interrogated and had his medical conditions ignored, resulting in him suffering a heart attack .http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/4828,kazakhstan-does-not-comply-with-fair-trial-guarantees Again, for the most part, average citizens were protected from such unreasonable use of state power, however during the period the death penalty was still legal and used. http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/3986,kazakhstan-and-the-death-penalty-reform-of-the-criminal-code-counters-the-abolitionist-tendency As well of cases of cruel treatment and unfair detainment, as discussed above in the case of Zhakiyanov. Kazakhstan has a history of religious tolerance, with significant Muslim and Orthodox populations, as well as a variety of other smaller religions. There was no connection between state and church in the years of 1999-2006, this is mostly due to Kazakhstan’s position as a former Soviet state, during which secularism was strongly encouraged. While the Constitution protects the right to freedom of speech, in practice this was not always protected. Some criticism is allowed, and at the time Kazakhstan wasn’t as controlling of the media and personal free speech as it was under the Soviet Union, however often dissent is censored. For example a popular sports columnist, Nesip Zhunusbayev, was fired from his position by the Minister of tourism and sports in 2004 after expressing some anti governmental opinions on how the government was approaching Kazakhstani sport. https://rsf.org/en/news/minister-fires-editor-sports-weekly-criticising-government Similar as discussed above, there is some degree of censorship, and if high profile figures didn’t tow the line they would find themselves in some trouble, but regular citizens were often safe. Again, the censorship was not as harsh as it was under the Soviet Union. A significant portion of the press was either directly controlled by the government or appeared to be suspiciously positive of the government and was most likely somehow influenced by he state, while there was still some independent news sources, many of them were not as popular as the pro state outlets. http://www.refworld.org/type,ANNUALREPORT,,KAZ,47c565ed28,0.html - It appears Nazarbayev was somewhat above the law, and was able to allegedly appropriate state funds and engage in dubious practices without any apparent consequence, this can seen through the scandal of “Kazakhgate” in 2000 and onward. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kazakhstan0404/3.htm Yes, the government of Kazakhstan consisted of two houses, an upper and a lower, and these legislatures were used to make and pass laws. During the period there was no single man who could make laws as he wished. While Nazarbayev post 2000 was effectively given power for life, and did enjoy high popular opinion, if he was to lose support it would have been feasible that he might bend to popular pressure. This question was difficult to answer, were there three options, 0=no, 1=kind of, and 2=yes I would have chosen the 1, as while Nazarbayev is in a official position he could feasibly still wield significant power if he were to leave office, as discussed above at #8. As previously discussed Nazarbayev enjoyed significant support from the public and did have some degree of a cult of personality, however at the time it was totally comparable to other famous cult’s of personality, like that of the Kim’s in North Korea, or that of Stalin or Hitler. |
| Kenya | 1978 | 2002 | 3 | 5 | 3 | An identifiable year thats events enshrine Kenyas gradual regime transition is 1982. Since 1969 Kenya has been a de-facto one party state. Under the Moi regime, however, opposition leader Odinga Odinga announced the inception of a new party in 1982. Two months later in detestation to this, Kenya adopted a dejure state system legally recognising Kenyas single party state status. Any MPs who contested the proposal were threatened with detention without trial. This action also captures the incapabilities of the legislative and parliamentary branch to restrain the concentration of power in the executive branch. During the mid 1980s Moi abolished the standing harambee system of parliamentary debate. This facilitated debate in the KANU party between factions . Even though this system was itself corrupt with the use of word of mouth promises and financial loans to the government, it still facilitated some debate and its abolishment further entrenched the patronage system within the party and meant the president could pass legislation even more arbitrarily. Parliamentary immunity was not practiced in debate and rendered MPs vulnerable to criminal conviction by the president for things they said in this space severely hindering the ability for parliamentary critique which on multiple occasions during the 1980s resulted in criminal conviction. The president had an active role in selecting government officials,frequently suspending those in his party who he thought were not truly compliant to his rule and replacing them with actors who were. by 1989 half elected members to parliament held ministerial roles. Lower level KANU politicians and officers lost a lot of their capabilities to influence national policy and their power only extended to seeking local projects and quizzing ministers. This extended to the legislature too. The executive passed the 1988 trade licensing act which allowed the executive to dismiss any lawyer whose actions were in disapproval of the government. Moi made it clear in the 1980 s that any critique by any actor was not tolerated and he did not adhere to balancing powers in political institutions. The only point of exception to this, however small, was critique made by church groups with affiliation to the KANU party. This was the only time where moi could be held accountable, when the interests of these church groups aligned with Moi s interest in their financial support but this is not a substantial check on power. Any critique of government by individuals was met by consequence often resulting in a loss of employment on the grounds of public interest as with Odinga’s wife when she filed a lawsuit against the government. Speech and free press are also not protected, in 1988 a new Ministry for National Guidance and Political Affairs was concepted to censor film and print media and push nyo nyo ideology and in 1989 rumor mongering became illegal. KANU increased its surveillance capabilities by creating a youth wing and giving it this function as with its association with other institutions separate from the government. This mass surveillance was accompanied by the subsequent arrests and torturings of its victims mainly targeted at lecturers, university students, lawyers and human rights advocates. Furthermore, economic inequality was blamed on minority groups and ethnic cleansing was suggested by the government as a solution. There was mass protest in areas of Kenya to Mois abusive powers and this incited international criticism forcing moi to adopt a multiparty system in 1992. Whilst throughout the early to mid nineties the concentration of power remained evident, it was enforced through bribery and financial benefits and so i define it as a different era. specifically on the eligibility of voters, i found evidence to suggest licenses to vote were hard to attain most notably for younger people but it was not clear. http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print http://www.tandfonline.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/doi/abs/10.1080/14662040008447828#aHR0cDovL3d3dy50YW5kZm9ubGluZS5jb20uaGVsaWNvbi52dXcuYWMubnovZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4xMDgwLzE0NjYyMDQwMDA4NDQ3ODI4P25lZWRBY2Nlc3M9dHJ1ZUBAQDA= https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya_African_National_Union#One-Party_State_and_return_to_Democracy |
| Kenya | 1997 | 2007 | 8 | 10 | 9 | Elections are indeed held for major executive positions; it has a legislative, executive and judicial identity groups are marginalised under Kenyan law. Cruel laws surrounding homosexuality, combined with the fact that an individual is not legally entitled to speak to a lawyer when under arrest earns Kenya very few points between questions 35-38. While religion used to have significant influence over Kenya, throughout the decades it has lost a lot of traction. The church does not play much of a role in Kenyan government, with the government continually restricting its influence. It is important to note that the freedom of media is protected under Kenya s constitution, ensuring the right to independent press and disabling the government to unreasonably prohibit broadcasting. It is unclear whether or not there are those above the law in Kenya, as there is conflicting evidence either way. Under the constitution, there is nobody above the law, however in practise it may be fair to assume that there are those who do not operate under the same legal parameters the majority of Kenya do . However, because of the judicial system- those in power are able to be held accountable to some extent. State leaders are always in official positions, and there is no evidence to suggest there is a significant cult of personality surrounding these state leaders. A quick note in regards to the questions being asked, I think it would be reasonable to alter question 36 Regardless of legal rights, significant identity groups experience widespread discrimination." . There are countries that enforce discrimination through legislation, which is an important part in understanding how certain groups are marginalised- a point that cannot be understood through the answering of the question in its current form. Also, answering question 30 was strange. The two points answer being There were elections for legislative positions that were at least competitive and involved more than one party. There is a very clear difference between an election being at least competitive and a genuine democratic process. Elections can be competitive and still vastly unfair and this question does not give room to make such a distinction. branch. Kenya functions as a democratic republic, with power being distributed among the respective branches of government . There are very basic restrictions as to the eligibility of voters, with that being the fairly standard requirement of citizenship and a minimum age of eighteen, with slightly more restrictive requirements for running as a candidate- but nothing out of an ordinary democratic government. This is why it was fair to suggest that two points for these questions was appropriate, however I did consider that one s sexuality could potentially prevent one s ability to vote, as homosexuality is a crime and if you are in prison you are not able to vote in Kenya. In regards to how identify can influence a person s rights in Kenya, this is particularly important in respect to the sexuality of a person. In Kenya, it is a crime to commit homosexual acts and therefore it is fair to suggest that Kenya should receive no points for such a question, as it is therefore true certain |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 1991 | 2005 | 12 | 7 | 8 | For the questions on democratic political institutions, my answers were almost exclusively in the middle of the spectrum. When researching the Kyrgyz Republic, I found that Askar Akayev’s election as the first President of the independent Kyrgyz Republic was genuinely fair end democratic, despite Akayev being the only candidate. Akayev was popular in the Kyrgyz Republic, and having served as president under the Soviet Union, faced a genuinely unopposed campaign. However, as time went on, Akayev’s regime became less democratic, as he campaigned through the use of state media, and applied legal and political pressure to opposition candidates. Ballots were also reportedly stuffed. So while elections for ececutive branch positions and legislative positions weren’t affected by violence, and were in some way democratic, undemocratic methods were used to ensure Akayev’s power was absolute. During Akayev’s rule, opposition candidates were even imprisoned before elections for various, unfounded crimes. For the questions on civil liberties, I found information harder to find. However, it appears that civil liberties were largely intact in the Kyrgyz Republic, however the majority of the media is state controlled. For the questions on institutionalised rule, research showed that while the Kyrgyz Republic does have a constitution that is followed for the most part, Akayev would frequently add or subtract to/from the constitution through referendums that largely did not come about through democratic methods. Due to the lack of fair elections, policy makers are usually not held accountable. There are also some concerning examples of violence towards protesters, where some have been shot and killed, although the majority of these occurences were towards the end of Akayev’s regime. My research for these questions came from the following web articles: http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Kyrgyzstan/sub8_5a/entry-4747.html http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/7364-briefing-kyrgyzstan-the-increasing-failure-of-askar-akayev http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4371819.stm |
| Kyrgyz Republic - 2001 | 1991 | 2005 | 5 | 6 | 5 | The Krygyz Republic was ruled by the Soviet Union in the past, but in the 2001 Krygyzstan was run by President Askar Akayev. I focused on the time period of 1991-2005 because this covers the first moments Krygyzstan transitioned to democracy to the end of President Askar Akayev. In the Democratic Political Institutions, I have rated Krygyzstan poorly in terms of being a democratic society. Being a former part of the Soviet Union, democracy was a foreign framework that was not encouraged or popular in Asia. According to Freedom House: I n 2000, opposition parties, including the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, The People s Party, and Ar-Namys, were barred from the polling stations for legal technicalities widely regarded as politically motivated charges. The People’s Party leader, Danier Usenov, was banned from running in a single-mandate constituency in the second-round runoff for allegedly failing to declare accurately his personal assets. Ar-Namys chairman Felix Kulov lost in the runoff by a large margin despite having enjoyed a secure lead in the first round. These are examples of why I could not mark Krygyzstan highly on the democratic section of the test. International observers had declared these elections neither free nor fair. In terms of civil liberties, I have rated Krygyzstan poorly once again due to it’s history of criminalizing any opposition to the President. Freedom of the Press in the Kyrgyz Republic is moderate, as state and private media are vulnerable to government pressure. This forces many journalists to practice self-censorship and all must register with the ministry of justice. Furthermore there is a policy that makes it legal to prosecute journalists who criticize government officials. In 2000, Usenov and Kulov were fined and charged with various suspicious infringements. We can assume that this is for opposing Akayev by running against him. Whilst there are no voting barriers for citizens, it does not appear that your vote matters; which is the greatest civil liberty of all in a democracy. Krygyzstan’s rating on being under institutionalized rule was very high, considering the fact that Akayev had imprisoned his opposition, charged journalists who spoke out against him and at one point forced the whole Congress to resign; it is clear that he is above the law. He is not held accountable by the people due to the fact that protestors and anyone who opposes his regime can be imprisoned or dealt with by the police. This regime is one that appears to be democratic through very flawed and restricting elections, but remains an authoritarian regime. |
| Laos | 1975 | 2017 | 3 | 4 | 9 | Laos has been a relatively stable Communist country since 1975, when the monarchy was overthrown and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party seized power, backed by Communist Vietnam. Thus, I defined the dates for this period as 1975-2017. There has been no significant political or social upheaval during this time period. Laos’ National Assembly is elected by the people, who regularly turn out in large numbers . However, the only legal party is the LPRP. The National Assembly selects the President, who then appoints the Prime Minister and cabinet with the NA’s approval. The true political power, however, rests with the LPRP’s Central Committee and Politburo - and particularly the party head, the general secretary. The current President of Laos is also general secretary. Thus, while Laos does have legislative elections, the true power comes from unelected sources. Civil liberties is a difficult issue in Laos. Although it is quite progressive on LGBT rights, guarantees representation of ethnic minorities in key bodies, and features high rates of women’s political participation, Laos has a history of discriminating against religious people and the ethnic Hmong, who largely sided with the West during the Civil War. Laotian security forces have arrested, detained, and even killed Buddhists, Christians, and Hmong. As well, a major refugee crisis with Thailand resulted in numerous detailed atrocities against Hmong. Furthermore, like many other Communist states, the security forces have leeway to detain and torture political and social dissidents, as well as critical journalists. Laos also experiences a high rate of corruption. Laos is not highly personalized - the fragmented rule through the LPRP, NA, and Presidency result in a very institutional system where decision-making follows preordained paths. A 1991 Constitution enshrined the LPRP as an agent of the state and as the state’s only political party, and more or less defined Laos to be the state it had been for 15 years and has been for the past 26. |
| Lebanon | 2005 | 2017 | 6 | 9 | 8 | Question 27. Answers shall be for the period beginning in the year 2005. As reported by Al Jazeera, in February 2005 former Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, was assassinated, leaving the country and parliamentary system in turmoil. The assassination sparked nationwide clashes between pro and anti-Syrian parties and eventually the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. This period saw the formulation of the US and Saudi-backed March 14 coalition and the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition. These coalitions have since formed the basis of political life in Lebanon, and to this day political party’s align themselves with one of the two camps. http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/lebanoncrossroads/ Question 28. The end period for my research is the present day. This is because since 2005 there have been many personnel changes in government, but ultimately the same electoral and parliamentary institutions have been in place. The methods for ‘elections’ and deciding the rulers have not changed throughout this period. Question 29-30. The electoral system in Lebanon appears to be in disarray. There are still, what are described to be, democratic institutions in place, yet these appear to exist only in principle and not practice. Even if practiced, these ‘democratic institutions’ provide plenty of debate about whether they truly are representative of the Lebanese population due to the allocation of seats according to sectarian division. There have not been elections held since 2009, with the current government extending its term twice in that period . The electoral system in place involves the general public who select 128 MP’s. This system appears to only be enacted in the rare cases of elections, however, not every time the government dissolves. The system involves a sectarian allocation of seats in parliament, to provide ‘proportionate representation’ of the various religions in Lebanon according to the 1989 Taif Agreement. This agreement says that seats will be divided: a. Equally between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect. c. Proportionately between the districts. The districts referred to are areas of the country which are allocated certain seats. The seats within a district, however, are for a specific religion only, so it may be that a Sunni Muslim lives in a region containing no Sunni seats. They are able to vote for who gets the seats in their region, but unable to vote for the Sunni seats in parliament because these fall in other districts. Furthermore, in a region where there is only one Sunni seat available, for example, even if the second-placed Sunni candidate wins more votes than the candidates from any other confession, the Sunni will not win a seat as only one Sunni seat is available. This system has been much criticised due to its non-democratic nature, as people seek a one-person-one-vote system free of sectarian division. Such a system is very elusive, however, as the country s sectarian political parties seek advantage for themselves and are unwilling to potentially sacrifice seats in parliament. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/why-lebanon-parliamentary-poll-is-unlikely-to-take-place-next-month https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf . http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/200962114819360431.html . Between nation-wide elections the presidency has changed multiple times since 2005 with various different governments resigning. However, the criteria for winning the presidency, according to BBC, is through a two-thirds majority of parliament, or 85 of the legislature’s 128 members. Most recently, after 45 failed sessions to elect a new leader due to political infighting that led to of a lack of quorum, Michel Aoun has been elected by winning the support of 83 MPs, according to Al Jazeera. The CIA website indicates that the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are then appointed by the president in consultation with the National Assembly. The prime minister then starts the task of forming a new cabinet. The steps beyond the election of MP’s is all done without a single vote from the public. It is this cabinet who have legislative powers, specifically the power to propose and execute laws, regulate all of the government s branches, including the civil, military and security administrations and institutions, and dissolve parliament at the president s request. By a two-thirds majority, it can also propose amending the constitution, change electoral laws, declare war or a state of emergency, and decide foreign policy. Because cabinet is chosen by someone, who is chosen by someone, who is chosen by people who are elected, there is a large degree of power which falls to people who are not directly elected. Those who are elected do hold the power to choose these people though - and it is worth noting that this is how the system intends it, so it is not as though the cabinet illegitimately gains this power. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14649284 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14648681won http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/michel-aoun-elected-president-lebanon-161031105331767.html https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37821698 http://www.newsweek.com/hezbollahs-latest-conquest-c-cabinet-541487 The result of this is that the people’s vote is rather diluted so that in the end they have very little influence on who is making the laws. This is especially the case in recent times as Lebanon is faced with conflict and dismay throughout their fragile region. Most recently, this situation has played in the favour of political party Hezbollah to gain a significant degree of power. Due to the lack of elections, Hezbollah has managed to manipulate the ruling system to work in their favour, increasing the number of their members in the government. This occurred after there was a 2 year long deadlock in the Lebanese government, because for a new president to be sworn in, they required the endorsement of a certain number of seats in parliament. The Future Movement party, with Saad Hariri as its leader, holds enough seats to prevent a president being elected. Therefore Michel Aoun required Hariri’s consent. This consent was not forthcoming, however, until eventually an agreement was made where Hariri endorses Aoun, under the condition that Aoun then elects Hariri as Prime Minister. This was only agreed to under the grounds that Hariri then selects certain Hezbollah members to be part of cabinet The result of this is a circle of non-democratic bargaining and dealing to ensure that certain people are part of the government. So, considering all of the above, in order to give credit for the existence of some semi-democratic systems, I shall give Lebanon a score of 1 for Questions 29 and 30. While there is clear corruption and a fairly diluted democracy, Lebanon is definitely not an example of personal rule, or the like, where individual leadership is gained through the exercise of power. Therefore it would be unjust to give a score of 0. Hence Lebanon scores 1. Question 31. There appear to be some mixed messages regarding suffrage in Lebanon, with the CIA reporting that voting has the following conditions: 21 years of age; compulsory for all males; authorized for women at age 21 with elementary education; excludes military personnel. However, this is the only source I found which suggests that women require a certain level of education - all others simply say they can vote. In terms of the age, there are multiple sources from 2009 suggesting that the age was reduced to 18, however these are followed by many more 2010 sources saying it was kept at 21. Therefore my understanding is that the proposal to lower the voting age made it past the first stage of voting in parliament, however was halted at the second step before becoming law. Therefore the only restriction on voting is age and, although it is 21 not 18, I believe this is sufficient to score a 2. http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/lebanon/lebanon-s-parliament-rejects-lowering-voting-age-1.587272 Question 32. There are many parties in Lebanon which suggests there is strong political competition. However, there is a major catch. Any person does not have the ability to run for office to hold a certain position which they desire. This is because each specific position in government is allocated to a specific religious sect. For example the presidential post is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister for a Sunni Muslim, Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim and so on& This instantly removes an overwhelming proportion of the population from candidacy for each role - making for a rather large barrier to democracy. Because of the fact that there are still multiple parties in Lebanon, and positions within each party appear reasonably contested, Lebanon will score 1 point for question 32. https://web.archive.org/web/20090322103601/http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0330_lebanon_confessionalism.html http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/why-lebanon-parliamentary-poll-is-unlikely-to-take-place-next-month https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-in-lebanons-elections/ Question 33. It is difficult to decide whether to award Lebanon 1 or 2 points. Due to the fact that the cabinet, who have the executive power, are there through the ‘democratic’ system and are not specifically in this position of power for religious or military reasons, I shall score Lebanon a 2. The reason for this is that, while the system may not be entirely democratic, this has already been recognised in the points awarded for questions 29 & 30. So therefore, because the power falls to people within the system, 2 points are scored for question 33. Questions 35-36. There are clear examples of gender discrimination in Lebanon whereby laws are different for men and women. Examples of this are provided in a freedom house report on Lebanon: 1. Women do not have the right to pass their nationality on to their husband or children. So the child of a Lebanese mother and a foreign father, may not ever gain Lebanese citizenship. A Lebanese man’s children have automatic citizenship, and his wife gains it after one year of marriage. 2. Article 562 condones violence against women in the name of honour by reducing the sentence of a man who kills or injures his wife or other female relative without premeditation if he can prove that he witnessed the victim engaging in illegal sexual intercourse. 3. Article 504 allows a husband to go unpunished for rape or any kind of abuse when the victim is his wife. A man’s punishment for rape will also be voided if he marries the woman. This is extremely disturbing for women as they may be forced to marry the man who has raped them . 4. Within the Muslim religious courts, the testimony of two women is equal that of one man. These are clear examples of women being afforded fewer legal rights than men, as well as obvious discrimination against women. Amnesty International also discuss discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in Lebanon. They say: “laws and policies in Lebanon have a discriminatory effect on Palestinian refugees with respect to their right to an adequate standard of living, the right to work, the right to social security, and the rights to own and inherit property.” Because of the discrimination and unjust treatment of women as well as Palestinian people in Lebanon, they receive a score of 0 for Questions 35 and 36. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Lebanon.pdf Question 37. According to freedom house, Article 7 of the Lebanese constitution asserts the equality of rights and duties for all citizens, regardless of gender. Article 8 stipulates that individual liberty will be guaranteed and protected by law. Despite this written in constitution, Amnesty International reports “Trials before the Justice Council and Military Courts continue to fall short of international standards for fair trials.” Freedom House also reports issues, saying that “women rarely claim their legal rights in practice, either because of legal illiteracy or because the prevailing patriarchal social system discourages them from asserting their rights in opposition to men. Similarly, noncitizen women have access to justice and are offered free legal assistance, but they rarely resort to courts due to ignorance of these services or the fear of becoming involved with an unfamiliar legal system.” Freedom house ranks non-discrimination and access to Justice at 2.8/5 for Lebanon. Although, in principle fair treatment under the law is present in Lebanon’s constitution, in practise this is not entirely the case. For this reason they shall receive a score of 1. file:///C:/Users/roque/Downloads/mde180052005en.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Lebanon.pdf Question 38. Both freedom house and Amnesty International say that torture and ill-treatment continue to be reported in Lebanon. Amnesty International claim that at least one detainee reportedly died in custody during 2004. In September Isma il alKhatib died, reportedly as a result of torture, after more than 10 days of incommunicado detention." Freedom house say that prisoners are usually detained in poorly ventilated cells and risk verbal and physical abuse at the hands of law enforcement personnel. Both sources state that cases of torture occur regularly, especially through the common form of incommunicado detention. Therefore Lebanon will receive 0 for this question. Question 39. This is a tricky one for Lebanon because, as discussed earlier, the entire political system is centred around religion and affiliation with religion. However, because the government system openly recognises and respects multiple religions, and does not force a particular set of religious practises upon its citizens, I shall give 2 points. Question 40 & 41. Freedom House report the following on freedom of speech: “The Lebanese constitution guarantees freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press, although those rights have not always been respected in practice. Generally speaking, activists and journalists face potential arrest, interrogation, and threats of bodily harm for online posts that criticize the government, religious officials, or the army. The Bureau of Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Rights remains highly active in targeting activists as well as continuing to interrogate users for criticizing public figures online, often in a manner that demonstrates little respect for the rule of law. Police have conducted early morning house raids to arrest activists and journalists for nonviolent defamation charges. Numerous attempts to reform the country s media laws have failed over the years and strict defamation laws remain a significant impediment to free speech and citizen journalism online. Websites owners, particularly news sites, often receive informal removal requests from public officials or powerful figures. Despite these limitations, Lebanon retains one of the most diverse digital landscapes in the Arab world, and several nongovernmental organizations engage in digital activism on political and social issues.” According to Amnesty International, freedom of speech is fairly well respected in Lebanon. However, they do cite the example of ongoing judicial harassment of human rights lawyer Muhamad Mugraby as an exception. These two sources suggest that Lebanon deserves 1 point for questions 40 and 41. Question 42. A state owned company holds a monopoly over internet service, while the mobile phone market is also split between two state-owned companies. By having sole control over internet and mobile phone services, the government can strictly regulate which sites are available in the country. Although this is the case, most websites are allowed with only 50 blocked, mostly relating to Israel, gambling, escort services or child pornography. Lebanese media is controlled by various powerful political groups. For example the prime minister, Saad Hariri, owns Future TV, al-Mustaqbal, the Daily Star, and a host of other online and offline media outlets. Similarly many other media outlets are owned and operated by different political parties. Such parties control the media and manipulate it to portray their messages. This system does ensure plurality because it is not simply a monopoly by one party. However, it also ensures that the media is dominated by a select few powerful parties. At the same time, politicians are known to bribe the few independent news outlets and journalists that do exist, particularly during election periods. If there were 0.5 points available, I think that would be appropriate. However I have decided to give Lebanon the benefit of the doubt and award 1 point because not all media is controlled by the same people, and there is some form of independent media . Question 43. As discussed in justifications for other answers, Lebanon does appear to violate its constitution fairly regularly. This is mainly because they have an extremely idealistic constitution which is verging on impossible to uphold in the Middle Eastern environment. Because, in most cases, it appears that the government makes a reasonable attempt to follow the constitution, I shall award 1 point. Question 44. The only example which appears in Lebanon of people acting above, or ignoring, the law is the case of Hezbollah. Hezbollah are themselves now a recognised political party in Lebanon, however they are banned from the right to bear arms. Despite this, they boast a strong military force which they mainly use to fight Israel. They have been attempting to legitimise their military for years, and many believe that with their increasing influence this may soon happen. Because this is the only case I can find, and it is potentially soon to be made law, I shall say that generally speaking, people are not above the law, and therefore award 2 points. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/lebanon-s-complex-history-1.1159508 Question 45. The law and decision making process appears to be reasonably transparent in Lebanon, in accordance with the Taif Agreement which clearly outlines the roles of those positions involved in decision making. I have not found any source which suggests that this is not the case, so I shall award 2 points. Question 46. There are no institutions in place in Lebanon for the people to hold the government accountable, and with elections a rarity, the need to please voters is not enough to force the government into action. The Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies said that no politician or political party has served the people they claim to represent. They go on to say that politicians have shielded the political system from any hint of accountability as well as demonstrated their disregard for citizens needs. Examples of this are the complete absence of action when faced with public campaigning about extremely sub-par waste disposal services in Lebanon, as well as public sector salary adjustment. Both were ignored. Therefore Lebanon scores a 0. http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=54 |
| Luxembourg | 1995 | 2013 | 16 | 12 | 11 | There is not much controversy in assessing Luxembourg s regime since it gains the highest scores in almost criteria throughout periods from 1995 to 2013 . Therefore, I only give brief justification for my assessment of Luxembourg. The first year of the research is 1995 because Jean-Claude Juncker became prime minister after his predecessor Jacques Santer had been appointed president of the European Commission this year. The last year is 2013 as it comes along with the end of the Jean-Claude Junker administration when he resigned after a phone-tapping scandal which also made his party The Socialists quit the government. Although the constitution was amended several times during this period, but it is not the issue. A range of sources was used to evaluate Luxembourg regime. However, information extracted from Freedom House reports, Amnesty International reports, and Luxembourg s constitution is used particularly. For democratic institutions questions, I mainly looked at Freedom House reports and the constitution of Luxembourg to find reasonable answers. For civil liberties questions, I looked through publishes of Freedom House and Amnesty International reports every year in chosen periods to give answers. Finally, institutionalized rule questions were answered after I analyzed information from two main sources: Luxembourg s constitution and Freedom House reports, but I also made up my mind from two other references which are Sustainable Governance Indicators and the book Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies to answer. These sources show that there were multiparty electoral system with universal suffrage during a period of research in Luxembourg. Although Luxembourg s head of state is unelected Grand Duke and according to constitution he/she is inviolable, his/her power is largely ceremonial. The political system is also open to the establishment of new parties. Voting is obligatory to Luxembourg citizens with no clear barriers to special groups of people, despite controversy of permission foreigners to cast their ballots . The government is essentially immune to corruption while elected official is highly accountable according to Sustainable Governance Indicators . The Freedom House reports also indicate that Luxembourg s constitution guarantees freedom of expression and broad range of opinions is reported freely in media outlets. Moreover, Print media are privately owned, and all media are free of censorship while Internet access is not restricted. Luxembourg also provides freedom of religion albeit Roman Catholicism is the dominant one. However, there is no state religion. Those suspected of crimes also have the right to public trials and are free to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in court while detainees are treated humanely in police stations and prisons. There is no official discrimination against any groups of people, for example Luxembourg s Muslim minority; and civic groups and NGOs may operate freely without blockage from government even if they raise ideas against the state. As a result, all of these evidence allows me to choose all the possible answers which likely indicate the highest democratic point for Luxembourg regardless of groups of questions. References Dumont, P., & De Winter, L. . Luxembourg: A Case of More Direct Delegation and Accountability. In Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies . : Oxford University Press. Retrieved 28 May. 2017, from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019829784X.001.0001/acprof-9780198297840-chapter-15 . LU . The Luxembourg Constitution. Retrieved 26 May, 2017 from http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/en/le-grand-duche-se-presente/systeme-politique/constitution-lois/index.html Sustainable Governance Indicator . Luxembourg. Retrieved 26 May, 2017 from http://www.sgi-network.org/2016/Luxembourg/Executive_Accountability |
| Madagascar | 2002 | 2009 | 11 | 12 | 10 | Madagascar Duration of regime: 2002-2009 In December 2001, an election was held in which both major parties claimed victory which resulted in a political crisis. Ratsiraka of the AREMA party was eventually defeated in July 2002 when he and several supporters fled to exile in France and Ravalomanana became president and in elections in December 2002, his party TIM gained a commanding majority in the National Assembly. This regime continued until March 2009 when Ravalomanana s government was dissolved in a military-backed uprising led by Andry Rajoelina. Democratic Institutions According to Freedom House, a nephew of one of Ravalomanana s challengers in the 2006 presidential poll was suspended from his position as mayor of Toamasina and arrested on charges of embezzlement. It is unclear whether this was politically motivated but many viewed it as such. This can be considered evidence that competition is not welcomed in this regime but I feel as though this is not enough evidence to condemn the regime to a lesser mark on this classification. There is universal suffrage and numerous groups of political opposition. I have not found any evidence that the democratic institutions of this regime are questionable, thus I have awarded this regime top marks in this section. Civil Liberties This area is arguable the most controversial of the sections as the questions in the Democratic Institutions and Institutional rule categories appear to have little evidence of weak integrity in this regime. An instance that does question the integrity of this regime, however, is the deportation of a Jesuit priest which raised scepticism in the Roman Catholic Church. While religious freedom has traditionally been granted to the Malagasy people, this right was defied when the traditional Protestant movement, of which Ravalomanana belongs, was challenged in late 2005 by a popular Protestant charismatic church who was winning followers from the former. The government shut down this church. The deportation of the priest and this act against the church put considerable strain on relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the state and these events also bring into question the level of religious freedom of the public, hence I awarded a lesser mark in the religious freedom area. Although I have awarded religious freedom a lesser marks, I have found no evidence that religion or ideology affects the workings of the government. Thus I conclude there to be a separation of church and state, and it is free from any particular ideology that limits the population in any way. Freedom House also outlines many issues with the judiciary system. Most of the 20,000 prisoners have yet to attend trials yet suffer harsh and, at times, life-threatening conditions. Rural regions are implicated most by the lack of training, resources and personnel and often sentence severe punishments, therefore I have given this section a low mark for its lack of respect for human rights such as wrongful detention which could be attributed to its lack of an independent judiciary. I found media liberties difficult to grade as there is evidence that there is a large presence of free media and it is protected in the constitution. However, this freedom has been limited at times by government officials who have attempted to supress coverage of incidents that show the government in a bad light. It is also important to mention that a vastness of media is under the control of president Ravalomanana and his supporters. Taking this into consideration, I have given this question a lower mark. As for the other aspects in the Civil Liberties category, there is some evidence that the country faces some differences and tensions in terms of ethnic groups but there is no overt evidence that these tribes have different rights or opportunities under this regime. Gender is more equal here than in many other African countries but they are still facing some difficulties in discrimination societally and in education and employment opportunities. However, women have a high presence in the work force and a large presence in government and managerial positions than is seen in many other African countries. Institutional rule The regime seems accountable to the people for the most part and the outcome of the elections appears to favour the ruling party . There is little to no evidence that the party is working outside its allocated parameters. Sources referenced: Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/madagascar |
| Malaysia | 2006 | 2017 | 5 | 9 | 5 | Political Institutions Malaysia operates under a federalist system with bicameral parliament, made up of a non-elected upper house and an elected lower house. There is a wide variety of political parties repersenting different interests . Elections for prime minister are regularly as provided by the constitution and voting is inclusive, however elections themselves are heavily biased towards the incumbents advantage. The short two week campaigning period limits opposition efforts, opposition has little access to main stream media, and there appears to be some evidence of voter fraud and occurrences of harassment. Elected officials appear to hold power and policy enactment is carried out by institutionally held offices. The role Monarchy plays is largely ceremonial, however some power is held by the monarchy most notably the king nominates 44 of 70 seats in the upper house and has the power to imprison citizens under the vague sedition act of 1948. Institutional roles have become blurred with minister of parliamentary affairs, Nazri Aziz addressing the separation of powers as " too idealist" . The centralisation of power has meant that citizens political choices are rarely overridden by non-institutional organisations,such as business interests, foreign power, military etc. Elected officials can find it difficult challenge one another for fear of imprisonment. For example, Anwar Ibrahim leader of the opposition party from 2008 - 2015,former deputy prime minister, has been convicted and imprisoned multiple times for unsubstantiated charges. Which has been internationally regarded a move to silence political opposition. In recent times Mahathir Mohamad has spoken out against the current prime minister in light of the 1MDB scandal. Sources: Malayisa Comparative National Systems 11/19/2009 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/malaysia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/malaysia http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577390-after-tainted-election-victory-najib-razak-needs-show-his-reformist-mettle-dangerous http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/02/economist-explains-1 Civil Liberties Malaysia has frequent cases of human rights abuses, arbitrary arrest, detentions and torture resulting in death are common. In 2006 alone 90 people were arrested and held without trail for alleged threats to national security under the 1960 Internal Security Act. A Human Rights Watch report in 2015 reported that in 2014 10 people dead in police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police often act with impunity and any civil suits against them are often covered up. Capital Punishment is routine and used for drug and violent offenses including,drug trafficking, murder and violent discharge of a fire arm. As of May 2015 1043 individuals awaiting execution on death row. LGBT, non-Muslim groups are often oppressed and detained without access to lawyers or due process, in 2014 16 trans gender women were imprisoned for cross dressing a practice illegal under Sharia law. Under the constitution, Malaysian citizens are meant to have access to equal religious tolerance however, non-Muslims Muslims are often subject to institutionalized persecution. There is no separation or church and state and Sharia courts and law hold significant power. There is an independent media in Malaysia but it operates under self-censorship as media licenses issued by the government can be revoked if content does not comply or strays to far from regime ideology. In 2015 Journalists were arrested under the Sedition Act for criticizing the government. Journalist reporting on the corruption during the 1MDB state investment scandal earned their news outlets criminal defamation proceeding and media license suspension. http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=malaysia https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/23/malaysia-end-arrests-transgender-women https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2015_web.pdf page 381 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/malaysia Institutionalized Rule Leaders and government officials frequency flout the rule of law, corruption is common place in Malaysia. The most notorious example of this is the 1MDB government fund scandal lead by prime minister Najib Razak. Public funds meant to be used in the development of the nation’s economy $700 million of which was funnelled through the PMs bank account benefiting himself and his circle of cronies. Najib Razak, is still in power at today present and was exonerated by the governor general who ruled that the money was a ‘gift’. Despite popular protests surrounding election fraud in 2013 Najib Razak and the United Malays National Organisation party are not accountable to the public as Razak did not step down and there were no consequences for his actions. Furthermore, the royal family and the wealthy seem to be above the law, Crimes committed are often covered up and frequently ignored by the judicial system and police . A infamous scandal involving Indonesian model Manohara Pinot her ex-husband Malaysian prince ;Tengku Fakhry. Manohara escaped claiming that her husband had help her captive against her will, raped and abused her. Subsequently the a Malaysian court awarded Fakhry $6million RM in damages in a defamation case. Regardless to whoever was in the wrong in this case the Malaysian royal family is mired with such scandals and this story is representative of the impunity the upper class have. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/201358174111284884.html http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2010/03/11/tengku-fakhry-wins-rm6mil-in-damages-against-wife-manohara-updated/ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/5422894/Teenage-model-who-married-Malaysian-prince-flees-abusive-marriage.html http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456 |
| Mauritania | 1984 | 2005 | 3 | 8 | 3 | Mauritania I must be brutally honest and say that I knew very little about Mauritania before starting my research for the data classification. I decided to start my timeline with the year 1984 because this is the precise moment when Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya led a coup that saw him take control Mauritania. I ended the timeline in the year 2005 because that is the year that Taya was ousted by a military coup led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. The Democratic Political Institution questions led me to data and findings that closely mimicked Ghana from 1990 till 2000. Taya did not allow political parties to return to Mauritania until 1991. This was followed by civilian rule, however, Taya s party, the Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social would go on to win every election until he was thrust out of power in 2005 . A small amount of seats were won in senate, and parliamentary elections, but not enough to make a true difference. The Civil Liberties questions are where Mauritania really sticks out for unfortunate circumstances. According to an Amnesty International in 1990, At least 200 people, including prisoners of conscience, were detained without charge or trial for over four months in the wake of inter communal violence in April. Other prisoners of conscience were among at least 60 political prisoners serving sentences imposed in previous years, mostly after unfair trials: 19 of these were released in December. Numerous reports of torture, some resulting in death, were received. At least 30 people appeared to have been victims of extrajudicial killings by government forces deployed in the south. Furthermore, discrimination against women is a massive problem. The majority of Mauritania citizens make personal decisions based off of sharia law. Under sharia law a women s testimony in a court of law is only accountable for half as much as a mans testimony Additionally the judicial system is no where close to being independent or free of corruption. Freedom House states, Opposition leader Chebih Ould Cheikh Malainine, of the Popular Front, was convicted in June with two others on charges of conspiracy against the state and was sentenced to five years in prison. Defense lawyers withdrew from the case, a fair trail could not be expected. Amnesty International said established court procedures were flouted during the trial and evidence tendered by the police was obtained from the defendants under duress. Prison conditions in Mauritania are harsh. Moreover, there is no true freedom of press. There are 20 privately owned newspapers, but all have to register with the government and they are only allowed to publish a certain amount of times. Of all the newspapers in Mauritania, only two publish daily and the state owns both. An example of cencorship is in 2011 when Mauritian authorities censored an issue of L’Eveil-Hebdo. Article 11 of the constitution forbids dissemination of reports deemed to “attack the principles of Islam or the credibility of the state, harm the general interest, or disturb public order and security.” Lastly there are some parties and activists groups that are banned from Mauritania. These include groups whose missions have to do with black rights such as the El Hor party I struggled to find evidence for the Institutionalized rule questions. However, research did show that a great deal of officials and members of police/security are above the law. Amnesty international reports that, although Mauritanian law prohibits the use of torture, the authorities took no known action to investigate torture allegations or to prosecute alleged torturers. It was also reported that during a time of conflict with Senegal over native black Mauritanians, the Mauritian government decided to deport more than 50,000 black Mauritanians. During the deportations, many of these individuals were tortured and executed . Works Cited https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritania#cite_note-29 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0003/1990/en/ https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/mauritania |
| Morocco | 1963 | 1999 | 3 | 4 | 3 | Democratic Political Institutions For this section, I looked mostly at the rough outline of how the Moroccan government worked and the past elections, from this research, much of the country’s politics during this period all point to a major lack of democratic practice. Throughout the chosen period, Hassan II was King and saw his executive position mostly unchallenged until 1972 which saw a failed coup attempt. Despite this, Hassan not only enjoyed political power but also religious power, he stood above everything outside of Islam . Morocco during the chosen period of the study did hold elections for the Assembly of Representatives of Morocco, however, most opposition candidates during this period were victims of Hassan II’s administration from imprisonment, intimidation, and media censorship; though the lower house was comprised of multiple, ideologically diverse parties their actual power was highly questionable Alongside this, the country went through a number of Constitutional reforms all of which written by the King himself; most of the constitutions of Morocco granted the King thoroughly unfair and dictatorial de jure legislative political power . Civil Liberties Freedom House rates Morocco quite poorly during this period in terms of both human rights and civil liberties. The country supposedly stands up in comparison to the rest of both Africa and the Middle East, however, Hassan II’s reign is mired with political prisoners, inhumane treatment of them, threats, bribery, and conflicts over Western Sahara. Alongside all of this, both religious and ethnic minorities in Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara faced either social or institutional discrimination. Both the BBC and Freedom House rate Morocco’s more recent media performance quite poorly. Though there aren’t any direct reports of Hassan II’s rule from Freedom House or the BBC, FH’s reports on media/press go as far back as 2002, which would still be highly affected by Hassan II’s oppressive media policies which are also highlighted in two texts, Drees & Leeuw and Olorunnisola & Douai explain how people regularly discussed the King in private, but ill mention of either him or the royal family in public would result in punishment. Also, a controversial case concerning the imprisonment of a Morrocan Journalist, Rachid Nini, is generally met with an outcry from the public and the international community over constitutional failure to recognise the Journalist’s rights . Morocco also has a poor history with non-Arabic cultures and people, and also religious minorities. The Marrakesh Declaration is an attempt by the current King Mohammad IV to rectify the previous marginalisation his father engaged in during his reign. This ranged mostly from the conflict with the Saharawis people in Western Sahara, following the annexation of most of the region, a referendum was called to decide the sovereignty of the region. However, due to the nomadic lifestyle of the Saharawis, the election was poorly orchestrated and generally considered fraudulent by international and local actors in the dispute . Also, the legal rights of Morocco are quite poor on a global scale. Hassan II’s rule was synonymous with political prisoners and torture for anti-Government sentiment; along with the early rule of Mohammad IV mirroring that of his father with poor legal rights and inconsistent imprisonments and punishments . Institutionalized Rule Due to Morocco being a nation under Islam, there exists a level of extra-legal authority that the King solely occupied. Despite the King also having his power vested in de jure political institutions, he also enjoys a large degree of religious authority through the 1962 constitution which gave him the title and command of “Commander of the Faithful.” In White, Hassan II is quoted as saying, “Islam forbids me from implementing a constitutional monarchy in which I, the King, delegate all my powers and reign without governing… I can delegate power, but I do not have the right, on my own initiative, to abstain from my prerogatives, because they are also spiritual.” There is no cult personality to do the degree of some other nondemocratic regimes, however, due to the religious element of Hassan II’s position, he did have a degree of heroism and command vested which was derived from Islam and his title. It’s not all bad for Hassan II though, he was well-received for his pro-Western foreign policy and his willingness to conduct diplomacy with Israel, and Bill Clinton was a big fan . I rate this as a medium inequality country only because most of the wealth seemed to be acquired by the royal family rather than a particular elite associated with certain demographics like Brazil, South Africa, or India. Thus, because of the more general poverty of the country, I think there may be some well-off merchants, or businessmen, but otherwise the country seemed to have most of its wealth vested in the royals. Bibliography Marrakesh Declaration. . Retrieved from http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/files/Bismilah-2-ENG.pdf and http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/about.html Campbell, P. J. . Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II. African Studies Quarterly. 7, pp. 38-58. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A107488965&v=2.1&u=vuw&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1 Amnesty International Annual Report 1998. ;font-family: sans-serif;font-size: 14.0px;font-style: normal;font-weight: normal;letter-spacing: normal;orphans: 2;text-indent: 0.0px;text-transform: none;white-space: normal;widows: 2;word-spacing: 0.0px;> POL 10/0001/1998) . . London, United Kingdom: Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1998/en/ Gregory, J. R. . Hassan II of Morocco Dies at 70; A Monarch Oriented to the West. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0709.html White, Gregory. . The Advent of Electoral Democracy in Morocco’s Constitutional Monarchy? The Referendum of 1996. Middle East Journal. 51, pp. 388-404. Olorunnisola, A. A., & Douai, A. . New Media Influence on Social and Political Change in Africa. Pennsylvania, United States: IGI Global Freedom House. Morocco Freedom of Press Report 2002. . Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2002/morocco Drees, M. M., & Leeuw, S. . The Power of Satire. Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins. Minority Rights Group International. Morocco - Saharawis. . Retrieved from http://minorityrights.org/minorities/saharawis/ The torturer. . The Nation. 252, p. 5-7. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A9250242&v=2.1&u=vuw&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w Morocco: Free Popular Columnist, Punishment of Rachid Nini Belies Rights Guarantees in New Constitution. . Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/06/morocco-free-popular-columnist Morocco Media Profile. . Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123019 Moroccans, world leaders pay respects at King’s funeral. . CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9907/25/hassan.06/index.html U.S. Department of State. . Morocco Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/morocco.html Bendourou, Omar. . Power and Opposition in Morocco. Journal of Democracy. 7, pp. 108-122 |
| Morocco | 1999 | 2016 | 5 | 6 | 4 | Democratic Political Institutions: The years 1999-2016 were selected as the time period of study, as this begins with the ascension of the current King of Morocco, King Mohammad VI, and ends with the most recent round of elections for the legislature. The institutions themselves are constituted into three areas: The king reigns as head of state/the executive, and selects the PM as head of govérnment from among the successful parties after an election. Those in the lower house are elected for five year terms in national elections. Some 60 seats set aside exclusively for women, and 30 exclusively for men under 40 years old. In the upper house members are elected for nine year terms. 162 seats voted on by local councils; 91 by professional chambers; and 27 by wage-earners. Retreived from http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21708688-challenge-provide-more-modernity-and-authenticity-elections-morocco. Accessed on 21 May 2017. Al Jazeera notes that around thirty parties contest these national elections, but only six of them dominate, meaning the remainder are required to form a coalition to join the government, or exist in opposition. Retrieved from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/morocco-elections-voting-parliament-160930135431653.html. Accessed on 20 May 2017. A system of competitive elections does exist, and universal suffrage exists from the age of 18, which is why questions five and six were allocated 2 points each. However, Freedom House, which produces reports on each of Morocco’s elections, explains that the extent of political competition can lead to fragmentation between the parties, and an inability for them to assert their policy agendas, Further, the ‘Justice and Charity Movement’, an Islamist party, is illegal and cannot contest elections, although it is ‘tolerated’ by the government, and is intimidated or raided as some other organisations are, which explains the seemingly contradictory answers for questions seven and nine. Retrieved from: h ttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2123.html . Accessed on 20 May 2017. Retrieved from:https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/morocco. Accessed on 20 May 2017. Neither mosque nor military play much of a role on government, though the latter is directed by the King and the former is nominally subordinate to the King, who claims to be a descendant of the prophet Mohammed, and claims for himself the title of ‘Commander of the Faithful’. The influence of Islam in legislative and executive decisions is difficult to assess, but some more specific questions of Islamic jurisprudence are addressed in the categories below. Parties do challenge each other, but not the monarch. Question nine, for more specificity might helpfully been divided into two separate questions, looking at genuine challenge between elected officials in one, and between elected and non-elected officials in another. Civil Liberties: Discrimination against identity groups occurs more ‘informally’ than through an institutionalised process. Freedom House claims that the dominance of Arabic culture directs much of what is tolerated or illegal. There are notable instances of the government, particularly through 2011 constitutional reforms, to promote cultural minorities and other languages in schools, such as Amazigh and Berber. Though same sex relations are illegal, they are often ignored in tourist areas. According to Freedom House three men were sentenced to three years of imprisonment in 2015 for allegedly engaging in Same-sex acts . In the same year, two other men received four months imprisonment for a photograph in which they can be seen holding hands. Also according two unspecified right groups, the pair was tortured while in prison. Human Rights Watch notes that article 489 can be invoked to punish lewd or unnatural acts with an individual of the same sex . They list an incident from October 2007, when police in Marrakesh arrested two girls aged 16 and 17 who were reported for cuddling in a private home. They were jailed for one week and then provisionally released prior to a trial scheduled for November 25 on charges under article 489. As to sex-based discrimination, Freedom House reports that Women continue to face significant discrimination at the societal level. However, by Arab standards, Moroccan authorities have a relatively progressive view on gender equality. The 2011 constitutional reform, which in part guarantees women s seats in Parliament, is legislative proof of this effort. The 2004 family code impresses Freedom House in that it allows women increased rights in the areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody, and various other laws aim to protect women s interests. HRW instances the cases of Wafae Charaf and Oussama Husn, who both served prison sentences for criticising the conduct of security forces. Since 2006, the government has k ept sealed the houses of the leader of the al-Adl wal-Ihsan, movement without providing legal reasons, thought the movement is known for doubting the King s claim to spiritual authority. Retrieved from:https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/morocco. Accessed on 21 May 2017. They also note a ‘research ban’ placed on them and Amnesty International in 2015, precluding their access to specified government buildings and documents. The judiciary is not distinct from the government, so many opponents of the King especially are punished. According to Amnesty International, arbitrary arrests and torture are regular occurrences, with Ali Aarrass’s case being a particular campaign. Retreived from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde29/5973/2017/en/ . Accessed on 20 May 2017. The King is dominant in the relationship between mosque and state, with the government maintaining strict controls and observations over the sermons which are given. The government also provides funding for a training program which educates councillors in the state-approved version of Islam. However, there is increasing proof of either tolerance, or more simply a tactic of ignoring ‘dissenters’ - it is those who actively oppose the religion who are targetted. Retreived from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/morocco. Accessed on 21 May 2017. Institutionalised Rule: Freedom House’s 2016 report on corruption noted that the government had shown a mixed record on combatting corruption. Further, “…in February 2015, cabinet officials defeated a parliamentary proposal to strengthen the powers of the main anticorruption body, the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption . However, in May, the ICPC received the authority from parliament to force government bodies to cooperate with corruption investigations.” Though this evidence is restricted to the government’s budget, and not constitutional violations Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/morocco . Accessed on 20 May 2017. Question 21 is difficult to assess, as no obvious dissentions from monarchical edicts have occurred in the specified period. Overall, not much disparity or contention exists between the sources. Disputation of their claims primarily comes from the Moroccan government. |
| Mozambique | 1992 | 2017 | 6 | 10 | 7 | Justification of Mozambique Period: 1992-2016. Focal point: 1999 To understand this reason for the time period chosen, an understanding of Mozambique s history is needed for context. Before 1975, Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. This was challenged by The Front of the Liberation of Mozambique which fought a guerrilla war for little over ten years against the Portuguese government till finally in 1975 it gained independence for Mozambique. They also took power and installed a one-party socialist/communist government. This sparked a violent civil war between this new government and the anti-communist Mozambican National Resistance . This saw massive bloodshed and finally peace talks influenced by various actors culminated in a ceasefire and peace in Mozambique in 1992. The first election was held in 1994. The FRELIMIO candidate Joaquim Chissano won this election and since then FRELIMO party has held power in Mozambique ever since. 1999 is the focal point because this was the year the second election was held. That year the elections were marred by the reelection of Joaquim Chissano and the were accused of fraud by RENAMO and the civil war was almost reignited but subverted only just. Justification of Democratic Political Institutions When answering this section, it was very unclear on how lenient one should be when looking at specifics of Mozambique s political system and processes. The first election had around 85% public participation and the seats were spread consistent with the levels of support across the country . There was a problem with some rural populations not having access to vote. Also, the fact of foreign monetary donations to FRELIMO for campaigns and allegations of widespread corruption and subtle electoral manipulation have been points against the FRELIMO party. There are elections for both the executive and parliament. Mozambique is a unicameral state with a semi presidential system. Voter turnout is quite high for a developing democracy. There is no evidence of an unelected position that commands some sort of power. The part that was harder to answer came to do with accountability within the elite in government due to lack of academic sources on the matter. All in all, one could classify Mozambique s political process as partly free but very flawed . Justification of Civil Liberties During both civil wars, human rights in Mozambique was virtually non-existent with massive indiscriminate killings on both sides along with an appalling health sector that was inaccessible to over half the population . However, since 1992 and the joining of the United Nations and the participation in the Vienna Conference led to the ratification and acceptance of the Vienna Declaration which affirmed both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. The situation has radically improved since pre-1990 s but is not perfect. Most of the Civil Service Organisations and human rights advocacy groups are in the capital and big cities which means they are still inaccessible to most rural citizens. Domestic violence is still a massive issue which often goes un punished in the judicial system and though not legally, women still face many struggles in Mozambique in regards to equality in public and private. In contrast to many African countries however, the recent decimalization of homosexuality in Mozambique was a big step forward. Arbitrary arrest, torture and execution in parts of Mozambique are still prevalent but not on the levels during the civil war. Access to the judicial system is also very flawed with a report by the Human Rights and Development Association reported that rampant corruption within Mozambique’s judicial system has robbed thousands of citizens of their right to a fair trial. Media is also another huge issue in Mozambique. Firstly, although the constitution allows for independent media, the state controls nearly all broadcast media and either controls or has huge sway on print media. Most not under active control self censor themselves. Opposition in politics also often get little to no representation in media. Justification of Institutionalized Rule This was the section with the least evidence but also the easiest to justify. Institutionalized rule has been part of Mozambique s political landscape since the establishment of multi-party elections. FRELIMOs power comes from unity within the party and is not defined by very powerful personalized leaders, rather from party strength. This is because you consider their years of established institutionalized rule which started way back in 1975 and the fact they have never left power gives them so called political legitimacy as a party. As stated before, accountability of government to the wider public is hard to prove either way due to lack of evidence but it seems like it would be difficult for the public to hold the government accountable for its actions. In summary, law making and government in general is institutionalized but accountability seems not to be in place to the public but is within the party. Sources http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_17130.pdf http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%20Mozambique_Historical%20context.pdf https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7035.htm https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/mozambique file:///C:/Users/Rayhan/Documents/Uni%20Course%20Work/POLS%20209/hman%20rights%20in%20mmomzambique.pdf http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB14.1C.GIF |
| Mozambique | 1994 | 2017 | 10 | 8 | 6 | Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 where FRELIMO secured itself as the sole political party. A 16 year civil war followed against the Mozambique National Resistance . After the civil war, a peace deceleration was entered into between the two parties creating a multi party system and in 1992 the transition to democracy took place. Democratic Political Institutions The President of Mozambique sits as the head of state and is elected by the people for a five year term, the legislature is also elected for a five year term. Although this is done fairly democratically, in a few elections since 1992 there have been allegations of corruption- for example in 2004 where the Electoral Commission admitted that 1400 votes were stolen from RENAMO accounting for 5 percent of the public vote . But overall, the electoral processes are generally regarded as fair and representative of the people’s vote. Because of Mozambique’s history of conflict, the two main parties are essentially the same sides in the war. While other political parties are not excluded from forming, they find it particularly hard to enter parliament due to a lack of funds - because state funding is only attributed to those parties with current democratic representation. So although other parties are not excluded, it would be misleading to label Mozambique as a multi-party system as power is virtually only shared by the two biggest parties. Within these parties, there is further concern of corruption- in 2001, Dhalakama expelled certain members from the party who were perceived as threats to his position as leader, and expelled them on often frivolous grounds such as ‘undemocratic behaviour’ . Thus, Dhalakama was able to concentrate power and control of the party within himself. Civil Liberties There are no specific identity groups that are disenfranchised or experience regular discrimination, however the criminal justice process is sometimes violated. Mozambique’s Attorney-General admitted that the justice system were often incompetent and there were abuses of power. Although the constitution calls for the right to a fair trial and an independent judiciary, the judiciary has been described as feeble due to an inadequate number of judges, prosecutors and poor communication among authorities. Cruel punishment/ torture has been reported, particularly deprivation of life, harsh prison conditions and a failure to protect freedom of speech. Although freedom of the media is protected via the constitution, the state controls nearly all the broadcasting media, and a vast majority of other forms of media including the largest newspapers, and although citizens could get independent news from the Internet, even this is restricted due to the poor financial condition of Mozambique, meaning that very few people have proper access to computers. Critical speech of the government although permitted, will be sanctioned if the speech is too critical - one academic was charged after creating a Facebook post criticising the current government . Institutionalized Rule Although there are mechanisms in place such as a separation of powers that will hold other branches accountable, there are still individuals who are able to elude the law- for example as stated earlier, Dhlakama was able to evict members who threatened him, if there were proper accountability mechanisms set in place then this sort of action should not be possible. Furthermore, Dhlakama supposedly never sat in parliament which creates this image of a ruler who would and could not be evicted by his party, the only way he would be removed is from severe citizen pressure. Mozambique has one of the lowest GDP per capita in the world and income inequality is apparent. Sources: 1: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/mozambique 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Mozambique 3: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/mozambique 4: https://www-cambridge-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6691E043AE096D9C7FA2AFD5834E0C1/S0022278X05001035a.pdf/continuidade_na_renovacao_ten_years_of_multiparty_politics_in_mozambique_roots_evolution_and_stabilisation_of_the_frelimorenamo_party_system.pdf 5: https://www-cambridge-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6691E043AE096D9C7FA2AFD5834E0C1/S0022278X05001035a.pdf/continuidade_na_renovacao_ten_years_of_multiparty_politics_in_mozambique_roots_evolution_and_stabilisation_of_the_frelimorenamo_party_system.pdf 6: https://www-cambridge-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6691E043AE096D9C7FA2AFD5834E0C1/S0022278X05001035a.pdf/continuidade_na_renovacao_ten_years_of_multiparty_politics_in_mozambique_roots_evolution_and_stabilisation_of_the_frelimorenamo_party_system.pdf 7: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/mozambique 8: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252921.pdf 9: https://www-cambridge-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6691E043AE096D9C7FA2AFD5834E0C1/S0022278X05001035a.pdf/continuidade_na_renovacao_ten_years_of_multiparty_politics_in_mozambique_roots_evolution_and_stabilisation_of_the_frelimorenamo_party_system.pdf 10: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252921.pdf 11: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252921.pdf 12: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/mozambique 13: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/mozambique 14: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252921.pdf 15: https://www-cambridge-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6691E043AE096D9C7FA2AFD5834E0C1/S0022278X05001035a.pdf/continuidade_na_renovacao_ten_years_of_multiparty_politics_in_mozambique_roots_evolution_and_stabilisation_of_the_frelimorenamo_party_system.pdf 16: http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world.html |
| Namibia 1996 | 1991 | 2001 | 15 | 11 | 8 | Namibia 1991-2001 Context I was given the year 1996 for Namibia. The political history of Namibia, post-1996, seems to be relatively uneventful in terms of major regime change, so I decided to do the decade 1991-2001, with 1996 at the centre. Democratic Political Institutions According to the Polity IV Dataset and other sources retrieved from the library, it seems that since gaining independence in 1990, Namibia has transferred to a parliamentary democracy. This is reflected in the data from Polity IV which shows that although Namibia was not a perfect democracy during this time, it was showing signs of a fairly smooth transition into democracy. I based my answers = 2 Designational/Transitional XRCOMP = 2 Dual/Transitional XROPEN = 4 Open For the questions about voting, such as eligibility of voters and the ability for alternative political parties to be created and to contest elections, I used the following indicator from Polity IV: PARCOMP = 4 Transitional And also a peer-reviewed article about the 1999 Namibian Elections which describes them as having a number of competitor parties running for the election and no formal barriers to voters. In fact, out of a population of 1.6 million; 850,000 are registered. NAMIBIA ELECTIONS - http://go.galegroup.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A57830767&v=2.1&u=vuw&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w DATASET MANUAL - http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf POLITY IV DATASET - http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html Civil Liberties For the civil liberties questions I used the Country Report for Namibia, 1999, by Freedom House. In general ; Namibia s Freedom Rating was 2.5, Civil Liberties Rating was 3, and their Political Rights Rating was 2. The report even says respect for human rights in Namibia has been among the best in Africa . Most civil liberties for all citizens are protected under the Namibian Constitution of 1998. Although constitutions are not the most accurate representations of human rights within a country, according to independent civil liberty reports and indicators these rights seem to be alive in practice. Those articles in the Namibian Constitution of 1998 include Equality and Freedom from Discrimination and the Right to a Fair Trial .The only slightly-alarming thing is the freedom of the press, which is recorded in the Freedom House Country Report. NAMIBIA COUNTRY REPORT, 1999 - https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/namibia NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION 1998 - http://www.gov.na/documents/10181/14134/Namibia_Constitution.pdf/37b70b76-c15c-45d4-9095-b25d8b8aa0fb Institutionalized Rule Institutional Rule is the place which Namibia seems to have been struggling the most to develop during the specified time period. Question 43, Question 44, Question 45 and Question 46 about accountability can be answered by can be answered by the following indicator from the Polity IV Dataset: XCONST = 5 Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority This indicator refers to institutionalized constraints. Judged by Namibia s constitution, there appears to be a lot of institutional barriers in place. Also all positions for state leaders are outlined within the constitution . |
| Netherlands | 1990 | 1999 | 13 | 10 | 9 | For the discussion of Netherlands in 1992, I mainly look at the information presented on Freedom house about the Netherlands in 1999, some documents on The annual register and a book I found online tittle “The Dutch Political System in a Nutshell” by the Netherlands Institute for Multi party Democracy. I choose the period between 1990 and 1999 since the information on Freedom house was recored in 1999, and reflect the period before it rather than just one year. For questions 4 to 6 that concern with the issue of election, it is clearly said on Freedom house site that the Dutch can change their government Democratically in 1999. This means that there were definitely elections for major executive and legislative position for the government. However, it should also be mentioned that the country did not have elected mayor, which are considered not major executive position, at the time, rather the mayors were appointed by the government. The book I found also mentioned that the only barriers to voting is age. The book is written in 2008 but there is no mention of changes in the past period so I believe the barrier is the same in 1992. For question 7 to 9. There is no mention in the 1990s or any other period that there are barrier to creating political parties. With in the book, there are mentions of multiple parties existing in the country prior to 1990, such as the ARP, the Dutch Labor Party or the VVD. There are a lot of non governmental parties such as the Calvinist SGP which promoted the establishment of church in the Netherlands. However, there was still a Dutch King and a Monarchy. Explained on Freedom house, the King still had certain rights over elected officials, such as able to appointed members of the supreme court, or could not be criticized by journalist. However they were still keep in check by the constitution and the parliament, which means that elected officials still had power over them in certain situations. For question 10 to 17, concerning civil liberties. It is first made clear by both the books and the website that there is no official religion in the country. There are churches but they are not enforced. The constitutions is cleared that everybody are equal, regardless of races, religion or gender. They are protected by the laws against any form of threats and have the right for a prosecution. However, the website mentions that in the 1990s, immigrants still suffered from bad living conditions and unemployment, which the Netherlands was trying to improve. The websites also mentioned that independent press exists under the government regulations that were not censored. But they were not allowed to insult the king and officials, which mean that it was unlikely the press can heavily criticized any policy or ideology made by the government. For question 18 to 25, concerning institutionalized rule. The book clearly states that institutions often did what they were assigned and there were no examples in the past that institution did not obey what is written in the constitution. The process of law-making required the full attention of the parliament and the approval of the king, so no law was passed without heavy consideration. I also found no example of people holding power without having official positions, in addition to a cult of personality. There was still a King and Queen, which means they could be above the laws in someways, but the answer is inconclusive since there was no case that they broke the laws. The website stated that the 1990s was in a period of relative economic stablitity and I found some statistic on google about economic inequality, which show a low rate in the Netherlands in 1990s |
| Netherlands | 2004 | 2017 | 15 | 12 | 11 | The reason I chose this period of time 2004-2017 is because it marked the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh . He had made a controversial film touching upon sensitive topics in Islam. This would further spark more racial tensions on the issue of immigration and cultural integration in the Netherlands. Just two years before the death of Theo was the murder of far-right politician Pim Fortuyn who took an anti-immigration stance. In this time, the Dutch parliament also approved a bill that would oust failed asylum seekers, some of whom had been living in the country for years. This would be criticised as violation on human rights and the Netherlands would be criticised for their asylum laws as they put them into practice. Generally speaking, I only felt the need to justify 2 questions as the Netherlands is one of the most liberal countries with its social democratic welfare state. The Dutch can elect their government democratically through free and fair elections. The level of political crruption is one of the lowest in the world. - Question 40. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/netherlands According to Freedom House, there do exists minor restrictions against insulting the monarch or royal family but it does not seem to be that serious. - Question 36. There does exist social discrimination on the part of Muslims. This had become apparent when Pim Fortuyn was murdered but tensions further escalated with the murder of Theo Van Gogh. - This spurred a series of incidents directed at the Muslim community. They are mainly criticized for not having fully integrated into Dutch culture, based on the fact that the number of criminals do occur amongst the Muslim youth, and also for their more conservative behavior towards such issues pertaining to women, homosexuality and corporal punishment. - However, there have been efforts by the government to counter this social discrimination in terms of a compromise that would suggest Muslims to better integrate themselves into Dutch society. However, these terms would be received by the Muslim community as social alienation. This is due to the fact that those terms would involve juggling freedom of religion and ban on discrimination. - One instance is the issue of banning Muslim women wearing the burqa in public places of education or employment. In 2003, the Equal Opportunities Committee had made a statement that the ban on headscarves in schools in Amsterdam is not discriminatory. Later in 2005, Dutch parliament adopted a resolution stating a ban on burqas in public places. - In recent years we see the rise of far right politician Geert Wilders also more prone to anti-immigration. On the whole, the Dutch democratic institutions are effective. It does seem as though the government is trying to fit certain actions that may be received as discriminatory towards the Muslim community into a legal framework in response to the urges from the “native Dutch”. But if that were the case, that would actually reinforce the fact that Dutch democratic institutions are effective. Referenced https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71398.htm https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/netherlands In terms of inequality, the Netherlands is ranked relatively low in OECD countries and in the world in general with a Gini index coefficient of 0.283 . However, when compared to other countries within the EU, the level of economic inequality is relatively higher. |
| New Zealand | 1970 | 1975 | 13 | 12 | 11 | New Zealand in the period of 1970-1975 saw considerable improvements in voting enfranchisement, such as lowering of the voting age to 18 in 1974 and prisoners gaining the right to vote in 1975 ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/voting-rights/page-5 ) . Resulting in a particularly strong showing regarding the strength of democratic institutions, this however should be tempered by the existence of the first past the post system then in place reducing the electoral prospects of political parties outside the two party dichotomy. The full score New Zealand receives with regard to its democratic institutions during this period warrants this stipulation due to the duopoly that existed at this time ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/fpp-to-mmp/first-past-the-post ) . This aside New Zealand s democratic institutions functioned strongly and effectively ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> https://ourworldindata.org/democracy/ ) . Civil liberties in New Zealand during this period were however challenged but not to the extent of wholesale institutionalized repression. Groups in society were not targeted but historic injustices still persisted unrectified as evidenced by rising protest movements ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/maori/page-5 + https://nzhistory.govt.nz/whina-cooper-led-land-march-te-ropu-o-te-matakite-reaches-parliament ) surrounding Maori land rights. The death penalty still existed during this period but only with regards to treason, this also contributed to a diminished score in New Zealand s civil liberties ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/the-death-penalty ) . 1971 did see the passage of the Race Relations Act which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality or ethnic origin and which should be noted as an attempt to adjudicate historic issues. Non-state radio broadcasting was limited during this period but existed and continued to expand ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/radio/page-5 ) television was exclusively monopolised by the state, with the two sole stations under state control ;font-family: Calibri;font-size: medium;> http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/television/page-1 ) . Freedom of the press was not threatened and the nature of radio and television broadcasting during this era can be attributed to the greater means of the state. With regards to institutionalised rule in New Zealand during this period there were no significant attempts by any party or individual to buck established conventions and vest themselves with inordinate power. It is of note that the legislative branch did/do hold considerable power but not enough to position legislators above the law &/or elections. The existing system political system chapter 2) . remained solvent and unchallenged. Regrettably there were few non-state sources that I could draw upon due to the period under examination regarding democratic measurements. Links for sources: http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/voting-rights/page-5 https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/fpp-to-mmp/first-past-the-post https://ourworldindata.org/democracy/ https://nzhistory.govt.nz/whina-cooper-led-land-march-te-ropu-o-te-matakite-reaches-parliament https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/the-death-penalty http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/radio/page-5 http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/television/page-1 Raymond Miller, Democracy in New Zealand |
| NewZealand | 1985 | 2015 | 16 | 12 | 11 | For the democratic institutions questions i looked at these sources freedomhouse.org and nzhistory.govt.nz. In general, these show New Zealand’s elections is free elections, competitive, with more than one party, there no significant barriers except age to the eligibility of voters and there are both elections held for legislative, executive positions. Moreover, there no significant barriers to creating political parties and contesting elections, citizens are allowed to protest about laws believed to be unfair, and political protest but should not be violent.To be more specific, New Zealand is a representative democracy. Members of the House of Representatives, commonly known as the “National Assembly,” or Parliament They get their seats in parliament through national elections. Elections are usually held every three years; They may be held at earlier date in case there is no or no special distinction. A election election is held to fill the void that arises in the period of parliamentary term.New Zealand has a multi-party because of proportional representation. The New Zealand’s 20th most important constitutional change was the MMP voting system in 1993. The Chief and Commission office co-ordinates the electoral system.At the locals level, including major, councilors, District Health Boards are elected in locals elections, is held every three years. these used both STV and FPP voting system in 2007. For the cilvil liberties question, I looked at the sources The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, freedomhouse.org and hrc.co.nz. The right to freedom of speech is not protected by the common law in New Zealand but it has been protected by a wide range of doctrines. independent of press, effective judiciary, and functions of democratic system exist to ensure the freedom of speech of press. Specifically, freedom of speech and expression are protected in section 14 of the New Zealand Act of 1990, which states that: Everyone has the right of freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form .The noteworthiness of this privilege and its significance to democracy has been underscored by the New Zealand courts. It has been depicted as the essential appropriate without which the control of law can’t adequately operate. The rights is not just the foundation of democracy system; it additionally ensures the self-satisfaction of its individuals by propelling information and uncovering truth. As such, the privilege has been given a wide understanding. The Court of Appeal has said that 14 is “as wide as human idea and imagination”. Freedom of expression grasps free discourse, a free press, transmission and receipt of thoughts and information, rights of expression in arts, and the privilege to silence. The privilege to flexibility of expression likewise reaches out to one side to look for access to authority records. This is accommodated in the Official Information Act 1982. Beside New Zealand supports equal rights for different ethnic groups. This includes access to good education, equal opportunities to get good jobs, all citizen should respect members of all ethnic groups, and that members of all ethnic groups should have the same rights and responsibilities, the most important example is the Treaty of Waitangi that ensure the rights for Maori people. |
| Niger | 2009 | 2010 | 5 | 8 | 3 | OVERVIEW - Niger gained independence from the French in 1960. After that, a series of one-party and military regimes took power until 1999 when there was a transitional government towards a democratic regime. There were generally free and fair elections to put in power Mamadou Tandja, supported by the MNSD and the CDS https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/niger . - Stated in Article 36 of Niger s 1999 Constitution, The President of the Republic shall be elected for five years by free, direct, equal and secret universal suffrage. He shall be eligible for re-election only once. style=margin: 0.0px;padding: 0.0px;border: 0.0px;outline: 0.0px;font-weight: inherit;font-style: inherit;font-family: inherit;font-size: 13.0px;color: rgb ;text-decoration: underline; rel=nofollow> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Fifth_Republic_of_Niger_ ) . - In 2004, President Tandja was reelected for a second term in a generally observed free and fair election. But then nearing the end of this term, he pushed for a referendum and change of the Constitution to prolong his stay in power by postponing the next election until 2012, which resulted in 3 more years of his presidency http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1966681,00.html, in which he would assume emergency powers and dissolve parliament and the court and rewrite the constitution to give himself more power. - This was regarded as a threat to democracy and would lead to isolation from the international community starting around July 2009 http://www.globalization101.org/upholding-nigers-constitution-2/ . In February 2010, a military coup led my Salou Djibo ousted Tandja from office and put him under house arrest. JUSTIFICATION - Question 2-3. I chose the time frame 2009-2010 because this was when, by law of the Constitution, the president would have finished his two alloted consecutive terms of 5 months and there would be a new election. However, at this point, the level of democracy plummeted due to Tandja’s violation of the Constitution in order to prolong his place as President to which he justified as wanting to see through the projects he had put through developing the country. Prior to this period, during Tandja’s reign 2000-2009, the country was relatively stable, its institutions did relatively uphold the Constitution until around 2007 when Tuareg rebellions started happening, at this point, the government heightened its crackdown on media freedom regarding any reportings that discredited the government. - Question 4 and 12. During Tandja s second term in office, efforts were made to put Tandja s likely successor, Hama Amadou, away ;text-decoration: underline; rel=nofollow> https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/niger . In 2007, a vote of no confidence was imposed on Amadou for accusations of corruption and then he was arrested and charged with embezzlement in 2009. During his trial, three judges on the case were dismissed. In 2010, when a referendum was called, the proposal was passed with 92% of the 68% voter turnout. But the opposition boycotted this motion and claimed that voter turnout was only 5%. - Question 5. There should be an independent judiciary but the system is subject to corruption a pressure from the executive: public prosecutors are supervised by the Ministry or Justice and the President has the power to appoint judges. And separation of power was undermined when the President dissolved the Constitutional Court. - Question 8. The Hausa and Djerma athnic groups dominate government and business sectors. - Question 10. There are instances of certain ethnic groups that are subject to government investigation and prosecution. - Question 11. Women and ethnic minorities are widely subject to discrimination. - Question 15-17. The media in Niger is not free. Reporters are criminalized if they try to discredit the government. - Question 19. They are usually brought into account when it is favorable. - Questions 18-23. The Constitution had been relatively upheld until nearing the end of Tandja’s second term. In attempt to keep is place in the system, democratic institutions were subject to failure. This resulted in a military coup in hopes of restoring democracy to the country. OVERALL In the period of 2009-2010, Niger still had the democratic institutions put forth in its Constitution. However, they were subject to decay due to Tandja’s wanting to stay in power longer. Elections in the state that were free and fair in for the past decade had now become under question. There were implications that pointed to the President playing on political motives to oust his competition from office. The judiciary was subject to pressures from the executive and thus corrupt. The media was restricted from making the Government look bad, reporters were crminalised and punished and some media outlets were shut down. Discrimination towards ethnic minorities and women persisted. Democracy declined, international aid was withdrawn, the state became internationally isolated. This resulted in a military coup to oust the President in order to restore Democracy. Looking at results from Polity IV, we can see an immense drop in authority trends in 2010 in the aftermath of the coup. It is suggested that the military coup had the support of the people . One thing that is worth noting is that Niger, which is one of the most impoverished countries in the world, was enjoying relative economic development up until 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, Niger’s economy was growing. GDP increased from $3405.1 in 2005 to $5718.6 in 2010, that is a 3.4% growth in GDP. Inflation dropped from 7.8% in 2005 to 0.8 in 2010. FDI increased, public and external debt decreased, although unemployment stayed the same. After the coup, almost all aspects of the economy receeded. The modernization theory would be unclear in the case of Niger. Niger’s level of economic development was growing yet its level of democracy had decreased in relation. . |
| Norway | 1997 | 2005 | 15 | 12 | 11 | I selected the years of 1997 to 2005 because for the majority of those years Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik was in office and he is the longest serving non-socialist Prime Minister since World War II. Although Bondevik was not Prime Minister from March 2000 to October 2001, due to a dispute over gas-fired power stations that lead to a vote of non-confidence, when he was voted back in, in the 2001 parliamentary election, he still enacted change and contributed substantially to Norway. His coalition with the Centre and Liberal Partys came out of the shadows after a decade in the shadows of both the Labour Party and Conservatives. With that incentive, the coalition brought a tremendous list of political ambitions. For the democratic political institutions questions, I looked at various sources that all confidently proved Norway to be a plausible democracy. In Norway, during Bondevik s era, there were certainly elections for major executive and legislative positions that were at least competitive and involved more than one party. On the Norwegian Storting results website, it portrays that there were 10 parties campaigning in both the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary elections. This is a clear depiction of involving more than one party . In terms of Question 8 inquiring as to whether elected officials have more authority than unelected officials, there is a factor that should be brought to attention. The Monarchy in Norway does have the veto ability against the government. Though, if they were to exercise this right in relation to governmental proceedings, then it would be highly likely that the Monarchy would be thrown off immediately. The civil liberties answers all demonstrate that Norway is genuine towards it citizens in most cases and respects their rights. A corruption report on Norway explains that there is a Norwegian Penal Code that criminalizes active and passive bribery, fraud, trading in influence, extortion, breach of trust and money laundering. This is applicable to Norwegian public officials, companies, citizens, and foreign companies. It clearly deters any violations as Norway is ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world. Regarding the independent press, Norway has a large selection of media sources, and opinions are diverse, especially when seen in relation to the size of the population. The media plays an important role in setting the agenda for public debate, and several corruption cases have been uncovered by journalists and the media. The biggest morning paper in Norway, the Aftenposten, is an independent centre-right newspaper and is not affiliated, in any way, with the government. According to Freedom House, Norway s media environment is considered free . Regarding the institutionalized rule questions, Norway s judicial system encounters high levels of public trust and has a long-standing reputation of independence, competence, and integrity, as specified by a European anti-corruption report page. Public polls revealed that bribes and abuse are almost never experienced when dealing within the judiciary, and very few citizens believe that the judicial system is corrupt. The resources used never mention anything about government corruption so it is evident that the government only exercised the power that they were constitutionally assigned and the people could hold them accountable, if necessary. I had no qualms with the answering the multiple choice questions. They were all worded clearly and had appropriate answer options. Some sources did appear to have ambiguous information, but with further research, each source had the ability to back up one another. |
| Norway 1977 | 1971 | 1981 | 15 | 11 | 11 | Period of study: Norway has had a continuous democracy from 1814, when its Constitution was adopted. In 1977 the Labour Party was in power. In order to limit the period of study to a reasonable length of time, I started in 1971 when the Labour Party was elected and ended in 1981 when the Labour Party left power, having had five governments . I would like to note that there are few sources about Norway other than its own official sources as it seems to be a stable and consistent regime. Many answers to the above questions are based on the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary. Democratic Political Institutions: Norway’s governments are elected every four years and the only executive power not exercised by an elected official belongs to the monarch, whose role is largely ceremonial and does not overshadow the elected government. The wording of Question 33 is somewhat unhelpful, as although Norway has a monarch who can exercise executive power, the monarch does not have more power than elected officials. I have given one point for this question because there is some power that lies with a non-elected person, but Norway could easily be given two points because this power is not more than the elected government have. Regarding voting rights, all adults over 18 can vote except those convicted of certain offences against the state. Because this is such a small group and is not arbitrarily imposed as it would be if, say, a certain ethnic group were barred from voting, I have still given Norway full marks for this question. Civil Liberties: I checked Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for instances of Norway breaching human rights, but was unable to find anything. In fact, Human Rights Watch states that Norway is an international human rights champion. Human rights and civil liberties are guaranteed in Chapter E of the Norwegian Constitution and I could find no evidence of these rights being breached. Article 16 of the Constitution states that there is a state church, the Church of Norway, of which the monarch must be a member. The same Article guarantees Freedom of Religion. There is a state media, but there are also many popular privately owned media organisations which are openly partisan and do not seem to have any restrictions on them. Institutionalised Rule: Laws are passed through the Storting . The government is accountable to the people through elections every four years. There is no opportunity for snap or by-elections, which arguably could reduce the amount of accountability, but there is still apparently the opportunity for leaders to be held accountable by their own parties between election cycles - the fact that there were four governments within ten years, where there would have been at most three elections, suggests that this is the case. Given that the question only asks whether there are formal accountability mechanisms and not what the strength or level of these mechanisms are, I have given Norway full points for this question. These questions are designed to distinguish a non-democracy from a democracy. Norway is a famous example of a democracy and as such, with the exception of two questions, it receives full marks. This leaves little to write about, and also means that the level of democracy is not so easily determined. |
| Pakistan | 1977 | 1985 | 5 | 5 | 3 | Pakistan 1977-85 I chose this time period because of its significance for Pakistan s democratisation. It represented a backward step from near fair democracy throughout the early 1970 s toward a militaristic style regime under the control of General Zia-Ul-Haq. My sources suggest that this period Pakistan s political and civil liberties were rated as partly free, however, it faced problems that significantly affected the democratic process. Throughout this period Pakistan remained in a state of martial law, granting more power to general Zia. Democratic institutions For this section I used these sources: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1.pdf http://www.ipedr.com/vol5/no2/113-H10169.pdf http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/01/20121181235768904.html http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jpag/article/viewFile/7083/_81 https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=CpTHBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT169&lpg=PT169&dq=civil+liberties+pakistan+1985&source=bl&ots=Xa5Q_16qrO&sig=P6zVe4VnFPLYW3Pq3HGcwPETq-Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXvcOAuvXTAhWIlJQKHeFABtYQ6AEIKjAB#v=onepage&q=civil%20liberties%20pakistan%201985&f=false 1977 represented the beginning of Pakistan s second military rule period, General Zia-ul-Haq gained power through a successful coup and was sworn in as president. Despite promising to bring Pakistan free and fair elections, Zia, on multiple occasions postponed elections due for unjust reasons. Zia remained in power until his death in 1988. Under Zia, Pakistan s parliamentary system decayed into executively run government. In 1985 there were elections for Political institutions in Pakistan, however, they are not deemed fair and are said to be corrupt. Institutions have been unable to complete their duties to a democratic level. Power throughout this time period was unevenly dispersed across legislative, judicial and executive branches. Pakistan has failed in continually provided checks and balances on these institutions. This time period saw a concentration of power in the hands of its ruler with little opposition. Although Pakistan saw its first elections in the early 1970 s by 1977-1985 political parties struggled to gain momentum under strict rule and supervision by Pakistan s military President. Mounting pressure from political opposition just as the PPN party forced an election in 1985. However, president Zia banned all parties from participating, only allowing singular persons to run, in an attempt to consolidate power. Not one candidate could gather enough widespread support to truly challenge Zia s rule. There was also a significant number of alleged votes bought by the Pakistani government in order to secure the election. This election lead to significant instability and protest of the Zia Regime. Social freedoms and civil Liberties. For this section I used these sources: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1.pdf http://www.zklawassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Rights.pdf http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Pakistan/civil_liberties/ https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=CpTHBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT169&lpg=PT169&dq=civil+liberties+pakistan+1985&source=bl&ots=Xa5Q_16qrO&sig=P6zVe4VnFPLYW3Pq3HGcwPETq-Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXvcOAuvXTAhWIlJQKHeFABtYQ6AEIKjAB#v=onepage&q=civil%20liberties%20pakistan%201985&f=false https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_Pakistan Social Freedoms and Civil liberties are not at a high standard, preventing Pakistan from being labelled democratic. During this time period, General Zia introduced extensive Islamic reform in the form of Sharia Law to Pakistan s legal system. Speech against Islam is heavily supressed and punished. Throughout this period, Pakistan was a majority Muslim country. Religious and ethnic groups were persecuted and treated unfairly under the law. In 1984 a minority Muslim group named Ahmadi s were forbade from calling themselves Muslim and using Islamic greetings. Minority Christian groups experienced violence and no protection from governing bodies. Although the constitution forbids it, a woman s testimony is worth half of a man s in court. Women are not seen as equal before the law. For example, if a woman reports rape without 4 witnesses, she is imprisoned for pre-marital sex. Criminals were often imprisoned without proper trial or charges. Institutional rule For this section I used these sources: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1.pdf http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jpag/article/viewFile/7083/_81 https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=CpTHBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT169&lpg=PT169&dq=civil+liberties+pakistan+1985&source=bl&ots=Xa5Q_16qrO&sig=P6zVe4VnFPLYW3Pq3HGcwPETq-Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXvcOAuvXTAhWIlJQKHeFABtYQ6AEIKjAB#v=onepage&q=civil%20liberties%20pakistan%201985&f=false With General Zia s Illegitimate rise to power via coup and subsequent appointment as president, the constitution was put on hold. This allowed the president to enforce law and policy inconsistent with the countries previous values. An example of this would be the introducing of Islamic law. General Zia controlled day to day decision making and policy. According to the CIA Zia ruled almost entirely through his Military as the country remained in a state of martial law between the times I am researching. Institutions in Pakistan are ineffective at adhering to the previous constitution and passing laws/policy in conjunction with it. The process of passing laws/policies is corrupt and not representative of the need/wants of the people. Military and legal officials often refrain from obeying the constitution in Pakistan. Similar officials are not held accountable to the law under the Military Styled Regime. Conclusion: In conclusion, This period strained Pakistan s democratic process. General Zia rose to power through illegitimate means, there were significant issues with democratic institutions such as corruption and weak governance. There were issues with social freedoms and civil liberties, especially for women and religious minorities. The country lacked a current constitution and failed to have successful elections with a level playing field. These factors combined define Pakistan from 1977-85 as undemocratic. |
| Panama 1979 | 1972 | 1980 | 13 | 1 | 4 | Panama 1972-1980 Context I was given the year 1979 for Panama. I choce to use the time frame of 1972 to 1980 firstly because this was the time in which Panama was under dictatorial rule by Omar Torrijos. 1972 is the year in which Torrijos was granted absolute power as head of government . 1980 is the year before Torrijos death because I did not want to capture any subsequent instability that arose from his death. Democratic Political Institutions For the democratic political institution questions I will use Polity IV to answer all of this set of questions as I wasn t able to find any other data sets or indexes which had extensive data on Panama during this time period. Most of the democratic political institutions questions, however, can be described by one of the indicators under the Polity IV dataset. For example, for Question 4, I chose the option of no elections whatsoever, of if there were they weren t meaningful at all to the composition of the executive. This is because for the majority of the specified time period, the Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and Openness of Executive Recruitment markers were all indicative of highly unfair, if not nonexistent, elections of executive positions in Panama during this time. And the same for Question 5, I chose the option of no elections whatsoever and if there were they were completely insignificant. I based this choice off of the indicator which describes Executie Constraints, which refers to limitations imposed by accountability groups such as legislatures. The power of Panama s executive over this period was described as having Unlimited Authority, with no regular legislative or constitutional constraint. Without these types of constraint, it would seem that even if there were elections for a legislature, they re largely insignificant. For Question 8, I chose non-elected institutions clearly have more influence than elected once because Omar Torrijos was a General and claimed/held power through this whole period from the coup d état. DATASET MANUAL - http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf POLITY IV DATASET - http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html Civil Liberties For this section, I was unable to find a civil liberties index that spanned all the way back to the 1970s so I relied on peer-reviewed journal accounts to answer these questions. Freedom in the World, the Freedom House index of civil liberties for Panama begins in 1999. Similarly, the CIRI Human Rights Data Project s datasets begin in 1982, two years after my time frame. For these specific questions I have used a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, 1978. This report was commissioned by the United States of America as an investigation into the human rights of Panama at that time. It gives detailed explanations about civil liberties such as the right to assembly and association, rights to due process and a fair trial, and the right to freedom of investigation, opinion, expression and dissemination. This allowed me to answer most of the civil liberties questions. Most violations of civil liberties are written about in quite a lot of detail which allowed me to see trends in discrimination against certain groups of people however I couldn t find a distinct pattern that would suggest there was specific discrimination against any particular groups of people . Another source I found was an account by an American diplomat talking about their time with Torrijos during negotiations around sovereignty over the Panama Canal. This book was called Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat by Brandon Grove, pp. 163-171. Grove recounts Torrijo being known throughout Panama as the first Panamanian leader to represent the majority population of Panama, which is poor, Spanish-speaking, and of mixed heritage, which leads me to believe there wouldn t be a lot of class discrimination during this time if Torrijo had absolute power. Overall, most civil liberties are freely given. There are still instances of certain journalists being detained but not enough to cause attention or for there to be a massive problem. This is the case for most civil liberties in Panama at the time. Majority of the time freely given, but sometimes violated. REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA, 1978 - http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Panama78eng/TOC.htm DIPLOMAT ACCOUNT OF OMAR TORRIJO - https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=SftdyiprK_gC&pg=PR4&lpg=PR4&dq=ISBN+0-8262-1573-4.&source=bl&ots=TPANdM294o&sig=4_ERi26OY03CEuXs_irwWqbe4-0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU18u24orUAhXFGZQKHSkxDuEQ6AEIKjAB#v=onepage&q&f=false Institutionalized Rule The questions pertaining to institutional rule can mostly be answered again by the Polity IV Dataset. For example, Question 18 about whether political institutions exercise the powers that they are constitutionallyassigned; Question 19 about whether some people are above the law, these questions can be answered by the XCONST indicator. XCONST covers whether the constitution is adhered to and how the law constrains members of the executive . The Polity Dataset listed a 1 for this variable which indicates that there is unlimited authority and no regulation within institutions. The XCONST indicator also includes those constraints imposed by accountability groups, for Question 20 and 21. |
| Papa New Guinea | 1999 | 2002 | 15 | 12 | 11 | Parliament has 89 members and all elected lawmakers serve a five-year term. Anyone over 18 can vote, and elections are competitive, with 15 competing parties securing seats in 2002 elections. However, the election in 2002 had reports of candidates using tribal gangs to intimidate voters and acts violence during elections is common. This small young country is rich in minerals, creating many corruption scandals of government officials being bribed by foreign businesses to privatize. Though people say what they like without much exception, it may be important to note that on June the 6th 2001, the police shot dead 3 students at a peaceful protest against the state airline being nationalized. |
| Peru | 1992 | 2000 | 7 | 9 | 4 | Democratic Institutions: Alberto Fujimiro won the 1990 Presidential race in what appears to have been a free and fair election. There were multiple parties and the legislative branch was elected separately. His authoritarian rule began when he claimed a state of emergency and dissolved congress, effectively taking over the government with the help of the military. This was done out of frustration at the legislative branch of government as they were not allowing his policies and economic plans to go through, thus stalling progress under his Presidency. The public generally supported his move because they had been displeased with the previous leadership and had no real incentive to protect their previous form of democracy. Even after this, Fujimori maintained that Peru was a democracy when he produced a new constitution in 1993, which also won the support of the public referendum. There was still a general election in 1995 that had multiple parties, however there are claims of unfairness favouring the incumbent President. These accusations were mainly aimed at his use of government funds to promote his candidacy. While these campaigns have evidence of being unfair, there were no rules that strictly preventing a large group of people from voting directly imposed by the government for the elections; for this reason I rated the elections with 2 points. Due to issues with registered voters lists not being current, some eligible voters were effectively disenfranchised but it was unclear how much this would have affected the election results, which is why I rated questions 3 and 4 with 1 point . While there were no powerful officials that were un-elected, but power was very centralized in Fujimori s hands. Parties were able to form but during his time in leadership, but they were often seen as disposable parties . Fujimori himself ran in three elections under three different party names. In general, there were aspects of the Peruvian regime in the 1990s that showed real signs of a functioning democracy, but when you examine it a bit closer you can see the flaws that make it unfair to large sums of people. Civil Liberties: I didn t find there were many cases of legal discrimination against groups by race, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation nor did I find cases of these groups being targeted by their government. This is excluding that gay marriage was not legal at the time, I didn t let this affect my rating too much as many democratic countries in the 90s hadn t yet recognized gay marriage . I couldn’t really find conclusive information on things like violent crime or petty crimes and whether they had fair trials or not. According to the constitution people had the right to a fair trial, however there were definitely times where those being accused of serious offences, like terrorism or treason, did not; therefore I could not give more than 1 point for legal conventions. Fujimori was convicted in recent years of various human rights violations like the murder of 25 people, and the kidnapping a journalist and a businessman. These were believed to be reactions to some kinds of revolt or insurgency. There were also several allegations later on in his presidency of undue force and use of torture by his secret police that went unpunished until he was sentenced in the mid 2000s . There were multiple outlets of media, however a small portion of the country had access to them. Newspapers generally had some independent branches, but TV was more tightly controlled by the state. In general I think free speech was relatively protected, though Fujimori admits to criminalizing some journalists. Religion wasn t a huge part of the political landscape from my findings. The constitution declares that everyone is entitled to whatever religion they want, and it is generally followed in practice according to the US State Department . In conclusion, there were some obvious civil liberties issues but also areas of leniancy which is why generally these questions warranted a 1 point rating. Institutionalized Rule: The whole premise of Alberto Fujimori s Presidency from 1992 2000 was based on his use of institutionalized rule. He dissolved the government so he could create one that favoured him and his policies, plus he and his secret police appear to have been above the law until he fled the country. In the beginning his intentions made some kind of sense considering the state of their economy. The public supported him because they believed he was doing it for the best of everyone. To his credit he was pretty influential in recovering the inflation levels, however he didn t really do anything beneficial for the poorer sector of the country despite his campaign promises. He was given a unique opportunity in 1990 because he was a new face to politics coming off a dreadful period in the 1980s. Levitsky claims that he could have created a better democracy but failed to do so . Fujimori campaigned on decentralizing power and then went the complete opposite direction by giving himself direct power over local government. They did utilize the referendum system but it had little effect on denying policy from going through. Even the institutions themselves didn t have very much control, like when a member of the JNE publicly denounced the 1993 referendum as fraudulent. It wasn t until the demise of his administration in 2000 that Fujimori was held accountable for all the bad things he had done over the previous decade. Conclusion: While I don t think Fujimori was a just leader, he did have a positive effect on the economy, which is what triggered his declaration of a state of emergency . Generally the constitution paints Peru as a fairly democratic and free nation, however there are pretty blatant disregards for human rights during this period and some serious questions of corruption and institutional discrepancies. In the end I wouldn t be surprised if Peru fell to the lower-medium end on our scale of equality. References Alberto Fujimori | president of Peru . Encyclopedia Britannica . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alberto-Fujimori HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF CONGRESS . Congreso.gob.pe . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.congreso.gob.pe/eng/?K=254 Human Rights Watch. . Probable Cause - Evidence Implicating Fujimori . Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/12/21/probable-cause/evidence-implicating-fujimori Levitsky, S. . Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru. Journal Of Democracy, 10 . Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16971 Peru . U.S. Department of State . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51650.htm Peru profile - Timeline - BBC News . . BBC News . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907 Peru: Deconstructing Democracy . Washington. Retrieved from https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Andes/Peru/past/peru_deconstructing_democracy_fujimori_eng.pdf Peru’s Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2009 . . Retrieved from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf?lang=en Peruvian Court Convicts Fujimori for Human Rights Violations . . Human Rights Watch . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/05/peruvian-court-convicts-fujimori-human-rights-violations Profile: Alberto Fujimori - BBC News . . BBC News . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439 Refugees, U. Refworld | Peru: The Two Faces of Justice . Refworld . Retrieved 25 May 2017, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7ed4.html The 1995 Electoral Process in Peru . . Miami. Retrieved from https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/reports/1995ElectoralProcessPeru.pdf The New York Times. . Peru’s Leader Dissolves Congress. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/06/world/peru-s-leader-dissolves-congress.html |
| Poland 1977 | 1975 | 1980 | 6 | 6 | 6 | For most of my answers I used one source; “Ideology in a Socialist state. Poland 1956-1983 by Ray Taras. In one chapter of the book, he talks about the political climate and regime in Poland from 1976-1980. Taras begins the chapter by discussing the inner workings of the Polish United Workers Party under the new general First Secretary Edward Gierek. Although elections were not held in Poland at the time members of the party were permitted to have a say in who was appointed to different positions, Gierek made an effort to increase levels of democracy within the party. Gierek made an effort to strengthen the relationship between the lower tiers of the part such as basic committees, activists and other members of the party and the elite tiers of the Polish United Workers Party. Although Gierek made efforts to make the party more democratic, those outside the party had little to no say in the direction of the party and what officials were appointed to which position, only those in the party had a say and even then it was the opinion of the higher tiers that held the most weight so it is understood that there were little to no levels of democracy. Gierek also made efforts to increase civil liberties, although some were still persecuted and some freedoms were limited. Gierek made efforts to increase civil liberties by focusing on individual freedoms and increasing the economic and historical knowledge as well as increasing economic egalitarianism, social justice, socialist morality psychological development harmonisation of various interests and political participation. This focus on social justice is key to the civil liberties increase under Gierek, however, there was no independent press and speaking out against the party could lead to punishment as found in 1976. When the part increased the retail price of food workers in the cities of Radom and Ursus organised strikes, protests and blocked railway lines as resistance. These workers were consequently fired and given harsh prison sentences for speaking out against the party, however, it is interesting to note that shortly after the price increase was redacted and the workers were released from prison in order to gain support from the working class. This shows that speaking out against the party was not well received by the regime, although it was something that the regime was becoming more lenient on, as long as it benefitted the party in some way. In terms of the institutional rule, the regime of Poland in 1976-1980 scored down the middle overall. The party could be held accountable for its decision, as could be seen in the reaction to the increase in food prices mentioned earlier, the party then had to retract their increase. Also, all state leaders are in official positions, not merely figureheads. Although it is estimated that there is a lot of inequality within the country, although Gierek ushered an era of economic prosperity in the first half on the 1970’s little of this wealth trickled down to the lower rungs f the socio-economic ladder. |
| Republic of Paraguay | 1989 | 2000 | 8 | 9 | 3 | Paraguay 1998 “Democratic Political Institutions 1: Are elections held for major executive branch positions?” “2 points: There were elections for major executive positions that were at least competitive and involved more than one party.” Elections are held in Paraguay during this period for the executive positions, in 1998 there was a presidential election with 4 competing candidates nominated by parties resulting in the Colorado Party’s Raúl Alberto Cubas Grau being elected president with a majority of 55.35% of the votes, all I can find subjects the election was at least competitive. Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume II, p425) “Democratic Political Institutions 2: Are elections held for legislative positions?” “2 points: There were elections for legislative positions that were at least competitive and involved more than one party.” Elections are held in Paraguay during this period for legislative positions, in 1998 there was a general election with 6 parties competing for the 45 seats in the senate and the 80 seats in the chamber of deputies resulting in three parties being represented in the senate; the Colorado party with 24 seats, the Democratic Alliance with 20 seats and the National Christian union with one seat. And two parties being represented in the chamber of deputies the Colorado party with 45 seats and the Democratic Alliance with 35 seats. Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume II, p425) “Democratic Political Institutions 3: Are there significant barriers to the eligibility of voters?” “1 point: There are some barriers for small groups. These may not be formal barriers.” The 1992 constitution of the Republic of Paraguay article 120 states: “Every Paraguayan citizen, 18 years old and residing in the national territory, is eligible to vote.” however a paper titled “Electoral Observation Mission in Paraguay 1998” put out by the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy General Secretariat of the Organization of American States brings up complaints of some people being “inability to exercise the right to vote” but it was unclear what the magnitude of electoral disenfranchisement was or if it was effecting specific groups so i have given it a 1 “Democratic Political Institutions 4: Are there significant barriers to creating political parties and contesting elections?” “2 points: Non-government parties can form and contest elections without obvious interference from the government.” The 1992 constitution of the Republic of Paraguay article 120 states: “Citizens can not only elect, but also be elected without restrictions, other than those established in this Constitution and the law.” the OAS’s observation mission observed that “no major concerns were expressed by the political parties with respect to the registration and disqualification of candidates” “Democratic Political Institutions 5: Do elected officials have more influence than unelected institutions or individuals ?” “1 point: elected officials are sometimes overshadowed by non-elected officials who have more real executive power, but elected figures are not powerless.” The president elected in 1998 Raul Cubas was a puppet of the disqualified and imprisoned Lino Oviedo, Cubas campaigned with the slogan “Cubas in government, Oviedo in power.” who he released after becoming president against the wishes of the senate leading to an attempt at impeaching cubas, and later after the assassination of Cubas’ anti Oviedo Vice president Argaña in 1999 the council of deputies impeached Cubas and forced Oviedo into hiding in Argentina. for the period in-between Cubas’ election and impeachment it could be said that Oviedo exercised executive power. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/paraguay “Democratic Political Institutions 6: Can elected officials publicly challenge one another and unelected officials and institutions?” “2 points: elected officials can challenge and hold other elected officials to account, and do so regularly .” as seen by the failed and successful attempt to impeach Cubas the council of deputies has the capability to hold the elected president to account and remove a president that violates the constitution and uses this ability at it’s own discretion. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/paraguay “Civil Liberties 1: Are certain identity groups criminalized or otherwise afforded fewer legal rights?” “1 point: Informal government barriers prevent some groups from fully enjoying their rights, even if the identity group is not formally criminalized or afforded fewer legal rights.” According to the Paraguayan constitution articles 16 and 17 every person has the right to defence in court and to due prosses, however there are cases of particular groups of angry campachinos who have been denied due prosses with 115 cases of extrajudicial abduction or execution and other human rights abuses to this specific class of people since the start of Paraguayan democracy in 1989. However because campacino s rights legally exist but are just ignored, I was torn between 0 and 1 ;background: white;> https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/paraguay.pdf ) “Civil Liberties 3: Do those suspected of crimes have the right to a lawyer, trial, and other fair legal conventions?” 1 point: Sometimes As said just before people all have a right to defence and fair trial but sometimes doesn t happen. “Civil Liberties 4: Are people protected from arbitrary or cruel punishment, including indefinite detention, use of torture and the death penalty?” “0 points: No. Many instances of cruel or arbitrary punishment and torture can be found.” Although the death penalty is illegal in paraguay there are many cases of dissaparances and torture and extrajudicial execution https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act53/004/1992/en/ https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr45/002/1995/en/ “Civil Liberties 5: Is there separation of church and state?” “2 points: Yes. There is no state church and religious orthodoxy is not enforced.” The catholic church is a major part of Paraguayan society and the impact it has had on the country is noted in the constitution however Paraguay is a secular republic and the freedom of religion is guaranteed in article 24 of the constitution. “Civil Liberties 6: Is speech critical of the government generally protected?” “0 points: No. Speech critical of the government is often censorred or even criminalized.” Some speech critical of the government especially surrounding human rights abuses are occasionally meet with death threats, however it is tricky to gauge exactly how critical one could be before such threats are acted on or how widespread these practices are. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr45/001/1995/en/ “Civil Liberties 7: Is speech that strays from the prevailing ideology generally protected?” “2 Points: With very minor exceptions, yes.” The constitution guarantees ideological freedom in article 24, and it seems that it isn t so much speech critical of the prevailing ideology but speech that seeks to show abuses of human rights and or unconstitutionality by the government that is not tolerated, I couldn t find any evidence of speech being censerd for ideological rather than political reasons, I cannot tell. “Civil Liberties 8: Is there an independent press?” 2 Points: Most influential media are independent of the government." The press is independent but subject to bulling and intimidation if covering protests or coruption http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/CNews/y99/apr99/29e7.htm “Institutionalized Rule 1: Do the stateâ s political institutions exercise the powers that they are constitutionally assigned?” “0 points: No. The constitution seems to be routinely violated.” See examples in other justifications, what the government has constitutional power to do is at odds with what actually goes on. “Institutionalized Rule 2: Are some people above the law?” “1 point: Unclear. There may be some people who flout the law, but they could be brought to account.” Cubas and Olivedo seemed to be flouting the law, when shortening olivedo s prison sentence as so to be aloud to pardon him, or when arranging Argaña s assasanation, but were in the end brought to acount so 1 point is fitting. “Institutionalized Rule 3: Are laws and policy created through an accountable institutional process?” “0 points: No. The OED s Country Assistance Evaluatio n report in 2001 described paraguay s policy making as less than transparent the country’s legal and institutional framework is weak, leading to evasion and selective enforcement of laws and regulations ;background: white;> www.oecd.org/countries/paraguay/35294497.pdf )”Institutionalized Rule 4: Are the stateâ s primary leader accountable to the people?" “2 points: Generally speaking yes.” Presidents and parties can be voted out at elections, and the council of deputies can oust the president as they did to Cubas “Institutionalized Rule 5: Are all state leaders in official positions?” “0 points: Some important leaders don’t actually have an official position - their authority is extra-legal. Oviedo s position after the election of Cubas is analogous to Gaddafi being in no official position but clearly associated with the power.”Institutionalized Rule 6: Is there a cult of personality?" 1 point: Unclear or conflicting evidence. Oviedo is a very controversial figure being a charismatic couping ex-military man, and had a devoted following, one man in 2006went on a hunger strike before crucified himself in protest of Oviedo s imprisonment “We will be using existing income and wealth inequality data to measure inequality, but from your reading, how much inequality do you think there is in this country compared to others?” 1: a medium amount " The gini inequality index for this period in Paraguay is between .40 and .50 what is considered around medium levels of income inequality http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SI.POV.GINI&country = |
| Slovakia | 1989 | 2002 | 12 | 12 | 10 | Slovakia is fundamentally a parliamentary democracy, and much like New Zealand- has legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The distribution of power in Slovakia is straight forward; the parties that are voted in via a democratic election are then assigned seats in Parliament that are in proportion to the amount of votes received. Obviously when reviewing just how democratic a country is, it is important to asses just who in Slovakia is able to vote and participate in the democratic process. Slovakia maintains a fairly standard voting requirement, enforcing an age minimum of eighteen year sold, as well as Slovak citizenship and permanent residence in Slovakia. The requirements to be able to run as a candidate are fairly similar as well, but with an increased minimum age to 21 as well as a denser list of jobs that are incompatible with running to avoid conflict of interest. This is why Slovakia was given two points for each eligibility question, as is it not excessively difficult to run as a candidate nor is it difficult to be eligible to vote. This information was extracted mainly from this source http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2285_B.htm . In terms of power distribution, it is fair to suggest that only those that have been voted in have any form of genuine executive power. There is no evidence to suggest there is a military with excessive power, and while Slovakia does have a state church, it has no sincere influence over the executive branch of government. What s more is that there is strong evidence to suggest that the exposure and challenging of those in power is not only possible, but also acceptable. This is clear when considering this case http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/01/scandal-slovakia, which was essentially the wiretapping operation that highlighted widespread political corruption. This case received huge media coverage and led to nation-wide protests. In regards to the rights of the individual, it is somewhat unclear as to just how protected these are. Under Slovakia s constitution, it is stated that the language or ethnicity of an individual shall play no part in regards to that individuals rights. However, whether or not the integrity of this statement is maintained comes into question. This is in regards to the 2009 language law, a law passed to regulate the use of languages other than the Slovak language. This has arguably led to the misrepresentation of those with a Hungarian background living in Slovakia. This is why it is fair to say there is some discrimination, but it is not always clear or widespread. In reference to legal rights, the individual has the right to all normal legal conventions, such as a lawyer and the right to remain silent. The individual is also protected from cruel or unusual punishment, meaning that Slovakia gets two points for both of these categories. I retrieved this information from its constitution here http://www.slovakia.org/sk-constitution.htm In terms of free speech and the freedom of the media, Slovakia offers a fairly reasonable system. As there are legal articles that protect the right of the Individual to free speech, as well as the abandonment of any type of licensing system for the press. Article 28 and 29 also guarantee the right to assembly and association, meaning Slovakia has set up a political system that encourages free speech and does not enforce state run media. It is also important to note, that nobody is above the law in Slovakia. There is no evidence to suggest there are individuals in Slovakia that are above the law, however this does not mean there is no corruption within the Slovakian government, only that it is not endorsed and they are able to be held accountable. |
| Slovakia | 1992 | 2017 | 15 | 12 | 11 | TIME PERIOD: - 1992 was the year which Slovakia marked itself as a sovereign state after the end of Communist rule in 1989. This was when its laws overrode those of the Federal Government. They were no longer part of “Czechoslovakia” and democracy was born into their country. - It is presently under the same democratic regime, although there have been leaders from different parties governing the state all parties were somewhat liberal and believed in similar ideologies. - I gathered this information from a few European articles which talk about Slovakia’s transition to democracy. All of which describe a somewhat steady, consistent transition where a change in parties does not affect the quality of democracy. Dubnica Nad Vahom. “Slovakia: Birth of a Nation”. The Economist. January 1st. 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/01/slovakia DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: - General elections are held for major executive branch positions in which all people are entitled to vote if over the age of 18. The National Council is proportionately represented in 150 seats according to the people’s votes of the executive branch. Once officials are elected they have more power than any unelected institution or individual in the state. Elected officials can hold one another accountable. The President can be recalled from office if the National Council decides he/she is incompetent but requires a 100% vote of the legislative body to be followed through. - There are no significant barriers stopping people from creating a political party and contesting the election. In fact, this has recently been made easier- the Slovakian government has recently made running and the financing of campaigning much more transparent and also have tighter regulations around campaign budget. - All of this information was easily accessible through the Slovakian Constitution and is evident through all past elections. Slovakian Government. “Constitution of the Slovak Republic”. 1992. http://www.slovak-republic.org/constitution/. CIVIL LIBERTIES: - Those suspected of crimes are entitled to a fair hearing and trial. They have the right to the help of an attorney and must legally be made aware of this at the time of arrest. According to the 2011 Human Rights Report, these procedures have almost always been consistently upheld. - " Basic rights and liberties on the territory of the Slovak Republic are guaranteed to everyone regardless of sex, race, color of skin, language, creed and religion, political or other beliefs, national or social origin, affiliation to a nation or ethnic group, property, descent, or another status. No one must be harmed, preferred, or discriminated against on these grounds.“- Slovakian Constitution. However, Romani communities did experience violent discrimination often, but not necessarily from the government- it was more of a civilian prejudice which the government did attempt to deal with many times. There have also been reports of neo-Nazi’s holding rally’s in order to intimidate minorities but these have somewhat been dealt with since it is clearly not in the government’s interest to promote these sorts of ideologies. - However, Romani do experience widespread discrimination in housing, education, employment, and health services. Roma unemployment was down to 80-90% in the last Human Rights Report. However, the Slovakian government did take action to attempt to improve the treatment of Romani. Firstly, they introduced a special police unit to keep an eye on the extremist groups who were in charge of not only implanting bad ideas but responsible for a fair amount of the violence against Romani. The government also allocated 200 million Euros to improve the Roma situation. They maintained watch over the country with five regional offices implemented for Roma relations. Therefore, although Roma is discriminated against within civilians, the government is doing something about it to fix it. - Those suspected of crimes are entitled to a fair hearing and trial. They have the right to the help of an attorney and must legally be made aware of this at the time of arrest. According to the 2011 Human Rights Report, these procedures have almost always been consistently upheld. - Capital punishment is not permitted in Slovakia, nor is”torture…cruel, inhumane or humiliating treatment or punishment“. Since capital punishment was made illegal in Slovakia there have been no reports of unlawful or cruel treatment of prisoners or people by the government. Although there have been reports of abuse of Romani community by police departments, I think this is more of a department issue than a government issue. - Freedom of speech is generally evident in Slovakia with some exceptions of censorship of extremist groups like the neo-nazis. There are no punishments for speaking and publishing content against the government or its ideologies unless it is particularly arbitrary and offensive to the general population. - There is a large amount of independent press in Slovakia. However, in the 2011 Human Rights Report, 47.7% of media owners claimed they felt pressure from the government to conform to their ideologies. State-owned TV broadcasters were subject to pressure to provide favourable coverage. There were also attempts to limit the actions of extremist groups. On a whole though, there is independent press and it is not too forcefully interfered with. Most of my information I gathered from the Slovakian Constitution to see what sort of civil liberties they should abide by, but often in countries which are misleading their people and the rest of the world, they do not respect their constitution. Thus, I used the 2011 Human Rights Report of Slovakia to see how much they really respect their constitution. Slovakian Government.”Constitution of the Slovak Republic“. 1992. http :// www . slovak -republic. org /constitution/. U.S Department of States.”Slovakia Human Rights Report“. 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154450.htm INSTITUTIONAL RULE: - Slovakia has exercised its power which is constitutionally assigned and worked to uphold their standards. This includes things like the right to protection, non-interference, and human rights. The only thing which was fairly controversial was a bill passed to protect civilians from the press where former President, Fico used the”right of reply provisions" to reply to an accusation of being part of a privileged group during the Communist era. This led often in other cases as well to a lawsuit to compensate for the humiliation felt by the victim. However, this was also made use of by the government, judiciary and political elites to suck large amounts of money from the press. There was fear that this would lead to media self-censoring. This is clearly not free press and speech. However, this is generally the only violation made by the government. - There are no people above the law. All people including elites are subject to the law. - There is a clear, twenty-three part procedure to passing a bill or referendum. This involves the executives, legislative and public opinion. Here is a link to the lengthy process: https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/en-US/NRSR/Dokumenty/rules_of_procedure.pdf - Articles 26 and 27 states not only that the state body is obligated to provide information of state happenings, but people are also entitled to address proposals, complaints, and requests to state bodies. This is regularly enforced around Slovakia. That is precisely how the Romani were able to make their issues known to the government, and as a result, the government installed institutions to aid them. - All state leaders are in official, elected positions and there are no cult personalities. National Council of the Slovak Republic. “On Rules as Procedure: as Amended.”. 1996. https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/en-US/NRSR/Dokumenty/rules_of_procedure.pdf Slovakian Government. “Constitution of the Slovak Republic”. 1992. http :// www . slovak -republic. org /constitution/. U.S Department of States. “Slovakia Human Rights Report”. 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154450.htm |
| South Africa | 1994 | 1999 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 4-7 In 1994 in South Africa, the African Nation Congress Party, one of thirteen political parties in that election, won the parliamentary election. The leader of the ANC party, Nelson Mandela, therefore, became the first black president of South Africa, the election determined the major executive position, as well as determining all other executive branch positions . The legislative branch in South Africa consists of a Senate and a National Assembly. To determine the Senate there are 10 nominations by each of the provinces, and for the National Assembly, there are 400 members. These members are elected by a voting system and party members are given seats proportional to the number of votes. This means that all state officials are determined by elections. The 1994 election was the first South African election with universal suffrage for citizens over 18 years . Section 19 of the Constitution of South Africa protects and reinforces the rights of citizens to vote and participate in a democracy . This extended to participating and forming political parties, the right to stand for office, the right to join a political party and to the right to protest. 8-9 As the President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela was the elected official of the Executive branch, his power had influence over every other institution . Mandela and the proportionately elected National Assembly and Senate had power over unelected institutions . During Mandela s Government, the South African National Defense Force was created, it was made up of the South African Armed Forces and the commander was selected by President Mandela. This showed that the military was subject to an elected official s rule . The Constitution of South Africa also allowed the ability for no confidence votes, thus allowing officials to publically challenge each other. 10-11 During Mandela s Government, the 1997 Constitution that was implemented outlines all the rights and protections that citizens have from discrimination that extended to their race, gender, religion to pregnancy and marital status, which were implemented to protects women s rights . During the Mandela Government, the Commission on Gender Equality was set up to make recommendations to the legislative branch to ensure the 1996 Constitution promoted gender equality . However, despite the Constitution allowing equal legal rights, there were indirect discrimination sectors of society. There was still a high disproportion of blacks being incarcerated compared to whites, and a clear socio-economic distinction between the two ethnic groups in South Africa . The discrimination and disparities were an indirect effect of the apartheid which officially ended with the 1994 election. 12-13 The South African Constitution guarantees the right to a fair civil trial, access to a lawyer, against arbitrary detention and detention without trial . These sections should have allowed citizens to a speedy trial, yet the high number of incarcerations alongside the lack of practising lawyers meant that people were detained for long periods of time without trial . There were also a high number of unexplained deaths in police custody and cases of violence at police stations, including torture . 14-17 Since South Africa does not have a state church, South Africa is considered secular, with the only ideology residing in government the one citizens voted for . With elections and the Constitution allowing the protests, critical speech of the government was protected. During the Mandela Government, one of his main criticisms was his ineffectiveness in combating the AIDS crisis that existed in South Africa . Mandela even invited criticism by stating criticism can only help us to grow . A free and vibrant press is one of the legacies that was implemented and invited by Mandela during his 1994-1999 Government, Mandela believed that independent press was crucial to the survival of democracy . The freedom of speech in both the press and an individual s ideology was protected by the Constitution . 18-20 In South Africa during the 1994-1999 Government, there was the drafting and implementation of a new Constitution. This Constitution set out the rights of the citizens and the power of the political institutions. Since the executive and legislative branch of the Government were determined by a majority vote, they exercised their assigned powers and were accountable to the public through elections . The Constitution also set out that all people were subject to the Law and would be held accountable through institutions and through legislation. The Constitution was created through an accountable institutional process as drafts were approved by the Constitutional Court and were subjected to revision and clarification . 21-22 As the President, there was the option for other elected officials to hold Mandela accountable and publicly challenge his decisions. Mandela was the leader and all those around him in power were in official positions. The Constitution of South Africa allowed for a no-confidence vote against the president under section 102 . In more severe cases section 89 provided the ability to impeach the president with a 2/3rd majority vote from the National Assembly . Despite these abilities being present, there was no threat or instance they came into practice during the Mandela Government 1994-1999. 23 Nelson Mandela was elected in a parliamentary representative democracy. Mandela was supported by the public due to his position on politics and human rights. Therefore; he was elected and saw through his presidential term upholding the ideology that he was elected to represent, rather than through a cult of personality . ANC risks losing born free votes News24, 2013. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ANC-risks-losing-born-free-voters-20130128 Francis X. Clines, The South African Vote: the overview The New York Times, 1994 http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/27/world/the-south-african-vote-the-overview-after-300-years-blacks-vote-in-south-africa.html?pagewanted=all South African Constitution, section 19. http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 History of Elections in South Africa South African History Online, 2014. http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994 Ibid South African National Defence Force Defenceweb, 2013. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29273:south-africa&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255 South African Constitution section 9. http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 Gender Discrimination South Africa, n.d. https://www.jyu.fi/viesti/verkkotuotanto/kp/sa/soc_gender_disc.shtml Different Treatment based on Race, Human Rights Watch, 1994. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/southafrica/5.htm South African Constitution . http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 Jason Brickhill, 2005 The Right to a Fair Civil Trial: The Duties of Lawyers and Law Students to Act Pro Bono, South African Journal on Human Rights, 2, 293-322 Police Lock Up, Human Rights Watch, 1994. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/southafrica/9.htm Kiarn Lalloo, 1998 The church and state in apartheid South Africa, Contemporary Politics, 1, 39-55 Rick Lyman, 2013 For Mandela, Reverence, but Criticism, too New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/world/africa/mandela-politics.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Sue Valentine, Mandela s Legacy of Media Freedom Stand Its Ground Committee to protect journalists, n.d. https://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-south-africa.php Ibid South African Constitution . http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 Wim Louw, The South African Electoral System, hsf, 2014. http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/hsf-briefs/the-south-african-electoral-system History of the South African Constitution 1910-1996, South African History Online, 2016. http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-and-acceptance-constitution South African Constitution, section 102 . http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 Ibid South African -first twenty years of Democracy South African History Online, 2014. http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/timeline-20-years-democracy-1994-2014 |
| South Korea | 1963 | 1972 | 12 | 9 | 5 | Sources for Democratic Political Institutions:, ;letter-spacing: normal;text-indent: 0.0px;text-transform: none;white-space: normal;word-spacing: 0.0px;> Electoral Politics in South Korea, Aurel Croissant, 2003) Sources for Civil Liberties: Sources for Institutional Rule:, The years 1963 and 1972 are the boundaries of the Third Republic of South Korea which mark the return of civilian rule after military rule since 1961, and 1972 is the year that the President dissolved the National Assembly and more firmly established his direct rule. Although Park Chung-hee was the President/leader of the country throughout 1961-1979, the period of the third republic is distinct from the other periods of his rule, in that it was largely, though not entirely democratic. Elections for the executive and legislative were held every 4 years, and were contested by multiple parties. Formerly imprisoned political leaders were even freed in 1963 before the 1963 election, though the resources of Park’s party were significantly larger than his competitors in each election . Despite not having favorable public opinion in most elections, Park won with at least 50% of the vote, while his party was by far the largest party in the legislative. While the constitution espoused many democratic ideals, and provided for basic human rights and freedoms, these were not always held, and the powers of the executive over the judicial system in particular made constitutional violations or amendments easy for the President. The executive had considerable powers over all aspects of government, being able to bypass the legislative entirely in times of crisis or disaster . |
| Spain 201 | 1981 | 2011 | 11 | 11 | 10 | For the section on “Political institutions”, I used various basic sources such as Freedom House and a few books on Spain’s political history. Spain has been a democratic country for decades now and have become accustomed to the framework of democracy. In the year of 2011 Spain had a general election which saw the drastic change of government to the “People’s Party”, and has not had any form of controversy surrounding it to be unfair elections. In Question 8, I have stated that at times monarchs do overshadow elected officials in the Spanish political environment. Whilst it is not over-bearing, the monarchy of Spain had had an effect on the referendum to grant Catalonia independence; whilst some politicians would have opposed it going to a vote. In terms of civil liberties, I have rated Spain quite moderately in this topic. Whilst the authoritarian regime in Spain was done a long time before 2011, there is still content that I find to be marginalized. Roman Catholicism is quite prevalent in Spain and is an ideology that is often followed by the politicians and media outlets. Newspapers and other forms of information may have bias on a national or international event by following the Catholic ideology. However, Spain is very free in terms of freedom of the press, considering no journalists have been victim to abuse or harassment from entities. Policies that concern other liberties like voting are controlled by the European Union, and Spain would be pressured to follow that policy. In Question 19, I have rated Spain a 1 in terms of people being above the law. Whilst the monarch has limited executive power, he can act above the law in some instances. This was a blurry line for me and so I decided to mark Spain moderately on the question. However, in terms of institutionalized rule I marked Spain quite high illustrating that there is not much of it; rather little inequality as well. There are reports from several reputable news articles of the gap between the rich and the poor closing, however it is not outlandish for this to be occurring. Regardless, Spain resembles your average democratic regime in Europe. |
| Sri Lanka | 2000 | 2010 | 5 | 10 | 9 | Democractic Political Institutions Sri Lanka government system operates under a democratic semi presidential system where regular elections for president and unicameral parliament as dictated by the constitution. The formation of political parties is open and many parties participate in parliament. Voting is generally free and fair, however in certain areas it is marred by separatist groups thorough violence and intimidation. Elected officials can challenge one another, to the point that is creates inaction where the president has to dissolve the parliament. Another example of Sri Lanka’s political in fighting was in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, post disaster rebuilding agreements were stalled by disagreements over political equity in reconstruction role and overall effectiveness of the policy was hampered. Elected officials appear to hold significant influence over non-elected officials in determining social, economic and politcal direction of the state. Peace talks between the state and Tamil separatists and new policy is led by elected officials. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/sri-lanka https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/sri-lanka Civil Liberties Sri Lanka unfortunately has a terrible record of discrimination and human rights abuses. The Tamil minority is often the subject of systematic discrimination, when It comes to job opportunities, education, and access to justice. However in recent times the government appear to be making inroads to improve race relations. Women are afforded equal rights under law but are the victims of sexual harassment as well as pay and promotion inequality in the private and public sectors. Domestic violence, rape continue to be serious issues and authorities weakly enforce consequences. Police and security forces are regularly implicated in violence and corruption. Aductions, extra-judicial killings,and torture are common. Citizens access to legal conventions such as a right to a lawyer and trail are sporadic and largely dependent on,status, gender, race and religious beliefs. There is a free press in Sri Lanka but the largest media outlet is owned by the government and coverage in war zones is censored due to the threat to ‘national security’. Journalist are often targeted for intimidation and violence on both sides of the conflict.The Kumaratunga administration in the past has filed criminal defamation suits against media outlets who’s content does not follow the regimes general ideology subsequently suspending lisences. The private press largely practises self censorship. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/conspiracy-to-deny-due-process-rights-to-sri-lankan-citizens/ https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/sri-lanka https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2007/country-chapters/sri-lanka Institutionalized Rule Political institutions operate within their sphere of constitutional assignments, the judiciary is independent and free of partisan influence, but the rule of law weak. The legislature is often controlled by opposition parties checking executives influence. Executive frequently adheres to constitutional rules. For Example Kumaratunga’s term in office was ended due to term limits in 2005. Policy creation is done through an accountable processes, Bills are voted on by the parliament and have to go through a series of house readings and filters, however the process has been criticized for lack of transparency. There doesn’t appear to be any cult of personality in Sri Lanka, presidents & legislators regularly lose elections and through those means are accountable to the public. However, corruption is an issue both in judiciary and police force as bribery is common place. https://www.parliament.lk/how-parliament-works/government-bills https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/sri-lanka http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka |
| Suriname | 1980 | 1991 | 6 | 1 | 3 | Question 2: Deli Bouterse stages a military coup d’etat in 1980, because he is unhappy with the government. Question3: Although he allows for elections in 1987, the new constitution allows for him to stay in charge of the military, meaning that when he is unhappy with the government again, in 1990, he stages the ‘telephone coup’, where he dismisses the ministers by telephone calls. He does not really fall out of power until 1991, when elections are held again. Source: https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=kXdhAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&p&f=false Question 4&5: This regimes was created by military coup, meaning there were no elections for the executive or the legislative branches. Although there is a brief period where Suriname holds elections in 1987, this is undermined when Bouterse takes power again by coup. The titular presidents were appointed by Bouterse himself, but he was the de facto leader. Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desi_Bouterse Question 6: There were barriers for voters when there were no elections to vote in and no way to have your say. However, when the elections did happen in 1987, there was no formal or clear discrimination to anyone who was not an adult, which is why a 1 felt appropriate. Question 7: Bouterse placed a ban on political parties in 1985. Under Bouterse, there were no elections to contest. He also executed political opponents. Source: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1218515.stm Question 8: All the power lies in the unelected military, and Bouterse himself. There are no elected officials. The titular president as a military appointed position, also holds no power. Source: wikipedia - Desi Bouterse Question 9: After Bouterse took power, there were multiple counter coup attempts, all ending in those complicit being heavily punished. Unsuccessful coup leader, Fred Ormskerk, was clubbed to death in 1982 for crimes against the government. Another unsuccessfull coup leader, Wilfred Hawker, was the last person to be legally executed in Suriname. Sources: https://www.vn.nl/de-meimoord www.nytimes.com/1982/03/14/world/around-the-world-rebel-leader-s-execution-anounced-by-suriname.html Question 10&11: Unlike most dictatorships, Bouterse does not identify a specific minority group that he is fighting against within his regime. Most dictators in history have tried to bring their countries together by dehumanizing a common threat or other. The Nazis had the Jews, the italian fascist regime had Slavics. This may have been due to the civil war between the regime and guerrilla fighters at the time. The change from dictatorship to bringing in elections was more due to international pressure and this did come with a 97% electorate approval for civilian constitution. It does seem that if citizens were compliant with the regime their lives would be relatively easy. There also did not seem to be a lot of direct oppression to the people, other than a curfew, and more civic oppression, like no political parties, elections or freedom of speech or press. So if you did not speak out against the regime and went home before curfew there was not a lot else that Bouterse’s regime infringed on. Source:www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname85eng/intro.htm news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/countries_profiles/1218515.stm Question 12: There were no trails for those attempted coup participants, and no trail for those killed in the December murders, where Bouterse ordered the killing of 15 high ranking officials who were opposed to his regime, including military, lawyers and journalists. There was no trial they were simply taken out of bed to port Zeelandia where they were killed after days of torture. As previously said, Hawker was the last person legally executed in Suriname, meaning these men were taken unlawfully from there beds and murdered by Bouterse’s men without trail. Source:https://web.archive.org/web/20071115132757/http://wwwdecembermoorden.com/ Question 13: Those killed in the December murders were killed because they were against the regime, which is basically being killed for your beliefs. Ormskerk was clubbed to death for attempted a military coup, again arbitrary and cruel. Execution without fair trial is cruel and arbitrary. Question 14: There is no evidence that Bouterse aligned his regime to any religion, although he was most likely Hindu, protestant or Roman Catholic, as are the majority religions in Suriname. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ns.html Question 15&16: Those killed in the December murders were killed because of their strong criticism for the government. Bouterse also closed down the University of Suriname after the December murders, in an attempt to silence the educated about his arbitrary rule. Although there was no strict ideology to follow, because the regime was secular and with other to discriminate, openly admitting you were against the regime would be dangerous, therefore would be like going against an ideology. Question 17: Bouterse heavily censored the one newspaper that was allowed to continue publishing, Suriname News Agency. This news paper was staffed by young supporters of Bouterse, who would write what the dictator wanted.Journalist were also among those killed in the December murders, when he also burned two radio stations and a newspaper publisher to the ground. Source: www.nytimes.com/1983/12/29/world/suriname-s-new-press-unesco-s-disciple.html Question 18: Bouterse abolished the constitution when he came into power. After that, a new constitution was put in place when the elections happened in 1987, but these still gave Bouterse a lot of power. This was not unconstitutional but it did leave the remnants of the regime around until 1991. Sources: wikipedia - Desi Bouterse Question 19: During the military coup, Bouterse’s soldiers shot at and burned down the Central Police Station of Suriname. It is only very recently that the government has apologized for the December murders and the Moiwana massacre, where the regimes soldiers killed dozens of civilians under the veil of civil war. Bouterse and his men have not been held accountable until recent years, so under the regime they were not liable. The reason I give this a 1 is because it is not clear what the law was and whether under this regime the law allowed them to kill as soldiers. Source: https://mg.co.za/article/2006-07-16-suriname-apologises-for-1986-massacre Question 20: Laws are not made fairly because this was a military dictatorship in civil war. Laws like a curfew and oppression of media were decisions made by Bouterse and not in a fair legislative area. Question 21: Similarly to question 19, under the regime Bouterse was never held accountable for the crimes he committed against human rights, nor were any of his men. Those leaders of military coups and the opposition were held accountable but again it was not until recently that those crimes were bad, and Bouterse and his men are not being punished for the murders. Question 22: The president was appointed by Bouterse and no real power against Bouterse himself. Bouterse was a de facto leader and leader of the military as well, so he did not technically hold an official position but he held all the power. |
| Sweden | 1982 | 1991 | 16 | 12 | 11 | Regime Duration It can be difficult to define the parameters of the regime as the Swedish Social Democratic Party has been almost interruptedly in power for about a century now. Only five general elections since World War II 1976, 1979, 1991, 2006 and 2010 have given the assembled bloc of centre-right parties enough seats in the Riksdag to form a government. The 1979 and 1991 instances of this allow us to define the duration of the regime of 1985. It began with the fall of the non-socialist parties in 1981 when the coalition spit over disagreements on tax policies which saw the return of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in the general election of 1982. The end of the regime could arguably be in 1986 due to the assassination of Prime Minister, Olof Palme, or could be in 1991 when a centre-right coalition, with dependence on a party called New Democracy, acquired a majority over the left wing, Swedish Social Democratic Party. For the purposes of this assignment, I will define the end of this regime as 1991 because, although Olof Palme was assassinated, there did not appear to be any cult of personality that would implicate the actions of the party with his loss, therefore the party would still act in the same manor, and answers to this classification scheme would not have been impacted. Democratic Institutions, Civil Liberties, Institutional Rule I found no evidence that the regime should be discounted in any of the areas of the classification for this period. |
| Sweden | 1982 | 1991 | 15 | 12 | 11 | TIME PERIOD: - For the regimes period, I chose 1982-1991. This was because 1982 was the year that the Social Democratic Party of Sweden regained power after its historical loss to the Conservative Moderate Party in 1976 after 40 years in office. This is an important transition as the two regimes are quite different in their ideologies. The Moderate Party values less taxation and government involvement in welfare and the market. Their ideologies are more on the conservative side compared to the socialists. Whereas, The Social Democratic Party supports high taxation and low-cost welfare but is aware of a need of balance of state-owned and private owned companies. They fall somewhat in between Liberal and Conservative ideologies. I chose to end the regime period to be 1991 because that is the period where the Conservative Party comes back into power. As mentioned earlier, these two parties are somewhat dissimilar. I found a very useful piece of writing about Sweden after social democratic hegemony which spoke directly about the changes in Sweden government. Anderson, Caren M. Immergut, Karen M. “Sweden: After Social Democratic Hegemony”. Research Gate. January. 2007. Chapter 10. Pp.10-12. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: - In terms of elections being held for major executive branch positions and legislative positions, I gave Sweden two points for both questions. Firstly, there are clearly competitive elections for executive branches, although the Social Democratic Party is dominant there are times where the party is fairly voted out. Furthermore, there are many minor parties which have been able to meet the minimum 4% threshold without facing difficulties from the current government. This included the Moderate Party, Centre Party, People’s Party, Left Party Communists, Christian Democratic Unity, Green Party, Worker’s Party Communists and other parties. A number of votes given to these parties ranged from 5,745- 1,313,337. There are no signs of this regime experiencing unfair elections. Additionally, the ‘Riksdag’, their legislative body is unicameral and decided proportionately to the executive branch. Essentially, however much support a party gets in general elections determines how many seats they gain in Riksdag to ensure all parties are represented. - There are no restrictions on voting eligibility aside from being over 18 and being a Swedish citizen, which are not generally restricting in the international realm. Secondly, there do not appear to be strong barriers from the government when creating a non-government political regime. I am able to assume this due to the fact there was at least seven non-government run parties which were able to gain a fair amount of votes. One which was called the “Liquor Party” particularly took my interest. This party is a single-focus party and was created by the actor, Benny Haag. There is also no non-executives who held power in Sweden at that time as far as I can tell. Although I found this information a little challenging to find, I assumed that the reason I could not find much on it meant that it was non-existent in the regime at the time. - Elected bodies can certainly challenge one another and unelected officials and institutions . Firstly, the Riksdag, the legislative body could call a vote of no confidence against any cabinet minister if he/she is not doing an adequate job for which it results in the resignation of the minister. The resignation of a minister requires a 100% vote from the legislative body.The Riksdag was also able to call a vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister of which implies the rejection of the government as a whole. From there the losing government has a week to call a general election otherwise the process for voting in a new Prime Minister starts again. - For this stage of my research, I turned to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden which included the Instrument of Government Act, introduced in 1974. This had adequate information about the Riksdag and its capabilities. I found information on Wikipedia about the parties which received votes in the relevant elections and also about voting restrictions. I figured because it was quite general information I could trust Wikipedia sources. Swedish Government. “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden”. ISN: ETH Zurich. Sweden. 2008. http://www.isn.ethz.chpp. P.p. 7-10. Wikipedia. “Swedish General Election 1982.” Wikipedia. 11th December. 2016.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_general_election,_1982 CIVIL LIBERTIES: - From a survey conducted in 1982 and 1990 by the Perspective Monde I found that in 1982 36% of people surveyed thought that equality was valued more than freedom. While 59% of people thought that freedom was valued more than equality. And only 3% though neither were valued. In 1990 equality over freedom lessened to 28% while freedom over equality increased to 66% and neither increased to 5%. I thus concluded that Sweden was both free and equal meaning that there were very few groups that experienced fewer legal rights. However, the right to marry is affected by sexual orientation at that time: where same-sex marriage was illegal. Homosexuals may very well have contributed to the “neither” percentage. However, it has since been repealed. It is unclear that this was widespread discrimination but with around 90% of people being Christian around this period it may be that there was widespread discrimination. Perspective Monde. “Freedom or Equality | Sweden |1982”. World Perspective. 1982. http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMValBase?codeStatV=E032TX&codepays=SWE&annee=1982. - According to the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, first enforced in 1948 a suspect has the right to either represent himself or get the help of an attorney or defense counsel. Furthermore, people under the age of eighteen and people suffering from mental issues could be represented by the person who has custody over them- they also have the right to appoint an attorney. He/she also has the right to a fair trial and to appeal to the court. The Swedish Penal Code instated in 1962 states that the worst form of punishment for a crime is imprisonment, thus, there was no use of arbitrary or cruel punishment. Furthermore, there is no evidence of inhumane punishment being used. Futhermore, the constitution states that: “There shall be no capital punishment.” And: “Every citizen shall be protected against corporal punishment. He shall likewise be protected against any torture or medical influence aimed at extorting or suppressing statements.” Swedish Government. “The Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure”. 1948. Chapter 21. Section 1-3. http://www.government.se/contentassets/a1be9e99a5c64d1bb93a96ce5d517e9c/the-swedish-code-of-judicial-procedure-ds-1998_65.pdf. Swedish Government. “Penal Code”. Notisum. 1962. http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19620700.htm. Up until 2000, the Church of Sweden was a state church. However, it was not compulsory to believe in the ideologies of the church and thus had little effect on everyday lives of the Swedish. Although a large proportion of people did follow the church it did not seem to have much or any power over the state. In 1957 when the Social Democrats were still in power the church refused the ordination of women but were overruled by the Riksdag. This was not since repealed, showing that the church has no power over the state- only the power to influence citizens. Wikipedia. “Church of Sweden”. Wikipedia. 8th May. 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_Sweden. - The ‘Freedom of Press Act’ which was introduced in 1949 states that: “The freedom of the press is understood to mean the right of every Swedish citizen to publish written matter, without prior hindrance by a public authority or other public body”. Private groups like Bonnier owned some of the biggest newspapers, separate from the state like the Expressen. Furthermore, The Evening Post or Kvallsposten makes itself known as “politically independent’. There is a wide range of newspapers which were around between 1982-1991 which were not controlled nor influenced by the state. - The Svenska Dagbladet newspaper which was published at the focused claims its political stance is”independently moderate“. At no time when the Social Democrats were in power did they limit or censor what came through this newspaper even if it held and advocated different political views. Thus, speech which is different from the ideologies of the state is protected and embraced. Newspaper links: http://www.expressen.se/, https://www.svd.se/ledare. INSTITUTIONAL RULE: - Generally, the state did exercise the power it was constitutionally assigned. Although it is difficult to find evidence that executives did not breach their constitutional responsibilities I can be fairly confident because there are no policies which stray too far from the Social Democrats ideologies. Thus, there would be no need to breach the constitution because the policies are the sorts people expected to see come out of the government and would be passed fairly easily. - Secondly, there were no people above the law. Everyone who exercised power was appointed by the people and the Riksdag. The law applied to everyone, including elected leaders - even the Prime Minister was subject to the law. No person has enough power to override the law. - All policies were accountable to the Riksdag and the Prime Minister himself. After an initiative for change, the Prime Minister appointed a committee of inquiry which proposes and circulated the proposal for report and comments . The government then drafted the proposal and submits it for a parliamentary vote to then find out whether it will be passed or not. So, yes, laws are created through an accountable institutional process. - Generally speaking, the leader was accountable to the people. People were able to vote every four years in general elections, take part in referendums, join political parties and comment on government reports of policy change. - All state leaders hold official positions and there was no evidence of any such cults. Swedish Government.”The Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden“. ISN: ETH Zurich . Sweden. 2008. http :// www . isn . ethz . chpp . P.p. 15-20. |
| Taiwan | 2008 | 2016 | 14 | 12 | 10 | Question Two- I have chosen 2008 as the first year of my period of study for Taiwan as this was the year that the Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang, regained power from the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan in the legislative and presidential elections in January and March 2008, respectively. Question Three- I have chosen 2015 as the last year of my period of study for Taiwan as Kuomintang was defeated in the Taiwan Presidential election in January 2016 by the DPP. 2015 was, therefore, the last year that the Kuomintang party ruled in Taiwan. Democratic Political Institutions Question Four - The 2012 Presidential election was a vigorous race between the KMT and the DPP. Therefore, it was competitive and involved more than one party. Question Five - The 2012 legislative election, held concurrent to the Presidential election, was competed for between a number of parties, including the KMT and the DPP. Question Six - The Taiwan elections since 2008 have been deemed generally free and fair by international observers . Question Seven - There were a number of parties contesting the 2008 and 2012 elections without obvious interference from the KMT party. Question Eight - According to Freedom House the president& wields executive powers& Therefore, there are no non-elected positions that exercise executive power. Question Nine - Elected officials can challenge one another in Taiwan. This is seen in the large number of corruption cases being taken elected officials. For example, former president Chen Shui-bian was indicted on charges of money laundering and misuse of public funds in December 2008. Civil Liberties Question Ten - Taiwan is very free regarding religion- according to Freedom House Taiwanese of all faiths can worship freely . In addition, Taiwanese law prohibits discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation, and violence against LGBT people is adequately addressed by police. However, Taiwanese women continue to face private-sector job discrimination and other women s rights issues such as rape and domestic violence remain a problem. Additionally, Taiwan s indigenous people continue to face social and economic discrimination. Question Eleven - There is no clear evidence of discrimination against certain identity groups in any sectors of Taiwan society. Question Twelve - According to Freedom House the judiciary is independent, and trials are generally fair . Question Thirteen - According to Freedom House, arbitrary arrest and detention are not permitted, and police generally respect this ban. However, Taiwan still uses the death penalty with six inmates executed in June 2015. Question Fourteen - There is no state church and there is no enforced religious orthodoxy as Taiwanese of all faiths can worship freely. Question Fifteen - According to Freedom House, the media report aggressively on government policies and corruption allegations . In addition, educators giving their view as well as private discussion is open, free and without interference. Question Sixteen - Speech amongst the general public is open and free, and there were no reports of the government illegally monitoring online communication. Question Seventeen - Although many outlets display strong party affiliation in their coverage, Taiwan s media reflects a diversity of views and report aggressively on government policies and corruption allegations . Institutionalized Rule Question Eighteen - Taiwan s political institutions exercise the power that they are constitutionally assigned. They are held accountable for this using measures to improve transparency in Taiwan such as the launch of a database for public document in 2013. Question Nineteen - Although corruption in significantly less pervasive than in the past, politics and big business remain closely intertwined. This results in corruption with big businesses in Taiwan wrongfully obtaining Taiwanese goods or services. Question Twenty - Policy making officials are elected and are free to set and implement policy without inappropriate influence from unelected actors. Question Twenty-one - Taiwan s leader is held accountable to the people through a democratic election every four years. In addition, freedom of assembly, including assembly against the leadership of Taiwan, is largely respected in practice. Question Twenty-two - Taiwan s leader, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT party, holds the official position of President. Question Twenty-three - There is no cult of personality for Ma Ying-Jeou with the Taiwan s media and the people of Taiwan showing a range of views on him. This prevents any cult of personality being created. Bibliography BBC NEWS. . Tsai Ing-wen elected Taiwan’s first female president . Retrieved from BBC NEWS: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35333647 Freedom House. . Taiwan . Retrieved from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/taiwan Freedom House. . Taiwan . Retrieved from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/taiwan Freedom House. . Taiwan . Retrieved from Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/taiwan |
| Thailand | 1989 | 2001 | 9 | 7 | 6 | Thailand 1989-2001 A Very Brief Political History During the period 1989-2001, Thailand experienced a marked increase in the use of democratic principles in the exercising of Government. Since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has fluctuated between military, elected and appointed government. Thailand was governed under a constitutional monarchy, with a bicameral legislature, the legislature was made up of the House of Representatives who were elected through public vote, and the Senate, who’s members were selected by the King. General ChatiChai was elected Prime Minister in 1988, but was abdicated by military coup in 1991. This was the seventeenth coup since 1932, resulting in a new Prime Minister Anand Paryarachun . After elections General Kaprayoon became Prime Minister in 1992, violent demonstration resulted in his resigning. 1995 brought about another election, with Banham Sulpa Ansha chosen as Prime Minister, he resigned the following year due to allegations of corruption. The Constitutional Draft Association was then formed and by 1997 the Constitution of Thailand was passed. This was a milestone on the road to democracy. The Constitution incorporated explicitly written civil rights and the ability for poorer people to be involved in the running of government. In the same year, the devastating Asian Financial Crisis caused bankruptcy and unemployment throughout Thailand. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai took lead in the years following, initiating the reboot of the economy, which once again ran smoothly by 1999. In 2000, legislation was passed, prescribing the senate was elected by the people, not at the King’s choice. Finally, in the year 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra formed a coalition government, after a landslide election. This government was the first to pass its election mandate of four years, in Thai history. It is for this reason, 2001 has been selected as the end period of analysis. Democratic Political Institutions The executive branch of the Thai Government was made up of the Ministers of State and the Cabinet. Ministers of State and members of the Cabinet were restricted by mandatory conditions they had to fulfil to be eligible. The individual must have been Thai by birth, older than 35 and must have a Bachelor s Degree or the equivalent. The Cabinet ran the administration and management of government departments and agencies and formed government policy. Members must publicly support all policies regardless of personal disagreement. Members of the executive are voted into their positions. The Thai legislature was made up of the Senate, who were chosen by the King to run six year terms. Secondly, the H ouse of Representatives, who were elected for four year terms. By 2000 the senate were also elected by the public. Although, both the executive and legislature were elected by the public, elections were plagued with fraud, the buying of votes and occasional political pressure. This is particularly notable in the Government of Banham Sulpa Ancha who resigned due to allegations of fraud and corruption. I have given one point on questions 4 and 5, as although elections were held they were highly unfair, during this time. Positively, there were no notable barriers upon voter eligibility, Thailand has enjoyed universal suffrage since 1932, with a voter turnout of 78.5% in national parliament elections in 1997. it was suggested that the constant coups during the 1990s in Thailand, were generally caused by bureaucratic cliques who compete for control of the state. The most powerful of these cliques are soldiers, as they are equipped with guns. The military had much influence over the Government in this period, as can be seen by multiple coups. The King and Royal Family also have much influence over the public in Thailand, however in reality had more of a symbolic role, much like today in New Zealand. It is for this reason I have given Question 8 one point. Though the military had influence over the Government at some times, a functioning Government also emerged occasionally throughout this period. Civil Liberties The 1997 Constitution of Thailand, guaranteed Thai citizens the right to due process, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the right to counsel during a police interview, for the first time. Within the Constitution, are several rights that were never explicitly legislated prior to 1997. This suggests legal rights are enforced by law. However, when reading news reports, one cannot help but notice the number of articles written concerning harsh legal penalties, particularly for carrying drugs. For instance, in 2001 Karyn Smith was allegedly set up as a drug mule carrying heroin. She was charged with twenty-five years in prison and remains there today. From this and other examples, we can gather that there are instances of cruel punishment; such as extended imprisonment. Thai law prescribed the death penalty via lethal injection and surprisingly stated that imprisonment should begin on the day of judgment. During 2001 and the beginning of Thakshin’s Government, there were harsh attitudes toward a Muslim minority in the south of Thailand. As there were to NGO organizers and civil society activists. Civil rights are occasionally breached by government behaviour conflicting with legal norms. The church and the State in Thailand were separated. However, the King practices the Buddhist religion and some Buddhist holy days are considered national holidays. The King was the head of the armed forces and the defender of all faiths in the country. Thailand was over 90% Buddhist and the Muslim religion was the largest minority group. Criticism of the Government is allowed up to a certain point. On May 17th 1992, 200,000 predominantly middle class Thai citizens protested in Bangkok against the Government, the protest ended with the military open firing, resulting in three bloody days of violence. Known as Bloody May. Independent press was regulated by the 1941 Press Act, which has been described as the single greatest legal obstacle to freedom of the press. In 2001 this legislation was used 14 times by Special Branch Police to warn independent newspaper companies of their straying too close to politically offending. The police have jurisdiction over material that may potentially offend the public. It is for this reason I have given question 17 one point. Institutionalised Rule The state, occasionally breached its constitutionally assigned powers during the 1990s. For instance, the 1941 Press Act was claimed to be in violation of the 1997 Thailand Constitution as it flouted a right to freedom of speech. However, the government, even up to today continues to put the act into force. The government could have been held accountable for this, through election. The judicial system was disrespected by several Prime Ministers, most notably Thaksin . During his first term, Thaksin used connections within the judiciary to obtain acquittal for prosecution for concealing assets. This represents obvious selective application of the law. During the first half of this period, laws were made through an accountable process with slight arbitrary traits. The senate could reject any legislation it wished, something the House of Representatives could do nothing about. However, in the latter half of this period, the senate were made responsible to election. Due to this change I have given question 20 2 points. Regarding a Thailand’s culture of personality, I gave this only one point. For most the period assessed, there was much change in government, so much so, it would have been difficult to stay in power long enough to create such a culture. However, Thaksin campaigned to the middle class, after the Asian Financial Crisis. He is a wealthy man and created policies aimed at helping the economy prosper. However, once he was elected, Thaksin unfortunately did not follow through on many of these policies. There is scant evidence on this point. Bibliography Bevins, Anthony. Unlikely Pair of Big Time Smugglers. Retrieved from; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/unlikely-pair-of-big-time-smugglers-professional-heroin-traffickers-may-have-been-using-karyn-smith-1492067.html Auline, F., Elinoff, Eli., Sopranzetti, Claudia. the Wheel of Crisis in Thailand. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology. Retrieved from; https://culanth.org/fieldsights/560-introduction-the-wheel-of-crisis-in-thailan Bertlssman Thailand Transition Index. Retrieved from; http://bti2003.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/126.0.html?&L=1 British Broad Casting Company Thailand Profile-TImeline. Retrieved from; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745 Encyclopaedia Britannica Thailand Government and Society in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from; https://www.britannica.com/place/Thailand/Government-and-society Global Security the People’s Constitution. Retrieved from; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/constitution-1997.ht K uriantzick, Joshua. Thailand: A Democratic Failure and its Lessons From the Middle East. Retrieved from; https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/thailand-democratic-failure-and-its-lessons-middle-east Kursalasaya, Karyna Buddhism and Thailand: Its Past and its Present. Retrieved from; http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/kusalasaya/wheel085.html Mishra, Patit Paban the History of Thailand, Greenwood, Santa Barbara, United States. N guyen, L Michelle. the Continual Breakdown of Democracy in Thailand Brown University. Retrieved from; https://devl1980.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/nguyenm_final_thesis.pd S ingh, Naunihal World of Bribery and Corruption: From Ancient Times to Moder Age. Bluebird, New Delhi, India. Theodora Thailand Government- 1989. 1989 CIA World Fact Book. Retrieved from; http://www.theodora.com/wfb1989/thailand/thailand_government.html Thailand Law Reform Law and Analysis and Features on South East Asia. Retrieved from; http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/constburns2.html Voa Thailand’s Uneven Democratic History Continues. Retrieved from; http://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-thailands-democracy-about-power-and-who-wields-it--92756049/116951.html |
| The Congo. | 2001 | 2005 | 8 | 8 | 8 | The Congo The multiple choice questions were straight forward, I had no difficulties answering these fore The Congo. I chose the time period 2001-2005 because it was an important time for The Congo. 2001/2002 represented The Congo s aim of democracy. A new constitution in late 2001 and the move away from civil war and local skirmishes represented the Congo s ambitious democratic project. Despite the clearly progressive constitution however, the Congo still had significant problems with democratic processes. Democratic Political Institutions For research on democratic institutions I looked at these sources. https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Justice#toc281862 http://africanelections.tripod.com/election_legitimacy.html https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/congo-republic-brazzaville https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cf.html These sources were unanimous in agreeing new elections were held in 2002 under a new constitution were generally free, but questioned the overall fairness of the electoral process. For example, candidates who posed the greatest electoral threat to the current ruler Denis Sassou-Nguesso either withdrew or were barred from participation. There was no independent electoral commission in the 2002 elections and the results were withheld from international viewers such as NGO s and other government. The level of political autonomy for democratic institutions in The Congo is said to be low, with power being dispersed through political institutions very unevenly. Freedom in the World argues that corruption in Congolese political institutions is vast, especially in the legislature and Judicial systems where it is heavily influenced by bribes and political affiliations. Sources suggest that Political opposition to the ruling party in The Congo often struggle financially and failed to attract support in rural and remote areas, because of this the government were accused of failing the Civil and Political Rights of its citizens to organize free and fair elections. Freedom house states that Significant political opposition was created in 2004 under the de l’Opposition pour une Alternance Democratique, who pledged to boycott and protest the government to make future elections free and fair. The CIA factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cf.html states that suffrage in the Congo is universal and voter fraud is low. Social Freedoms and Civil Liberties For Social Freedoms and Civil Liberties I used these sources as well as the freedom house link above. https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=uiDfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=congo+brazile,+corrupt+electoral+process&source=bl&ots=rXfg4MPbGh&sig=XvoByXIf39uxSi6bA_DUwxwuLOw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwitpte85fDTAhXMFpQKHaykBh4Q6AEITzAH#v=onepage&q=congo%20brazile%2C%20corrupt%20electoral%20process&f=false http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Republic%20of%20the%20Congo/Brazzaville.pdf https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61564.htm https://www.fidh.org/en/ these sources generally agree that the Congo has limited social freedoms, but has, in recent times made significant progress in this area. The Congo was plagued with sporadic violence in the times following the 2002 election. This along with weak government and human rights issues is said to have a significant impact civil liberties. Freedom house ranks The Congo in 2005 as partly free, with limited political and civil liberties. While the 2001/2002 constitution outlines the right for free speech, in reality the government s commitment to this ideal is limited. Freedom in the world argues that the Congolese government generally respects the constitution in allowing freedom of press. However, the government remains the most influential source of media in rural areas. Through radio and television stations. Independent press does exist, but fails to gain significant audience outside the country s capital. However, there have been accusations of government threats toward independent media for speaking against it. Freedom house and Freedom in the World express concern over the treatment of criminals. Overcrowded prisons and underfunded legal systems often result in physical abuse and detention without trial. In 2004 the chief of police was arrested in France for abuse of criminals and the disappearance of 353 refugees. Concerns have been raised about the imprisonment without trial of twelve officers allegedly planning a coup. They have now been detained beyond the limit imposed by Congolese law. There is cause for concern over the treatment of women and Pygmies under the legal and prison systems despite constitutional safe guards. Institutional rule in the Congo. For this section I used the following sources: http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Republic%20of%20the%20Congo/Brazzaville.pdf https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=uiDfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=congo+brazile,+corrupt+electoral+process&source=bl&ots=rXfg4MPbGh&sig=XvoByXIf39uxSi6bA_DUwxwuLOw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwitpte85fDTAhXMFpQKHaykBh4Q6AEITzAH#v=onepage&q=congo%20brazile%2C%20corrupt%20electoral%20process&f=false Country Report. Democratic Republic of Congo., 2002. Governing Institutions in The Congo are said to be overburdened, under-funded and significantly corrupt. They re not entirely accountable to the people. Laws and policy and not passed through accountable processes, but are heavily influenced by external and internal bribes. The state s primary leaders were not voted in through legitimate elections, but they are all in official positions and are not outside the government. While the President faces term limits, some members of the opposition parties argued that the constitution allows the President to have too much power and not enough accountability. For example, there is no process for impeachment. There are examples of governing officials and Army leaders not being held to the law and acting without concern for punishment. For example, a verdict acquitted high-level government and armed forces officers of complicity in the massacre of 353 Congolese refugees returning to Brazzaville from the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999. While the trial did find the state responsible for the killings and disappearances, no individual was held responsible for the massacre. Conclusion In conclusion, the Congo in 2005 was in a state of transition from brutal civil war. Significant adaptations to the government had recently taken place in an attempt to democratise swiftly. Despite this however, their remained multiple factors that prevented the Congo being defined as democratic. These included not entirely free electoral processes, limits on civil liberties and freedoms, weak governance, mass corruption and low transparency. There are plenty of others, though these seem to be the most significant. |
| the Swiss Confederation | 1971 | 2017 | 16 | 12 | 11 | |
| Togo | 1998 | 2010 | 5 | 5 | 5 | Democratic Political Institutions: The elections in Togo follow the same process as its colonisers, the French. An initial round is held where many candidates attempt to receive a majority. If no individual does, a second round is held between the two best candidates. This process was hindered significantly during the 1990 s and early 2000 s with rules around candidacy being changed by Gnassingbe Eyadema. The legislative elections use a closed list which also hinders the democratic process as the people do not know who they are voting for, only the party that they are voting for. Before the 1990s, Togo was a state with a single party regime. The introduction of multiple parties in the 1990s created a threat to the power of Gnassingbe. The introduction of new candidates for both presidency and legislature created and increase in restrictive laws, such as those discussed under the civil liberties heading. Civil Liberties: As is similar in many African countries, groups find themselves targeted and disadvantaged in Togolese society. An example would be that women can be forbade from working by their husbands, or, if they are allowed to work, then their husband can choose to be the one who accepts their salaries. Women do have many rights in Togo, but a significant barrier to a proper implementation of equality is the distinction between the rural and urban areas. Girls are often not in secondary schooling, even in the cities; the attendance is around 14% throughout the country. The lack of education leads to a lack of knowledge about what their civil liberties are. Gender discrimination is therefore akin to mistreatment by keeping them ignorant. Homosexuality remains illegal in Togo under article 88 of the criminal code. Offending leads to imprisonment, occasionally to the discretion of the judge, or to one-three years and a hefty fine. Freedom of press in Togo was restricted immensely around the 1998 and 2003 elections. These elections were the last for the long-term leader Gnassingbe Eyadema. Due to fear of losing power with the introduction of a multi-party system, the ruling party introduced laws to make it a criminal to offend or slander the president. Lastly, the judiciary is the most efficient and reliable of the institutions in Togo. Offenders go through proper procedure that would still seem strange to common law citizens. They are offered a legal advocate if they cannot afford it. The main issue with the court system is that there is very little separation of power between itself and the executive. The leaders can influence judicial decisions, and the judiciary must follow. Institutionalised Rule: The timeframe for assessing Togo, between 1998-2010 gives two stark representations of Togolese society. It helps represent the change that has happened between Gnassingbe Eyadema and Faure Gnassingbe. During the reign of Eyadema, many laws were put into place that specifically averted liability from himself and the ruling party. These laws made it difficult for opposition parties to gain a foothold in the country as merely being critical of the Eyadema s policies could equate to a criminal offence. For a brief period after the death of his father, Faure achieved power in Togo through a military coup. Significant international pressure lead Faure to set a date for an election which he won. There were allegations of electoral fraud, but nothing came from them. The state itself has a written constitution that has and can be enforced, but is difficult to do so. When the leaders flout it completely, as Faure and Eyadema did, it brings up the question as to whether it is there merely as a representation. SOURCES https://www.britannica.com/place/Togo-Year-In-Review-1998 http://www.fiacat.org/press-statement-abolition-of-the-death-penalty-irreversible-in-togo https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2003/togo https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/togo http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Togo-JUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256293.pdf Jones, D. . . Censorship: A world encyclopaedia . Routledge, pp 2433-2436. |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 2002 | 2010 | 15 | 12 | 11 | While researching Trinidad and Tobago, I found that the country scores very highly for almost all categories. Trinidad and Tobago is for all accounts a bona-fide modern democracy, having open and free elections, political institutions are what you would expect from all modern democracies. Civil liberties are mostly intact, and elected officials are the only people in positions of state leadership. People are treated fairly, and human rights are respected. The major issues with Trinidad and Tobago regard crime and corruption. Trinidad and Tobago have some of the highest murder rates in the world, and drug cartels and organised crime are commonplace. Over the last decade, there are a few reports of police brutality and a lack of due process, as the country struggles to deal with the increasingly high crime rates. Also, while elections are fair and the government does not abuse its power, government officials have been found to be corrupt, with several officials having financial ties to organised crime, and committing fraud etc. However, there are several examples of these officials being held accountable for their actions, so while some might have avoided criminal punishment, it appears that no one is above the law. My information came from the following sources: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1209872.stm http://www.electionguide.org/elections/?inst=&cont=Trinidad+and+Tobago&yr= https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/trinidad-and-tobago/government https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html |
| Tunisia | 1956 | 1987 | 12 | 8 | 8 | These questions came with complicated answer because Habib Bourguiba’s rule must be split in two. The first part, up until about 1976, was rather moderate and he was quite popular amoung the public. It is only after the countries resources dry up, they are hit with economic hard times and Bourguiba’s mental health deteriorates that he becomes more of a centralised authoritarian dictator. So most of the answers were a ‘1’ because he would have started good and ended not so good. Question 27&28: In 1956 Tunisia gained independence from France, elected Habib Bourguiba as president and wrote a new constitution. In 1987 Bourguiba was deemed unfit to rule by his Prime minister, Ben Ali, and placed himself as president, ending Bourguiba’s relatively moderate rule. Question 29: Even though Bourguiba was originally elected, he declared himself president for life in 1975, unelected. Question 30: In 1959 Bourguiba’s party, Neo-Destour, won all 90 seats in the countries new National Assembly. They were the only party at the time and although the Nahdah party were allowed to run in 1981, they won no seats. They declared a false election, but this was neither investigated nor proven. Question 31: There were no significant barriers. In fact, Bourguiba removed barriers with the 1956 Code of Personal Status, giving women the vote and practically equal legal status to men. Through this same movement polygamy was banned, women could now initiate divorces, and be properly educated, and a minimum legal age for marriage was introduced. Bourguiba was had very western views because he was educated in France. This was good for women but obviously upset many religious conservatives in the country. Question 32: In the beginning there was not really any opportunity for other political parties to be involved in the election, and although the elections were contested this was never investigated fully until after the regimes end. Question 33: Bourguiba had all the power as an elected president. He once joked with a journalist asking how the new system was going, saying. “The system? What system? I am the system.” Question 34: Bourguiba essentially forced his election as president for life in 1975 by preventing the emergence of a successor. Those in Bourguiba’s regime never openly spoke against him, however it was his own prime minister who deemed him unfit for rule. He did allow for an opposition party to exist, that obviously spoke against him, and they were allowed to publicly criticise. Question 36: There were no formal barriers, however, due to stretching of resources for so many years, unemployment rates very high, which is what lead to the bread riots in 1978. Question 37: Those who were sent through the normal system would be given fair trial. However by the 1980’s Bourguiba’s mental health had decreased so much that he became convinced by bombings in his hometown, Monastir, that the Islamist movement would threaten the country, and order a ferocious assualt on leaders and ranks of the Islamist Tendency Movement . This was without significant evidence or a trial of any kind. Question 38: If they were sent through the normal system, they would recieve normal punishment as criminals. However as seen in ITM’s case, punishment can be arbitrary and without fair evidence. Question 39: Although Bourguiba has banned religion from government business, he still declares Islam as the state religion. Question 40: In the constitution, freedom of speech is protected, and there is only one significant event, after Bourguiba’s mental health starts deteriorating, where critical speech is not protected. The ‘bread riots’ of 1978 became violent after unemployed protested the governments regime, and their exploitation of resources. Bourguiba’s only ambition was to leave behind a legacy of ‘stability and secularism’, so protest on this scale caused a retaliation from him. His army shot into crowds killing 40 protestors. This is the only major event where he has strong-armed the public. Question 41: There is no specific ideology, other than secularism, that needs to be followed. Question 42: It is protected by the constitution Bourguiba created in 1959. Question 43: Normally yes, but the bread riots and the ITM assaults are examples where it has happened. These are two major events across a 31 year presidency. Question 44: After the ITM assualts a trial ensued which exposed abuses by the states security forces and resulted in the ‘bloodless coup’, that threw Bourguiba out. Question 45: This is one which was complicated to answer from a western point of view. Obviously I consider the laws Bourguiba was passing were good ones, based on equality and secularism. But the law was created because it was Bourguiba’s wishes and generally did not go through the National Assembly, or at least had an opposition to oppose it. I gave this a ‘1’ because although the laws were created completely arbitrarily, The laws were still better for the people. This is most likely a biased, western conclusion, coming from a place which considers these ‘good law’. Question 46: Although Bourguiba’s security forces were put on trial after the ITM assaults, there is also the fact that the accusation of election fixing was never investigated on behalf of the opposition. Overall, I do not think Bourguiba was a fundamentally bad person. He was just a man, who in the midst of losing his mental health and his legacy, tried to westernise a country which did want to be western. It is unfortunate that someone who is so mentally ill that they need to be put under house arrest, could stay in a presidency for as long as he did. If he had stepped down in 1975, his legacy would be of stability and secularism. The reason it was a bloodless coup was because Bourguiba was concerned with Tunisia staying stable, and knew that a violent coup would sent the already fragile country into even deeper political turrmiol. I simply feel sorry for Bourguiba, because I do not he can be held responsible for his actions when he was in such a high stress situation with such a low tolerance for it. Sources: -www.nytimes.com/2000/04/07/world/habib-bourguiba-independance-champion-and-president-of-tunisia-dies-at-96.html -https://www.britannica.com/biography/Habib-Bourguiba -https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nahdah-Party -gulfnews.com/news/mena/tunisia/timeline-tunisia-since-independance-1.746757 -www.correspondents.org/node.2343 -https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/01/27/tunisia-declares-state-of-emergency-as-workers-riot/884f30cd-8499-4462-a86a-2d87d6467127/ -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_Tunisia#Pre-Bourguiba -www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7201 |
| Turkmenistan | 1991 | 2007 | 4 | 1 | 1 | Turkmenistan, between the years of 1991 and 2007 was not a democratic country. This began with Turkmenistan’s independence in 1991, and consequently becoming known as Turkmenistan. This proved beneficial to the rise of Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, the leader of the former Communist Party. Unsurprisingly, Niyazov’s rise to power was uncontested among the Turkmen people. Niyazov’s reign featured a great many acts of personal glorification, even to the point of changing days of the week and the school curriculum to meet his own standards. Through this it can be inferred that there was no real separation of powers, and if there were a form of judiciary, legislature and such-forth, they would be superimposed by Niyazov’s power and influence. There appears that there is no real say from the outside. Citizens’ rights, and definitely their quality of life, severely descended throughout Niyazov’s rule. Not only did Niyazov’s reforms of the education sector damage the overall education levels in Turkmenistan, but the economic sector suffered greatly. It was found that in the early 2000s, Niyazov moved a large portion of state income, equal to half of Turkmenistan’s GDP, into a private presidential fund. The monetary diversion further worsened the quality of education and also reduced the quality of health care services to the Turkmen people. Relating to religion, many religions were banned and those found practicing were often exiled, persecuted and/or prosecuted. There was no compulsory religion in Turkmenistan. To further magnify that Turkmenistan was under a non-democratic rule, Niyazov formally changed the constitution in 1999 to make it so that he could be president until he died. His presidential term would never end . Through this, Niyazov also banned all opposition parties from forming so that he could never be overthrown. Furthermore, Niyazov set to control the media, especially the news, thus blocking free speech and restricting negative talk about his government. This is highlighted by the blocking of the internet, having everything funneled through one main service provider. It has been said that Turkmenistan’s control over the internet at this time rivaled even the Great Firewall of China. Following Niyazov’s death in 2006, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow came to power and set to reversing much of the negative things Niyazov had done to the country. Much of this involved improvements to the education system, removing the “Book of the Soul” as a compulsory text, and attempting to make Turkmenistan a more democratic country. At this current time, Turkmenistan is not yet at the standards of typical first-world democracy. |
| Turkmenistan | 1991 | 2006 | 0 | 4 | 3 | As with Venezuela, Turkmenistan’s relative obscurity and especially its isolation on the international stage has led to a lack of sources detailing sociopolitical norms in the country. Although the time period given was much more recent than Venezuela, the government’s repression of criticism and general inaccessibility has proven just as difficult to inquire into its level of democracy. I used 1991 and 2006 as the time parameters for my study, from Turkmenistan’s independence to the death of autocratic leader Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006, although his successor Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has kept much of Turkmenistan’s political apparatus in place. Elections do exist in the country for executive positions, but only one party is allowed to exist. The legislature is also elected but all members must be personally approved by Niyazov, whom has no checks or balances on his personal power. Voting restrictions extend to cases of insanity or imprisonment according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union but otherwise no other restrictions exist. Niyazov’s absolute power allows him to do whatever he wants, which has included enacting giant statues of himself around Turkmenistan and renaming the days of the week after his own relatives. Russian, Uzbek and Kazakh minorities are often excluded from the political process and organized religion is restricted to only Russian Orthodox and Sunni Muslim sects. Other religious groups are routinely harassed by the government, including allegations of imprisonment and torture. Turkmen law is based on the remains of Soviet law blended with elements of Islamic law, and as such does not respect Western legal conventions. According to the Human Rights Watch, numerous political opponents and activists have been silenced by the Turkmen government using forced disappearances and torture. The same organization also states that “there is no media freedom in Turkmenistan”, with the state controlling all print and electronic media. According to Oleg Stalbovskiy and Maria Stalbovskaya, a pair of Uzbek researchers, the Constitution of Turkmenistan is regularly amended to include whatever addenda Niyazov wishes to include, thus allowing Niyazov to always stay within the bounds of the Constitution. Although Niyazov is an elected leader and holds the position of President of Turkmenistan, his person controls every governmental action in Turkmenistan and he is not personally accountable to anyone else. A pervasive cult of personality developed around Niyazov, who declared himself Turkmenbasy, in 1993. Turkmen society is built around Niyazov, with his face adorning everything from banknotes to clocks, and the logo of the national television station. Niyazov even wrote two books which are required reading in all Turkmen schools and must be learned by rote for all civil servants. His books are often compared to religious texts in their importance to Turkmen society, and Niyazov himself extolled that reading his books would “become more intelligent, will recognise the divine being and will go straight to heaven.” Turkmenistan seems to be a highly unequal country economically, with most political power in the hands of a few, which control all state resources and the vast majority of its wealth. |
| Uganda | 1962 | 1966 | 9 | 5 | 9 | The period of study I ve chosen goes from the 9 th October, 1962, when Uganda officially gained independence from the Britain crown and become a republic under the elected prime minister for the National Assembly, Milton Obote. Obote ruled the country during the next nine years, however, after a period of conflict and challengers, he suspended the Constitution and assumed all powers of the government on February 1966, declaring himself President of the republic and the state of emergency later that year. The major challenge for Obote was to create national unity with a lot of ethnic groups, however the Baganda region never accepted it as they considered themselves specials. The Uganda People s Congress won the parliamentary elections in 1962. By then, there was a really important political rivalry between the Democratic Party and the UPC, which had been persisting since before independence. Obote s sense of nationalism and agenda lead to independence in October 1962, but there never was a sense of nationhood. According to some scholars, this ethnic conflict has defined the country for a long time and has driven Uganda into more violent rivalry even after independence. The period of study happened within the 1962 Constitution, which contemplated elections for both executive and legislative, however those elections never happened. Basically because Obote suspended the Constitution and assumed all powers a few months before the election was supposed to happen. So the answers for 29-31 and 31 were true in theory but not practice. Buganda people never saw in Obote a legitimate leader, he came from a small ethnic group, Lango, and had brief experience in politics, nor was charismatic enough to lead the country. Scholars have defined this period as a kleptocracy , where politics was a zero-sum game between both parties. The Constitution of 1962, clearly influenced by British democratic values, distributed powers between the four kingdoms, and Buganda was given more than the other three, declaring it hegemonic. The leader of Buganda was a monarch, who held most of the kingdom s power, however the leader of the nation was President Kabaka Mutesa, who never got along well with Obote . Obote assembled a multi-ethnic cabinet and he gained cooperation for the nation. However, some of them were political challengers, and they undermined Obote s reputation gradually. Little by little, every ethnic official started demanding for his people, so Obote had to mediate between everyone of them as expectations were high. Such expectations differed hugely with what the regime actually did, so the people begun to withdraw support and commitment to Obote. Soon a big division within the party appeared and Obote started to lose authority at home, his associates were crucial to maintain some support. Obote was usually challenged ), for example in 1965 he was accused of corruption and plotting to overthrow Mutesa, but he surprisingly managed to overcome, or at least postpone, every one of them for a few years. As the years went by and threats accumulated, Obote started to plan to overthrow the Constitution to avoid any intention of military coup or political move that could get him out of the government. In February 1966, the coup was imminent and chaos was reigning in Kampala. Five ministers planned a coup against Obote and he arrested and deported them before they could do anything, however they were released by a surprisingly independent judicial power, under the fact that they had been arrested without warrants, but they were arrested again once the Emergency State was set, silencing any apposition. Then, he took all powers of the Government of Uganda under the pretext of national stability and security. Although the Constitution did not contemplate it, there was also a strong religious influence to both sides during this period, the UPC represented neocolonial Catholicism, while DP represented everything else. Scholars have found examples of privileges related with the distribution of goods and surpluses, given by official positions to one side or the other during this period. There was no official state religion, but it clearly affected political decisions and religious crimes were found often . It depended on where you were, you could face discrimination of any kind. In Uganda, political alliances at the center of the country sometimes followed an ethnic line, sometime politico-religious allegiances, sometimes a racial difference. More frequently, they cluster along some combination of these alignments . Despite the fact of a legitimate judicial power, torture and political violence was found often in Uganda. For example in October 1963, a western region demanded separated district and this request was denied by the government, that imposed a state of emergency in the area, who faced torture, rape, detention and massacre . Other non-regime political views were accepted, however, often criticism turned into intentions of coup, which Obote took advantage of to eliminate political threats once and again. I believe there was a strong lack of legitimacy of decision making from Obote, so people used to not accept most of his policies, leading to political disturbance and violence, so no clear answers for questions 40-41. People did not have the chance to account the leader directly, but pressure was enforced and Obote was watched. When Obote came to power, there were 41 newspapers registered. They were separated in three categories: the government-owned propaganda; commercial newspapers to make profit; and those very specific socio-economic policy promoters. There was a pseudo-independent press, but highly polarized, so it was almost impossible to find accurate information on any side. Although censorship was applied sometimes and selectively, according to scholars, Uganda enjoyed almost unrivaled freedom of the press in Africa . Before 1966, the relationship between Obote and the press was really harmed and the newspapers were extremely polarized, so for example in 1966, the government shut down a paper for defending and encouraging anti-regime violence during a confrontation between the Buganda government and the Central government. Bibliography : Lamphear, J., & Karugire, S. R. . A Political History of Uganda. The International Journal of African Historical Studies,15, 785. doi:10.2307/217903 Otunnu, O. . Crisis of legitimacy and political violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979 . Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. US Department of State. Uganda . Retrieved May 28, 2017, from https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm#history THE CONSTITUTION OF UGANDA, 1962. . Retrieved May 29, 2017, from http://www.buganda.com/const62m.htm#chap1 Constitutional history of Uganda. . Retrieved May 29, 2017, from http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-uganda Glentworth, G., & Hancock, I. . Obote And Amin: Change And Continuity In Modern Uganda Politics. African Affairs,72, 237-255. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a096383 Saul, J. S. . The unsteady state: Uganda, Obote and General Amin . Gasiorowski, M. J. . An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset. Comparative Political Studies,29, 469-483. doi:10.1177/0010414096029004004 |
| Uganda | 1986 | 2005 | 4 | 6 | 6 | For the ‘democratic institutions’ section I looked at the following sources: africanelections.tripod.com/ug.html http://www.ec.or.ug/?q=content/history-ec These sources show that during the time period specified Uganda had a one party political system.During this time period other political parties did exist but were not allowed to partake in elections for the executive. The President had decided that people would be elected on a principle of merit not party affiliation. After 2005 multiple parties were allowed to run for election but President Museveni has continued to be elected President until this day. For the ‘civil liberties’ section I looked at the following sources: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2005/04/27/china10549.htm https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/6.htm http :// www . asf .be/ blog /2011/06/17/long-detention-before-trial-in- uganda -violates-rights/ http://freethoughtreport.com/countries/africa-eastern-africa/uganda/ http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050701452408 In Uganda people identifying as a part of the LGBTQA community are routinely discriminated against. During this period it was a criminal offense to be homosexual or partake in homosexual activities. Question 14 asks about the separation of Church and State, I gave Uganda one point for this because even though they do not have an established religion, Ugandan politicians use their religion as reason for just about everything they do in the creation and changing of laws. Also civilians who show anti-religious or secular thoughts are often discriminated against by both the state and other civilians. Therefore whilst the church and state might be formally separated it is not as clear cut as the question makes it out to be. In the Ugandan constitution freedom of the press is enshrined as a right, however, the press in Uganda is routinely threatened by the state if they publish dissenting comments or articles. From 1986, when president Museveni took power, to 2004 more than 24 journalists have been arraigned before the courts on criminal publication offenses. So whilst the government does not control or own the majority of the press, the press has to be very careful about what they publish to avoid persecution. For the ‘Institutionalized Rule’ section I looked at the following sources: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050701452408 https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/6.htm http://www.ulii.org/node/23824 While the constitution is routinely violated it seems the violations are more to do with human rights abuses by the entire executive ministers than the president having consolidated all the power to himself. It is unclear whether or not the president is accountable to his people, he has committed many unpopular acts as president, for exapmle, all of his many human rights abuses. The evidence of a cult of ‘personality’ around Museveni is somewhat lacking, although I would assume there would be at least some as he has been president since 1986, this assumption may be wrong though. |
| United Kingdom | 1968 | 1974 | 9 | 7 | 6 | My answers base on the informations I looked at The annual register: A record of world event, especially in “History of the United Kingdom” and “Chapter 2: Law in the United Kingdom”. These sources show that the United Kingdom had democratic system in 19th century. And the UK is dominated by the multi-party system, although there are now three political parties controlling the political system. The United Kingdom uses the system of a first-past-the-post system to select members of Congress, elections and political parties in England are governed by the Duverger. As a result, the election system in tend to limit the rights of other small parties. On the other hand, in UK society still have discrimination among social class including royal family, aristocratic, bourgeois and the poor. In addition, The elite certainly have priorities from the government even to the law. For example, in many case if the elite in UK are unlawful, they will also be protected even protected by society and even by the judge. It can be said that the rule of law in UK since 1968 is taken by The Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor is the head of justice in England and Wales, appointing judges for criminal courts on behalf of the royal court. Gujarati is responsible for the functions of all three branches of government - executive, legislative and judiciary. However, the Constitutional Reform in 2005 removed many of the powers of the title to other titles in the British government by establishing the position of Minister of Constitutional Affairs. Moreover, people in UK in this period have a rights to vote and participated in election system. People in UK also have rights to exercise and adore their religion but mostly religious activities still under government managment. Besides, the press in UK have also grown since the 19th century and more and more developed in 20th century. There are many independent newspaper in the UK in the research period, espcially “The Daily Express” and “London Evening Standard”. However, many newspaper and press in the UK have to through government censorship. |
| United States of America | 1981 | 1988 | 12 | 11 | 10 | With the focal year of 1988, I have chosen to research the time period of Ronald Reagan s administration which ran from 1981-1988. Reagan has been a famous and infamous president for a number of reasons and the shift from democrat to republican reign makes it an interesting time period. In general, the United States of America during the period of Reagan’s administration would certainly be labeled as democratic. However, this was of course an imperfect democracy due to some significant restrictions of civil liberties, economic inequality and corrupt practices by Reagan’s administrative team. Addressing questions 4, 5 and 6, the USA clearly holds free and fair elections. The elections are held every four years and are effective in changing the government administration, whether it be Democratic or Republican. However, for question 7 I scored the USA under Reagan 1 point due to America effectively having no monetary cap on campaign spending. The basic argument is that needing so much money to start a competitive campaign limits candidates to those with upper-class privileges. In the 1980 election Reagan’s campaign amounted to $57.7 million dollars, and his competitor Jimmy Carter’s campaign spent $49 million . Needless to say, it takes a huge amount of money to create a competitive campaign and I believe this limits the democratic capabilities of American citizens. For questions 8 and 9, it is clear that the elected officials have the most executive power. Moreover, elected officials are more than capable of holding each other, and unelected institutions to account. Reagan’s administration was not without its scandals, however these were brought out and critiqued by the opposition, putting democratic pressure on the elected officials to be held accountable. Of course, one must omit that it is far more difficult to identify if it is possible for politicians to critique unelected officials and institutions as this is usually done behind closed doors. Addressing a democratic issue that may fall somewhere around question 15/16, is the essential democratic right to organize unions. I believe a question within this classification system addressing unions and the right to protest inequality and corruption of the state is desperately needed as it would assert whether citizens of a certain country have the democratic capability to protest their governments actions in a peaceful egalitarian way. Moreover, restrictions on unions is one democratic downfall of the Reagan administration. In 1981, soon after he was inaugurated, Reagan fired approximately 12,000 federal air traffic controllers who were on strike for better working hours and rights. The union Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization known as PACTO had supported Reagan s presidential campaign, and the blatant disregard for the unions requests came as an unpleasant surprise. While Reagan did not oppose unions quantitatively, it was the symbolic message he sent to other large corporations that did the most damage to democratic union rights. Reagan s move set the trend for American businesses to take a harder line against unions, such as replacement hiring, which greatly undermined the power unions had to represent workers . In combination with Reagan administration s supply-side economics, better known as Reaganomics the 1980 s initiated a downward slope for American inequality levels and workers rights . The consequences of this are still being felt in the present day. This led me to give the United States a 1 point rating on question 24 concerning equality. Reagan s administration also involved a large amount of corruption, leading to over 130 investigations, convictions and indictments of administration officials. One of the most significant of these was referred to as Irangate when it was revealed in 1986 that funds gathered from selling arms to Iran had been secretly siphoned toward Nicaraguan Contra rebels despite a clear ban on rebel aid by Congress . This led me to give question 19, regarding whether anybody is above the law, a 1 point rating. One issue I was faced with while researching the United States level of democracy in the 1980 s was due to America being in many ways the self-proclaimed heart and center of democracy, there is comparatively much less critique of its democratic downfalls, particularly inequality. References: The Awl https://theawl.com/how-much-more-money-do-presidential-candidates-raise-today-8bfcbcdd8960 Open Democracy https://www.opendemocracy.net/people-ronald_reagan/article_1951.jsp Democracy Now https://www.democracynow.org/2004/6/11/reagan_class_and_organized_labor_one Baltimore Sun http://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-bz.unions08jun08-story.html Wall Street Journal http://search.proquest.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/docview/397994423/fulltext/DE384D2616904FC2PQ/1?accountid=14782 Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/events/lingering-questions-on-president-reagans-role-in-the-iran-contra-scandal/ |
| Venezuela | 1958 | 1998 | 14 | 10 | 8 | The biggest problem with categorizing Venezuela’s level of democracy in 1973 was a comparative dearth of sources, with most foreign attention on Venezuela focused on the more recent presidencies of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, and the aftermath of the Bolivarian Revolution. Internal sources during this time period are often in Spanish, and many of these sources have not been computerized, meaning I only have a few sources to work with. I chose a rather wide margin for the start and end date of the period that I’m studying, as 1958 signals the beginning of continuous democracy in Venezuela that lasts until at least 1998, with the election of Hugo Chavez and institution of the Bolivarian Revolution. 1973 seems fairly similar to 1958 and 1998 in terms of the political actors and low levels of repression, although economic crises and increasing corruption ensure Venezuela’s democracy looked quite different in 1998 compared to 1973. Democratic political institutions in Venezuela during this time period appear fairly intact, with at least two parties vying for executive and legislative control and few barriers for political representation, as shown by Howard Handelman’s “Venezuela’s Political Party System on the Eve of National Elections.” The 1947 Venezuelan Constitution guaranteed universal suffrage with subsequent governments attempting to ensure political participation by enacting laws regarding voter registration. The role of the opposition seems minimal outside of political campaigning, but that could be due to the lack of sources and not a lack of participation in government. While no groups are stated to be excluded from the political process, Gregory Wilpert writing in 2004 argued that racism was still present in Venezuelan society despite being largely homogeneous, and that many other social ills existed, although it was minimal when compared to most other countries. The Codigo de Enjuiciamiento Criminal of 1926 dictated Venezuelan law during this period, and gave judges more power than modern legal conventions suggest, although Venezuela was the first country in the world to abolish the death penalty, doing so in 1863. While there is no official state church in Venezuela and religious tolerance is practiced through all the governments of this time period, the Catholic Church still held a civic role in Venezuela with the early democratic regimes often compromising with the churches and large landowners to ensure political stability, according to Handelman. Free speech seems relatively well protected within Venezuela during this time period, with students generally allowed to protest at the universities and the vast majority of the media completely independent of the government.Institutionally Venezuela used the d’Hondt system which was criticized by some including political historian Allan Brewer-Carias as making the ruling government more responsible towards their party than the people they governed, leading to a marked increase in corruption. This period of relative democracy ends with the election of Chavez in 1998 on the back of economic hardship for the majority of the country, as an economy heavily dependent on oil prices borrowed heavily from foreign actors and became crushed by debt and embroiled in corruption scandals, with most of the brunt of this economic hardship bore by the poor. |
| Venezuela | 1983 | 1999 | 7 | 11 | 5 | The starting date for the purpose of this assignment is around 1983-84, when Venezuela s economy drastically fell due to the drop in world oil prices - petroleum exportation made up around 95% of Venezuela s total exports. In addition, Venezuela at the time had accumulated a level of public debt that it could not afford to pay back, and thus was unable to keep borrowing more. This resulted in an economic crisis. The end date for the purpose of this assignment is in 1998, when Chávez was firstly voted in as President. This gave rise a constitution change within Venezuela. Democratic Political Institutions During this period, general and Presidential elections were held in Venezuela. Congressional elections were largely based on Germany s MMP system. Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume II) There have been many political groups within Venezuela s politics that have competed against each other during election time. Until 1993, the Social Christian Party and the Social Democratic Action Party dominated politics. It has been quite difficult to find reliable information about whether elections during this period had been free and fair. However, due to the amount of political parties that competed with each other, and the fact that generally President s only served for one term, suggests the elections were more free and fair than not. Additionally, a Freedom house report states that the regional and presidential elections conducted in 1998 were free and fair. Another source described the elections prior to 2001 to have been peaceful, competitive and fair& with the opposition actually replacing the party in government, however, I haven t been able to find any other specific information. Women gained the right to vote in early 20 th century, and by the end of the 20 th century many women were exercising this right during the 1999 election. Majority of the population in Venezuela were Roman Catholic. In terms of military and religious influence, Venezuela has been a secular country and I was unable to find many examples of unelected religious leaders exerting more influence than elected officials. However, as will be noted below, the Roman Catholic Church was successful in opposing proposed anti-discriminatory provisions in 1999, when Chávez came into power. While military officials held some power, a coup that was attempted in 1992 that included military officials was ultimately unsuccessful, which suggests their influence was not greater than that of elected officials. A source that discussed the time period after Chávez came into power stated that the military had gained unprecedented influence, with officers occupying the most critical positions in government . This suggests that prior to Chávez s rule, military officials held much less influence. Civil Liberties The period between 1983-1999 was filled with & social problems greater than any seen since… early 1960 s . LGBT individuals face legal challenges that were not experienced by other members of society. Same-sex marriage was not recognized, nor was adoption by a same-sex couple. However, since 1996, sexual orientation had been protected from discrimination in some form or other, particularly from discrimination in the workplace. . It was illegal for a homosexual individual to join the military. Nearing 1999, anti-discrimination provisions were to be included in the new constitution proposed by Chávez, however due to strong opposition from the Catholic Church, these provisions were taken out. While most individuals were Roman Catholic, I was unable to find instances of punishment or penalties that were dashed out to individual who did not conform with this religion. However, women s participation in Venezuelan society had significantly increased in the latter part of the 20 th century. Throughout most of the 20 th century, women primarily took on the role of a mother and wife. By the end of the century however, more and more women were rebelling against male dominance within the political system, serving as ministers, senators and deputies. However, a relatively small number of women obtained executive and managerial posts, demonstrating that discrimination was still present in the professional sphere. A freedom house report stated that widespread arbitrary detention and torture of suspects was common throughout this period. Additionally, a number of extrajudicial killings by military forces and police took place. Also, it has been estimated that around 66% of imprisoned individuals had never been formally convicted of a crime. A freedom house report also noted that only a few indigenous people held title to their land, and indigenous communities that tried to defend their legal land rights were often subject to abuse or murder by corrupt rural police and gold miners. Generally, ethnicity or race did not give rise to issues of discrimination. Although press/government relations worsened when Chávez came into power, tensions had begun to mount since the 1990 s. The press was mostly privately owned, and following 1994 the media had generally faced intimidation. According to World Bank s 1994 data, Venezuela ranked 29 th in the world in terms of the percentage of people who had access to newspapers. Conversely, the journalism law of December 1994 made it more difficult for journalists to obtain licenses. If an individual practiced journalism without a license, a possible penalty included imprisonment. This law was a result of the criticism that President Rafael Caldera s government received on both a domestic and international level. Extreme censorship however has been relatively rare throughout Venezuela s history. I wasn t able to find much information about the protection of individuals who spoke critically about the government. However, since journalists who openly criticized the government or spoke contrarily to prevailing ideology were prone to intimidation, I put the score somewhere in the middle . Institutionalised Rule: A freedom house report stated that since the 1992 coup attempts, weakened civilian governments have had less authority over the military and the police, and rights abuses overall were committed with impunity. Police brutality and murder were rampant as crime increased. However, in 1993, Perez was impeached for corruption and removed from office. This shows that there was a level of accountability present. However, in 1995 allegations were made that President Caldera was guilty of corruption among his inner circle. These allegations were ultimately ignored, however public disillusionment with the government and politics deepened. Additionally, prior to 1999, the judicial system was highly politicized, and was generally undermined by chronic corruption this included the growing influence of narcotic trafficking that permeated throughout the entire political system. The judiciary was also unresponsive to rights abuses. Decisions made regarding the violation of rights by members of the military were not able to be appealed in a civilan court, which resulted in many military individuals going unpunished. |
| Venezuela 2007 | 1999 | 2013 | 9 | 7 | 2 | Chavez came into power through a coup in 1999 and it lasted until 2013 when Chavez died. Around the 1999 period there were elections and Chavaz was winning them, however the opposition had denounced the elections as fraud and corrupt but they have never proved it. ;background: white;> Gunson, Phil. “Chávez’s Venezuela.” Current History 105, no. 688 : 58-63. https://search.proquest.com/docview/200735447?accountid=14782 . They have found it difficult to oppose the governing party as they have control of the stations, hamper the oppositions ability to campaign, a popular opposition leader was jailed for 13 years, supposedly fake charges. Everyone over the age of 18 can vote Article 64 http://www.venezuelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf Non-elected institutions don t seem to play a part in the regime but it was hard to tell, Chavez came from the military but it didn t seem to play a role in his government. Chavez s party could not unless they wanted to be removed by Chavez which he did at one stage, towards the end of his regime. It was not a main aspect of his regime, Chavez was more about persuing own political agenda. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/18/venezuela-rights-suffer-under-chavez Today that system is firmly entrenched, and the risks for judges, journalists, and rights defenders are greater than they ve ever been under Chávez. A government critic spent 3 years in jail awaiting a trial. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/17/venezuela-concentration-and-abuse-power-under-chavez there were trials and other legal aspects but they weren t fair to the individuals. Amnesty international in 1999 reported that 9 people were detained and reported being tortured and beaten by police after police detention. In 2007, a human rights defender was shot for protecting the right to education. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/002/1999/en/ There is no a higher church that overlooks the Venezuelan government, Chavez continually disagreed with the church http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/hugo-chavez-died-in-the-bosom-of-the-church/ Students had protest in 2009 but were sometimes forcibly repressed, it s an example that there was some freedom but not complete, there were lines to not be crossed. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/venezuela Chavez s government was about socialism and the Bolivarian Revolution, his main priority was to rule and suppress his opposition who opposed him and his revolution, many finding that they could not run in the following elections. Although Chavez was more sensitive of criticism towards him not the ideology. http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Reports/Chavez/Chavez.html When Chavez found the news to be discredited he exerted more control over the private media and created their own media. Threatened private stations that were too antigovernment. Further along he reduced genuine opposition media to insignificance and defused the private media altogether. In 2007 Freedom House placed the press freedom in Venezuela at 74 this is a law score and resulted in Freedom House saying the media was no free. Reasons why included, the president has a weekly television show and exercises his power to pre-empt programming to ensure extensive coverage of government announcements in private media. It was unclear from readings, but I responded that it is routinely violated because Chavez had control over all parts of the government. Chavez was clearly above the law, he could do whatever and justify it however he wanted he didn t have to report to anyone for his laws and could make them on a whim. In 2010 he was given one man rule by congress https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/venezuela + http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/AR2010121802933.html It is hard to tell if Chavez was accountable to the people. He always had a loyal following of people, helping him to believe in his plan however, if that was to go away, I am unsure how Chavez would have responded, I m assuming that he would have continued on and silenced the opposition as he had been doing. Yes there are elections for them https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-Chavez It is a low inequality country http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/06/business/venezuela-chavez-oil-economy/ |
| Zambia Time period: 1996 | 1996 | 2001 | 7 | 9 | 6 | Time Period: While my year was 1996, I chose the period between 1996 and 2001 because it is the end of President Kaunda’s time in office, changing to President Chiluba’s. This period saw both both his rise and fall from grace. In 1996, the constitution was amended so that the parents of the President had to be Zambian by birth or descent, and the President could only serve two terms. Both of these factors prevented the previous President Kaunda from running, and the UNIP boycotted the elections. This marked the end of UNIP’s influence, and the beginning of President Chiluba’s time in power. This period ended in 2001 when Chiluba attempted to alter the constitution to spend a third term in power. Pressured by many interest groups, including members of his own cabinet, he did not succeed. Chiluba became infamous for his corrupt government, and a petition of an impeachment was presented at the general assembly. This time period reflects a hope for the future, met with corruption and hatred by the end. It also involves a change towards a more liberal approach to international economics . This helped push me towards putting the period as 96-01 rather than 91-01. I also felt that a decade was slightly too broad. The following sources helped me come to this conclusion: https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/zambia1996.html https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp037_e.htm Democratic Political Institutions While elections were held for executive and legislative roles, the presidential election seemed extremely biased as the constitution was changed to prevent the previous president from being able to run again. This also influenced my answer for question seven, as it is clear from this that there must have been a serious lack of balance on the playing field to have necessitated the constitution amendments. Voting seemed quite equal overall. Elected officials seemed to have had more power than non-elected individuals. The government is what I would guess to be a competitive authoritarian state. The executive needs to sign off legislation passed by Parliament however, which to me seems a violation of Seperation of Powers. I used GlobaLex and their research on Zambia’s legal system to answer this area: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Zambia.html Civil Liberties: Women are not formally discriminated against in legislation, however there is another form of law known as customary law. This enforces strong expectations of how women are supposed to act and in the customary courts women are heavily discriminated against. I gave a 1 because I’m not sure if such issues are broadly across all legal outlets, but it is very much on the 0 side of 1. The following question is definitely 0 because of this, there is clearly some serious gender inequality. Such gender issues are highlighted in a 2002 Human Rights Watch Report, which I have used as my source of information for this section.The 1996 constitution labels Zambia as a Christian state, which suggests at least some connection to the church. However, I did not see any significant control which churches or custom control the populace apart from customary law. The 2000 annual report on religious freedom found Zambia to be all-round quite amicable when it came to different religions. Freedom of speech and the press appears to be reduced, while I did not find many examples of media control in this period there have been recent concerns with the government’s control over these areas today. I assumed that this has been an ongoing issue with the context provided. New sources used are as follows: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/zambia/index.htm#TopOfPage https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/zambia1996.html US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000. Can be found here: https ://books. google .co. nz /books?id= OTx 1 qbA 8OW8C&pg=PR3& lpg =PR3& dq =freedom+index+ burkina + faso +2000&source=bl& ots = yTVSRfkHMp & sig = OdTbWiKVWfYX - rdEyl _ uay 3 jrJ 0& hl =en& sa =X& ved =0 ahUKEwjFzsOz 14 nUAhVGG 5 QKHRARCtMQ 6AEIRTAH#v= onepage &q&f=false Institutionalised Rule: Issues with courts discriminating against women suggests that the judiciary can violate human rights. The example provided above by the President attempting to bend the constitution suggests that powerful individuals can warp boundaries, but can also be held accountable for some of their actions. The fact that the President did not carry on attempting to change the constitution without following procedure due to pressure from other members of government earns question 21 a single point. With cult of personality I am less confident with my decision. Did President Chiluba start off very popular for promising a change from the last party or was the previous party just very unpopular? I do not think there is enough to suggest a cult of personality. This is definitely a low inequality country, the disenfranchisement of the public shown in 1996 reflects this push for change and subsequent anger at a lack of promised change. Chiluba was later investigated for corruption as well. The clearest inequality of all however is gender. |